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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
A modem power system is normally reliable and robust to disturbances, even if the 
disturbance is large, i.e. the initiating contingencies are of high-order. This is due to the 
application of planning standards [1], the expansion of synchronized systems and the wide 
implementation of system wide controls such as system protection scheme (SPS) [2]. Power 
systems are expected to operate in a way that will not cause the denial of power supply to a 
large area under occurrence of any credible contingency. It is designed to be robust enough to 
withstand considerable disturbance at the planning stage. Each line, generator or transformer 
is armed with sophisticated and redundant protection schemes and monitoring devices. 
Trained operators continuously monitor their condition. It should be unlikely for a power 
system to have an uncontrolled catastrophic event that blackouts a huge area. However, the 
behaviors of actual power systems around the world tell us a different story. The recent spate 
of large-scale blackouts in Europe and North America shows that what we did is not far from 
enough. Actually, large power system blackouts are not as rare as what the general public 
assumes. Reference [3] gives an exhaustive report on large power system blackouts in history 
worldwide. There are a number of questions power system engineers have to answer for these 
rare events, which are also called large blackouts, cascadings or catastrophic failures in 
different occasions. How 'rare' are such kinds of events? Can we predict them? What should 
we do if an event begins to unfold? 
The objectives of this work are to 
Provide a better understanding of the probabilities of rare events in power 
systems; 
Develop ways to identify initiating high-order events in addition to 
contingencies; 
-4» Provide an operational approach for avoiding or mitigating these types of events. 
The focus of this work is on power system rare events that are not caused by 
uncontrollable natural forces. Large natural disasters like earthquakes, cyclones or 
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geomagnetic storms that cause simultaneous loss of much power equipment are not 
addressed in this work. 
1.1 Review of Recent Catastrophic Events around the World 
We list just a few representative catastrophic or could-be catastrophic events that have 
occurred in the past world wide in Table 1.1 and the paragraphs that follow. A detailed 
description of events can be found in Knight's book [3], NERC and PSERC's websites 
[4][5], and the websites of each country that are responsible for reporting large power 
system disturbances. We describe a few of them in what follows. 
Table 1.1 Summary of some large blackouts around the world 
Location Date Scale in term of MW or Population Collapse time 
US-NE [6] 10-11/9/65 20GW, 30M people 13 mins 
New York [7] 7/13/77 6GW, 9M people 1 hour 
France [8] 1978 29GW 26 mins 
Japan [9] 1987 8.2GW 20mins 
US-West [4] 1/17/94 7.5GW 1 min 
US-West [4] 12/14/94 9.3GW 
US-West [4] 7/2/96 11.7GW 36 seconds 
US-West [4] 7/3/96 1.2GW > 1 min 
US-West [4] 8/10/96 30.5GW > 6 mins 
Brazil [10] 3/11/99 25GW 30 sees 
US [11] 8/14/03 62GW, 50M people > 1 hour 
London [12] 8/28/03 724 MW, 476K people 8 sees 
Denmark & Sweden 
ri3iri4i 9/23/03 4.85M people 7mins 
Italy [15] 9/28/03 27.7GW, 57M people 27mins 
WSCC. December 14.1994 
At 1:25 A.M. on December 14, 1994, electric power flowed much heavier than normal 
from southern California to northern California and from northern California to the 
Northwest. A single phase-to-ground fault on a 345kv line at the three-terminal substation 
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Midpoint-Borah in Idaho caused the inadvertent tripping of an additional 345kv line in the 
same station. Due to the substation configuration, the remaining line became open-ended, 
which is equivalent to being off-line. Overload and under voltage condition for some lines 
developed within the system due to the weakened network. The lines tripped one after 
another in a domino effect style, which led to the formation of four separate islands. 5,020 
MW power was lost and 1,500,000 customers affected in this single phase-to-ground fault 
initiated event [4]. 
WSCC. July 2.1996 
At 1:25 P.M. on July 2, 1996, a huge disturbance occurred in WSCC system. A short 
circuit occurred on a 345 kv line between the Jim Bridger plant near Rock Springs and it was 
tripped successfully. This disturbance caused a parallel line to be tripped also. An SPS 
scheme was initiated after the tripping of the two lines, which shut down two generating units 
at the Jim Bridger plant. The under-voltage and inter-area oscillation problem developed 
quickly throughout the system. At least five islands were formed as a result. 2,500MW power 
was lost and 1,500,000 customers affected [4]. 
WSCC. July 3.1996 
At 2:03 P.M. on July 3, 1996, a chain of initiating events that is very similar to the 
incidence, which occurred about the same time as the previous day in WSCC system began. 
After the shutdown of two generating units at the Jim Bridger plant, similar voltage problem 
began to develop. However, the operators of Idaho Power Company, recognizing the 
potential for an incident similar to that of July 2, manually shed about 1,200 MW of demand 
in the Boise area. As a result of this decisive action, the system was saved and only a small 
number of customers were affected [4]. 
WSCC. Aueust 10.1996 
At 15:48 on August 10, 1996, high temperature throughout the West coast led to high 
electricity demands. A number of transmission line outages in Washington and Oregon over 
a period of about one hour weakened the transmission system, which led to growing voltage 
oscillations in the system. Three 500 kV Pacific AC tie lines and the +/- 500 kV Pacific DC 
tie-line were lost due to the oscillation, which rendered the system to a state of random 
outages without control. The result was that 5,700,000 customers were interrupted [4]. 
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Brazil. March 11.1999 
At 22:16 on March 11, 1999, a phase-to-ground fault struck the Bauru 440 kV bus bar 
that had no bus bar protection and breaker failure protection intalled. It caused the opening of 
all the five 440 kV lines connected to the station. The Brazil power system withstands the 
multiple intiating contingency, but only for 10 seconds. The power system began to collapse 
starting at the disconnection of T.Irmâos-I.Solteira 440 kV. A sequence of trippings of a 
number of power plants in the Sâo Paulo area, the loss of both the HVDC and the 750 kV AC 
links from Itaipu, finally led to the separation of the system. This disturbance caused the loss 
of 24,731 MW load. 75 million people were affected for up to four hours. About 10 islands 
were formed after the separartion [10]. 
US Midwest and Northeast/Canada. August 14.2003 
Before the blackout, a sequence of line trippings in northeast Ohio after 15:05 EDT 
caused heavy loadings on a number transmission lines. The weaken system quickly started a 
cascading blackout at 16:05:57 (East Standard Time) after the Sammis-Star 345-kV relayed. 
In less than ten minutes, more than 508 generating units at 265 power plants were lost. The 
northern part of the whole eastern interconnection was broken apart into five islands. The 
blackout affected about 50 million people and caused the loss of 61,800 megawatts of electric 
load in the states of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Jersey and the Canadian province of Ontario [11]. 
Italy. September 28.2003 
In the night of September 28 at 03:01:42, the 380kv transmission line Lavorgo - Mettlen 
connecting Italy and Switzerland had a flashover over a tree and was tripped by relay. This 
tripping caused some other transmission lines to become overloaded also. About 25 minutes 
later, two transmission lines, the 380kv Sils (Italy) - Soazza (Switzerland) and the 220kv 
Airolo (Italy)-Mettlen (Switzerland), were also tripped due to overload. At 03:25:26, a 
special protection scheme automatically disconnected the 380kv Lienz (Austria) - Soverzene 
(Italy) to protect the Austria system. Immediately after the last contingency, the Italian grid 
lost its synchronism and went separated. A total of 27.7GW load was lost and 57 million 
people were affected. The energy not delivered amounted to 180GWh [15]. 
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It is observed that cascadings can happen no matter the system is heavily overloaded as in 
the case of the WSCC summer events or is lightly loaded as in the WSCC winter events. 
System could collapse immediately after an initial contingency, which leaves little room for 
operator to take any action, as well as take a considerable time (minutes to hours) before final 
system wide collapse. When a system is stressed, a single fault tripping is more likely to 
trigger other events and thus a big blackout, while when a system is only lightly overloaded, 
a more severe triggering event is need to bring a cascading. 
1.1.1 Characteristic of Cascading Failures in Power Systems 
Since large scale power systems are usually interconnected, and each part depends on the 
proper function of other parts, even small disturbances can propagate like a ripple in 
water, bringing troubles to a wide area if the system is operating close to limits. As we may 
see from the events listed in the last section, they have the following common characteristics: 
4- The initiating event may be as well as 
Following the initiating contingency, additional outages occur one by one rather than 
simultaneously; 
While in many cases systems are typically stressed with overloading, which means a 
minor contingency may be contagious and spark a system wide failure as in the 
WSCC 1996 summer case, catastrophic events can also happen when the system load 
is very light in middle of night and in winter as in Italy 2003 and the WSCC 1994; 
4- Initiating and subsequent causes are various. Protection malfunction, insufficient 
reactive power, and inappropriate relay setting can all contribute to a cascading 
blackout. 
1.2 Approaches to Rare Events in General 
There are many approaches to evaluate the reliability of a system. The typical approaches 
include failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA), fault tree analysis (FTA), event tree, and 
state space method [16]-[17]. When the number of components is small or the system can be 
reduced to a small number of components, engineers can study the system reliability 
' In the language of the power system engineer, if there are # functioning components then an event is the 
loss of one of them, and an N-k event is loss of k of them when it is implicit that k> 1. 
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thoroughly by enumerating the system's failure mode. As the scale of the system increases 
and there are strong inter-dependencies among the components of the system (as in a 
network), which makes it difficult to be reduced, engineers must seek other ways to study 
system reliability. Two ways to approach the reliability of a complex network are event tree 
based on rare event approximation and Monte Carlo simulation. The motivating idea of both 
these approaches is that if it is impossible to capture all of the failure modes of a complex 
system, then we should devise a method of identifying and studying important subsets of all 
failure modes. 
The rest of this chapter will give two ideal probability models that model some 
interdependency between events in order to give a more accurate estimation of high-order 
contingencies. 
1.2.1 Rare Event System and Rare Event Approximation 
Usually for a well-maintained system, the probability of component in failure state is 
very small while the probability of component in normal state approaches 1 in a particular 
time interval, provided that the component is currently available. 
If the failure probabilities of each component in an ideal reliability system are 
independent of each other, the probability of any event ,4; (;=7, 2, j...) of the system can 
always be expressed as the summation off}(f;, ..., P„) Each E) can be expressed as 
F, (i.i) 
where P/, _?&... and P* are the failure probabilities of each component in the system. 
We say that the event (z=7, 2, 3,...) is a system of rare events if there exist a such 
that f/, and approaches as p goes to zero, where C is a constant for 
f . .  . a n d  
One important property of a rare event system is that when we calculate the probability of 
its events, we can always omit high order terms with little loss of accuracy. Its application 
includes event tree simplification when the studying the availability of f the complex 
systems. 
Suppose py, are the individual probabilities of a group of independent events E/, 
Ej, Ej. The probability of a compound event, i.e., a combination of events Ey, Ej, . .. E„, 
can always be expressed as a polynomial of jo,, For example, the probability of the 
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event (E;n ^2)^3 is f Further suppose that p,, -, are all of 
approximately the same order of magnitude, then the order of magnitude of each product 
term in the polynomial will depend on how many terms are in the product. We call the 
number of terms in the product the probability order. Thus, the probability of is 
composed of three different terms (probability order 1), pip% (probability order 2), and 
(probability order 3). 
The basic idea of rare event approximation is that, if the individual probabilities of a 
group of independent events are very small, we can always simplify the calculation by 
omitting the higher order terms of the polynomial without much loss of precision [18] . In the 
given example, if we knew that /%, and were very small, then the probability of (#7 m 
E2)v&3 could be approximated as or even as 
Often, the failure probability of an individual component is very small for a well-
managed system such as a power system. The fault probability of a power system component 
is usually at the magnitude of 10"* per hour (or <1% per year) [19]. Suppose the fault 
probability of a line is per hour and the failure probability of a breaker is pz/hour. 
Obviously, they are not exclusive events. The probability of a fault (py), breaker in a failed 
state (f%), or both can be expressed as assuming the two events are independent. 
Considering the small nature of py and p%, if we ignore the probability component of 
simultaneous occurrence of the two events, the error is only about 10 
Based on this idea, the sequence of our research should focus on the high order events 
with higher probability first, then lower probability, since, as the order of contingency 
increases, the probability of its occurrence decreases sharply to infinitesimal. A complete 
discussion of rare event systems can be found in [18]. 
Although not stated clearly, much of the literatures implicitly apply the rule of rare event 
approximation. We summarize the convention as 
1. For contingencies with the same probability order, those that are likely to cause 
greater consequence are analyzed with higher priority. This rule explains the 
rationale for ranking all contingencies by their consequences. 
2. For high order contingencies, their probabilities usually are assumed to be not at 
the same order of magnitude as single contingencies. Unless they are clearly of 
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higher probabilities or will cause a huge loss, they will not be analyzed and 
ranked, and therefore no money is spent in trying to prevent their occurrences or 
mitigating their consequences. 
Although rare event approximation provides a convenient way to estimate probability, 
it has severe disadvantages. It does not consider interdependence between the occurrences of 
events. A line trip is more likely following an initial line trip, that is, the second event is 
dependent on the previous events. In addition, some high order contingencies may occur with 
probability equivalent or even higher than a common contingency because of topological 
weakness. This will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
1.2.2 Event Tree Approach 
For a small system with limited components, it is possible to study all its fault modes and 
study them one by one in detail. However, for a large system, a system wide failure is often 
due to chronological sequence of events, with the occurrence of a next event depending on 
occurrence of previous events. It is useful to model these events with an event tree. There is 
no strict definition for an event tree, but we can understand it by the following characteristics. 
4- Event trees are horizontally built treelike structures that begin on the roots, i.e. the 
initiating events; 
Development of an event tree from the root proceeds chronologically; 
Each path from root to end nodes of an event tree represents a sequence or 
scenario with associated consequence; 
-4- An event tree is most useful if the condition of a system depends on an 
approximately chronological, but discrete, operation of its units or subsystems. 
The correct or incorrect function of one part of protection often depends on the function 
of another part. The action of protection system, whether successful or not, often happens in 
a sequence rather than simultaneously. This characteristic makes the event tree [16] and [18] 
a suitable tool to model the protection failure scenario. Figure 1.1 shows a conceptual event 
tree describing the protection behavior of a power system after an initiating fault event. 
This tree is not expanded to a full scale. It is the useful feature of the event tree that it can 
be pruned according to the structure of the physical system or the probability of events. 
Should the tree be fully expanded, there would be eight branches on the right side of the event 
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tree rather than four. Other possible branches of the tree are cut off. For example, if there is a 
fault but the primary protection system (relay) fails, breaker failure has no influence on the 
outcome. We assume breaker failure, relay failure, and inadvertent tripping are independent 
events with small probability. The right side of the diagram provides the probabilities and 
descriptions of each event sequence. The probabilities of each node are approximated by the 
rare event approximation, i.e., we use 7 to substitute those 7-p, terms. The three types of #-
7/7V-& primary confrnggncies described in section 1.6 are actually three branches of the event 
tree in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 1.1 Event tree expansion following a line fault 
1.3 Current Approaches to Rare Events in Power Systems 
1.3.1 Contingency List Method 
With limit computing resources, it is necessary to limit the number of contingencies to be 
studied. A common practice in power industries is to rank the contingencies according to 
their importance and then select the most import ones to study in detail. To rank the 
contingencies, a performance index is defined, usually in the form of 
= Zw,(x,)|/(%,)|" 
where x, is a post-contingency performance measure, / is a function that gives the 
consequence measure of the contingency, and wy is the weighting function for [20]-[22]. 
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1.3.2 Special Protection Scheme fSPSl 
SPS used to be an acronym for <$Decia/ frofecfion but now it stands for jfysfem 
frofecfion ^cAeme (since all protection system may be considered special in some sense). 
According to [2], &P5" w (désigna/ fo defect a6»ormaZ ay^fem comdifioMf ond fa&e 
pref/eferming^ corrective ocfiow (bfAer fAan fAe iaoWion q/}!zw/fe(/ e/emen^ fo preserve fAe 
mfegrzfy oW provide acc^pfa6/e jy^fem pey/brTMance. 
There are two types of SPS: event-based and response-based. Event based SPS is 
triggered by selected rare contingencies, for which the power system is not designed. 
Response-based SPS take measured electric variables such as frequency or voltage as its 
triggering signal. The corrective actions taken by SPS include remote load shedding, 
automatic shunt switching, braking resister, controlled opening of interconnection, tap 
changer blocking and set-point adjustment. 
1.3.3 Risk-based Security Assessment fRBSA) 
Risk-based security assessment of power systems was first proposed in [23]. Since then a 
number of papers [23]-[36] has been published regarding this topic. The risk index, which is 
defined to be the expected consequence, calculated by RBSA provides a good indication of 
how robust a system is and by sensitivity analysis, it identifies ways to mitigate high risk. A 
review on this issue can be found in [33]. 
13.4 Self-nreanlzed Crltirality 
The concept of Self-Organized Critically (SOC) was first proposed in Dr. Bak's paper 
[41] and his book [46]. The theory provides a new view of nature. The main point of this 
theory is that nature is always unbalanced and organized in a critical state. The statistics of 
state follow a 'Power Law', which means the probability (P) of event (s) is some power of 
the scale (or the rarity) of the event. That means every event, no matter how rare it is and at 
what scale, can happen with a probability higher than people used to assume. The theory tries 
to give us insight that even if the rule that governs a system is simple, the behavior of the 
system may be complex. Dr. Bak claims that SOC has been found in many areas, which 
includes landscape formations, earthquakes, solar flares, and biological evolutions. 
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There is also some papers that discuss the application of SOC in power systems [42] [43] 
by Dobson. These papers claim to find initial evidence based on statistics from the North 
American Reliability Council (NERC) that power systems follows SOC rule. 
As introduced in [5], Self-Organized Criticality provides new ways of thinking about the 
reliability of complex systems. Because of the interdependence of the components of 
complex systems, small disturbances to the system can trigger a domino effect. Power system 
engineers studying major contingencies look for specific reasons behind each event. Each 
contingency is unique and needs to be studied on individual bases. However, if we study 
them from a statistical point of view, we can make some useful high-level observations. The 
surprising part of this theory is that it claims a system with SOC is inherently unreliable and 
catastrophic events are inevitable. 
1.4 Classification of Multiple Outage Contingencies 
Identification of high-risk #-& contingencies involves two basic steps: selection of JV-t 
contingencies and network performance assessment for those contingencies. 
In this section, we provide the basic reasoning used in our approach to the first step. 
Four distinct types of #-& contingencies have been identified that have high probability 
relative to other contingencies. They are classified according to circumstances under 
which they arise. These are: 
Type 1 : protection system inadvertent operation; 
Type 2: protection system failure to operate when needed; 
Type 3: topological vulnerability; 
-4- Type 4: cascading. 
Major blackouts are typically low probability, high consequence events, or rare events. 
Their causes are various. We classify events into one of two classes based on their likelihood. 
#-7 events: These are often called "credible" events, and they form the basis of 
traditional security assessment. They result in loss of a single power system 
component, such as a line, transformer, or generator. Although AW events range in 
probability, this range will typically not be more than one order magnitude. 
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Therefore, we say that all AW events have probability order P. For this category, it 
is the task of the local protection to remove the problematic element. 
JV-t events: Here, it is implicit that *>/, indicating an A^& event may be loss of 2 or 
more power system components. These events, otherwise known as "high-order" 
events, are often of lower probability than AW events. They can in turn be divided 
into two sub-classes: 
- Independent A^& events: These are typically very rare; they will have probability 
order of P*, where P is the probability of a single outage and AT is the number of 
outaged components. However, when there is a common cause that could lead to 
events, their probability can be higher. 
- Dependent A^t events: These are typically not rare; they will have probability 
order p ranging from P*<p<P. 
We put our effort mainly on type 2 and type 3 in this dissertation. 
1.5 Types and Number of Initiating Contingencies 
The causes of cascading events in power systems are various. One major contribution to 
cascading is higher order initiating contingencies—simultaneous removal of several power 
system components in a very short (typically in seconds) time. Contingency set identification 
is an essential step in monitoring the power system security level. Currently, most literature 
[20] on contingency selection emphasizes the screening method to select contingencies from 
a presumed AT-7 contingency set plus a limited number of high order contingencies, ranking 
them using an appropriate severity index. References [37]-[39] studied the effect of the 
multiple outage caused by substation and protection failure for individual substations. 
However, the literature on systematic selection of high order contingencies, called Af—t 
contingencies with is limited. The difficulty of Af-& contingency selection lies in the 
combinatorial nature of their number: the total number of distinct non-ordered (simultaneous) 
AT-& contingencies is AW[&7(3V-%)]. For a very modest size power system model with 
N-1000, there are 499,500 Af-2 contingencies, 166,167,000 N-3 contingencies, over 41 
billion AT-V contingencies, and so on. One might argue that most of these contingencies are 
so low in probability that they do not warrant attention. However, A/-&, contingencies 
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do occur, and when they do, consequences can be very severe, and these very practical facts 
motivate the identiGcation of high-order contingencies that cause high risk. 
As the multiple primary contingencies analysis problem is formidable because of its 
combinatorial nature, we are interested in whether the rare event approximation has a 
significant effect on decreasing the number of events worth investigating. We use the 
probability order two ( ) as a criteria for our cutoff. By this criterion, given a fault, we 
assume only one breaker could suffer a stuck failure, and only one neighboring component 
could suffer inadvertent tripping. This assumption is consistent with the rare event 
approximation. We are not going to do anything to list the primary contingencies with 
probability order greater than 2; further more, we will not study all the contingencies within 
the cutoff, rather we will select a subset of them based on observation of published 
contingencies statistics [40][4]. 
For modem large-scale power systems, the initial loss of one or more components 
(typically transmission lines) usually does not cause an immediate collapse. It is the slow 
dynamics following the tripping that eventually causes the widespread outage. We do the 
dynamic system simulation assuming the failed component is removed immediately. We 
capture the main problem this way without jeopardizing too much accuracy of our analysis. 
Three types of contingencies addressed in this dissertation are: 
1) FGC: Functional group tripping contingencies 
This category of contingencies includes all the forced outages due to primary 
protection tripping caused by whatever reason. The tripping action may be 
proper or inadvertent. We distinguish FGC by the components it removes 
rather than the cause of the contingencies. An FGC is usually an AW event. It 
also could be an 7V-&, k>l contingency, depending on the amount of 
components within the functional group. The contingency in this category 
happens with a probability order greater than one. 
2) SBC Stuck breaker tripping contingencies following FGC contingencies 
This category of contingencies includes all the forced outages due to primary 
protection tripping caused by fault plus failure of one breaker to open. It is 
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usually a multiple contingency outage. The contingency in this category 
happens with a probability order of two. 
3) ITC Protection relay inadvertent tripping contingencies following FGC. 
This category of contingencies includes all the forced outages due to primary 
protection tripping plus an additional line tripping nearby. It is usually a 
multiple component outage. The contingency in this category happens with a 
probability order of two. 
These contingency categories capture the majority of high-order contingencies that can be 
systematically identified by topology processing. There are other types of contingencies with 
higher probability but unique to specific systems, such as common right-of-way and common 
tower lines. They can be studied on individual basis. This dissertation does not address them. 
The number of events we study may be calculated by 
N = Nfgc + NSBC + NJTC (1.2) 
where A^^ is the total number of contingencies by protection failure to trip, is the total 
number of contingencies due to breaker failure to trip after fault, and A^ is the total 
number of contingencies due to inadvertent tripping. 
Actually the total number of contingencies # is roughly linearly proportional to the 
number of functional groups (denoted as Z below) multiplied by the average number of 
breakers that can isolate the functional groups. The total number of contingencies is bounded 
by F x (max {AT^}+max {A^ )+1), as we may see from the inequality below. 
N  =  N F G C  +  N S B C  +  N F J Ç ,  
i~\ 
where A%; is the number of neighboring lines for functional group i, A/B, is the number of 
breakers needed to open to isolate functional group i, AfD, equals 1 if there is differential 
protection for zone i and 0 if not. If a breaker fails to operate, then either the relay fails to 
detect the fault or breaker itself suffers an actuating mechanism failure. So, A3, includes the 
two cases as both result in the operation of backup protection and subsequent outage of one 
or more additional elements. That is why AfD, is an indicator function of differential 
protection rather than generic protection. The contingency set we identify is bounded by a 
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number linearly proportional to the scale of the system. We do not have to worry that the 
contingency number will become extremely large. 
1.6 Organization of this Dissertation 
This dissertation includes three parts: probability, identification, and prevention of rare 
events. 
In Chapter 2, we provide an analysis of the event probabilities of a power system from a 
general review, as a way to motivate the interest in the subject. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 
reports on work done to identify likely high-order initiating events and calculate the 
probabilities and risk of contingencies. Chapter 5 describes the dynamic event tree (DET) 
proposed in this research as an operator decision aid for mitigating or avoiding catastrophic 
events. Chapter 6 reports results from a prototype DET test system. Chapter 7 concludes. 
Chapter 2 addresses the probability of rare events. It presents a discrete probability model 
for cascading events. It shows that high-order events occur with higher probabilities, which 
motivates the works of other chapters that follow. In addition, this chapter also jBnds a better 
way to estimate the conditional probabilities of subsequent events, which provides a basis for 
the estimation of probability magnitude in Chapter 3. We propose the use of the cluster 
distribution, derived from a negative binomial probability model, to estimate the probability 
of high order events in terms of number of lines outaged within a short time. We use this 
model to St the statistical data gathered for a 30-year period for North America. The 
maximum likelihood method is employed to estimate the parameters of the cluster 
distribution. The model is compared against the commonly used Poisson model and the 
recently proposed Power Law model [41]. Results indicate that the Poisson model 
underestimates the probability of higher order events while the Power Law model 
overestimates it. We use the strict Chi-square fitness test to compare the fitness of the three 
models and find that the cluster model is superior to the other two models in this case. This 
method may be used to estimate the probability of rare events and can also be used in long-
term planning to be well prepared for large events in the future power system. We also 
discussed other possible approaches to estimating the probabilities of large-scale blackout 
scenarios. 
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Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 address the identification of rare events and estimation of the 
risk they pose. There exist a very large number of possible contingencies in a large-scale 
interconnected power network, and it is impractical to analyze them one by one. Therefore a 
standard approach is to analyze only a subset of the contingencies. The normal method of 
selecting this subset is via use of the so-called JV-7 rule. In Chapter 3, we go a step further by 
proposing a new method of forming a high-order contingency list, based on substation 
configuration obtained from topology processing data and probability analysis of protection 
system failures. This method is particularly suited for on-line security assessment. Protection 
system failures assessed include stuck breakers and failure to operate. We present ways to 
identify the above events in a schematically way. Furthermore, we give a concise form for 
the probability calculation of the stuck breaker failure events. In Chapter 4, we first analyzed 
the risk posed by the high-order contingencies we identify in several typical substations, as 
an example for the application of our identification approach in Chapter 3; then, we study the 
load shedding risk of IEEE-RTS 24 bus system due common fault contingencies, stuck 
breaker contingency and inadvertent branch tripping contingency under difference loading 
condition. 
The last part of this dissertation, including Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6 proposes a 
possible solution to cascading events in power systems: dynamic event tree (DET). It is 
based on the observation that many severe events follow a pattern characterized by slow 
successive component tripping in the early stage. This part of the dissertation discusses the 
attribute and construction of DET. If a system is building up a cascading, halting the trend at 
the early stage may be the most cost effective way. A detailed account of the concept of the 
dynamic event tree, its elements, and how a system operator may use it is included. Chapter 5 
presents a prototype implement of on a 21-bus test system. Chapter 6 compares the DET and 
system protection scheme (SPS). 
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CHAPTER 2 PROBABILITY OF RARE EVENTS IN POWER 
SYSTEMS 
In this chapter, we show that high-order events occur with higher probabilities, which 
motivates our works on the rare events of power systems in the later chapter. This chapter 
also finds a better model, compared to the frequently discussed Power Law model, to 
estimate the conditional probabilities of subsequent events. It provides a basis for the 
estimation of probability magnitude in Chapter 3. 
We discuss in this chapter three possible probability models: Poisson, Cluster, and Power 
Law. A specific form of the negative binomial distribution that we call the c/zt?fer model is 
developed. We use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate parameters for the cluster, 
Poisson, and Power Law distributions in describing outage statistics from North American 
power grid histories over a 30-year period. A chi-square fitness test is performed on the three 
models to compare their fitness. 
2.1 Introduction 
There are three ways to estimate the contingency probabilities of power systems. The first 
is to fit an existing probability model to historical data; the second is to use physical 
attributes of each individual event; the third is to use Monte Carlo simulation with variance 
reduction. We report on investigations via the first approach. There are also different metrics 
to use in characterizing the rare events of power systems, including number of customers 
interrupted, power interrupted, energy not served, and number of elements lost (AW, A^2,...). 
We use the latter characterization in our probability model because it better conforms to 
planning and operating reliability criteria used in industry. For example, reliability standards 
performance criteria are often categorized based on the number of elements lost. 
Obtaining probabilities for high-order contingencies poses difficulties for power 
engineers. Their rareness means there are not enough statistical data to build a credible 
probability model for them. The occurrence of high-order contingencies, especially those 
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catastrophic ones, is usually illusive with causes irregular and unexpected. Usually a 
very large part of a power system suffers when they occur. This feature makes it is hard to 
use the traditional state space model [17][16] approach to study them, which have too many 
unfounded assumptions and only suited for small or simplified system. As a rule, engineers 
have to examine specific power system components, topology, generation, and load pattern to 
evaluate a specific system's vulnerability to high-order contingencies. Among a few works 
that study modes for the probability of high order contingencies, a Power Law approach was 
first proposed in [42]. This model is in accordance with the existing large power outage 
statistics in the sense that it predicts that large events happen with a much greater probability 
than commonly expected. In addition, according to [42], a power system does not always 
exhibit Power Law until it is heavily loaded, which limits its application to other power 
system conditions. Although heavy overloading is a major contribution to large power event, 
many other condition such as unfavorable topology condition [43] and incorrect protect 
behavior may also trigger huge outages. For example, the December 14, 1994 California 
outage occurred at midnight and cut service to 1.5 million customers. Another event is the 
Brazil outage caused by bus fault; the Italian event [15]. To prove the fitness of a probability 
model, a strict statistic test will be used. We especially want to compare the fitness of 
different models that appear St and appropriate otherwise. 
In this chapter, we will discuss different ways to estimate the probabilities of rare events 
in power systems and examine the application of three probability models (Poisson, cluster 
binomial, and Power Law) applied to the jV-& outage statistics for a 30-year period in North 
America [4]. We will find that negative binomial model is the most appropriate. We first give 
some background knowledge about the three probability models in next section. Then we 
reparameterize the probability model to deduce the cluster model for the distribution of 
transmission line outages in power systems. In section 2.4, we use the maximum likelihood 
method to estimate the parameters of the three models to fit the data. The Subsection 2.4.5 
uses the strict - test to comparison the fitness of these models. 
The raw data we are going to analyze throughout this chapter is from reference [40]. 
This data is replicated in condensed form in the table below. 
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Table 2.1 High order transmission outages statistics 
ZEEE survey oft/SaW Canodzon overAgacf 
(ra/w/»KfioM owfagay of 2JOtv oW oAove, 796J-7P&S [40] 
Number of Contingencies By Voltage Levels 
Total luin. type 
230kv line 345kv line 500kv line 765kv line 
N-l 3320 5807 721 295 10143 
N-2 303 577 35 36 951 
N-3 39 99 3 2 143 
N-4 18 16 0 2 36 
N-5 7 1 0 0 8 
N-6 0 1 0 1 2 
N-7 3 1 0 0 4 
N-8 2 0 0 0 2 
Table 2.2 Total number contingencies in each single or multiple 
contingency categories 
Cont. Type N-1 N-2 N-3 N-4 N-5 N-6 N-7 N-8 
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
10143 951 143 36 8 2 4 2 
The data we analyze is the total number of elements lost in each contingency in North 
America from 1965 to 1985 [40], as indicated in Table 2.1. The last two columns give a 
summary by voltage levels. According to [40], the data reported in Table 2.1 adheres to the 
following: 
-0- Each individual component tripping in a multi-component outage event must 
occur within a 1 minute interval; otherwise, it is considered a separate outage 
event; 
Whenever an event involves components of different voltage levels, it will be 
counted as one instance only with a specific voltage level; 
4- Only line outages are reported. Other components such as generators, 
transformers, and capacitors are not reported. 
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2.2 Background: Some Probability Models for Rare Events 
We introduce several probability distributions in this section. These are important since 
we are going to use them later. 
2.2.1 Poisson Distribution 
We derive the Poisson distribution in a traditional way. However we also introduce 
another way to derive this distribution, and as a result, the Negative distribution as well. 
While the first derivation is commonly presented in standard probability text, the second one 
is quite different from the traditional one; it is first presented in a monograph [18] of W.A. 
Thompson, Jr. We will show how the latter is used to model the probability distribution of 
simultaneous multiple contingencies. 
Consider the event of an individual line tripping within a fixed time period by a binary 
random variable 7 , such that T e {0,1} , with 7 = 1 representing line tripping and 
Pr(T = 1) = ^. The probability of tripping of each line follows the Bernoulli distribution 
Pr(T = f|/?) = y(l-p)'"'; f = 0,l; 0<f <1. (2.1) 
Suppose the total number of circuits in a power system is #. Assume that each has the 
same probability to be tripped within a fixed time and each trip event is independent of 
another. We want to study the probabilistic distribution of defined to be the total number 
of lines removed from the power system. This is important within this work because it 
provides some basis for estimating the probability of contingencies. We have the 
following binomial distribution for calculating the probability of M = & : 
f AA Pr(M = &) = (1- /?)""*, where & = 0, 1, 2, 3,...,# and p=Pr(r=7) (2.2) 
w 
Usually, is small and n is reasonably large, in which case T = 1 becomes a rare event 
[18] and can be approximated with the Poisson distribution 
Pr(M = &)= /(I-f)"-* «Pr(# = &|A) = /1! 
Pr(M = &)= /(1-f)"-* «Pr(# = tpl) = /A! (2.3) 
l&v 
where /I = , & = 0, 1, 2, 3,...,oo. 
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The Poisson distribution is sometimes called the distribution of rare events [45]. Both the 
rare event system and the approximation of binomial distribution with Poisson distribution 
assume that the element events (the failure of an individual) are independent, i.e., the failure 
of one component does not affect the failure probability of another component. These may be 
the theoretical basis for power system engineers to omit most multiple contingencies since 
their probability is so small, based on this model. 
2.2.2 Negative Binomial Distribution 
Another family of discrete distributions that are similar but different from the binomial 
distribution is the negative binomial distribution models. We do not derive the negative 
binomial distribution here because the derivation process using the classical urn model [18] 
to get the common format of negative binomial distribution is of little relevance to power 
systems and rare events. The reason we present this distribution is that we are going to use 
another form of this distribution to study the distribution of multiple contingencies in power 
systems. Rather than counting the number of successful trials after doing a predefined 
number of Bernoulli tests as in binomial distribution, the negative binomial distribution 
counts the total number of tests to get a predefined number (M) of successes. Suppose T is 
the random variable that represents the number of failures before a predefined (M) success 
test is observed in a sequence of Bernoulli (p) tests, then the distribution of T is 
The distribution is typically called negative binomial (M,p). The range of M here can be 
extended to that of real numbers. 
A special case of negative binomial distribution is the geometric distribution, where f=7, 
where p = /%,/(! +A), * = 0, 1, 2, 3,...,oo. 
2.2 J Power Law Distribution 
A random variable % that follows a Power Law has a normalized distribution as follows: 
^ The sample space of standard geometric distribution is {1,2,3,. ..,00} rather than {0,1,2,3,. ..,00} . 
so that the above equation above becomes^: 
(2.5) 
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Pr(% = z|p) = -7-^—;p>0 (2.6) 
1% "ak 
where c is a constant. % can either be a continuous variable or a discrete variable. We 
divide by the constant F %"dkto make sure the expression is a proper pdf. The range of 
the integration is the sample space. In case the sample space is discrete and % is a discrete 
variable, is equivalent to . If the sample space of the random variable is 
infinite, e.g. %e{l, 2, 3, - } or 0 < % < oo, then p has to be greater than 2 so that the mean 
of % is bounded and p has to greater than 3 so that the variance of % is bounded. When 
studying a system with the known size, we may limit the sample space of % so that range of c 
can be less than 1.0. 
If we draw the relationship of and % on a log-log plot, we can use a straight line 
with slope rate -<V jx"ak as 
log f(% = %)= , / log(i) (2.7) 
Ix 'ak 
This feature is unique to Power Law distribution among many other pdfs that model the 
probability of rare events. 
In Figure 2.1, we plot the number of circuits involved versus frequency, which is from 
Table 2.1 on the following double logarithmic graph. We can see the dots roughly distribute 
along a straight line, that is, the dots follow a Power Law. We use least square curve fitting to 
find the corresponding distribution parameters, and the constant c is found to be -4.38. There 
should be two parameters for regression analysis, one is intercept and the other one is slope. 
In our case we only use the slope parameter. The reason is that, as we may see from the 
graph, the intercept is close to zero. 
This method is not regular parameter estimation and it does not guarantee a probability 
distribution. We normalize the above equation by multiplying (2.8) with 0.9434 so that the 
summation on probabilities of {*=1,2, 3,...} is one. 
We will try other regular parameter estimation methods such as maximum likelihood 
later in Section 2.4. 
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= M = l, 2, 3, ...00 (2.8) 
2 210 
Z O10 CL g 
310 Frequency observed 
Least square approximation Solid line 
3 6 1 2 4 5 8 7 
N is the number lines outaged (log scale is used) 
Figure 2.1 Least square fitting Power Law to the statistics 
of line outages 
2 J Cluster Model for High-order Transmission Outages 
Students who do not know each other studying in a library tend to avoid one another by 
choosing regularly spaced positions, however if some students are acquaintances or in the 
same classes, they tend to sit together. Molecules in a room repel each other, Glling the room 
uniformly; however, bacteria on a plate reproduce themselves and tend to form colonies or 
'clusters'. In other cases, insects distribute eggs in a fashion that avoids placing too many 
eggs in one place [18]. The patterns of these phenomena can be illustrated in Figure 2.2, 
which is taken from [47]. The first rectangle of the figure shows the placement of the dots 
tends to repulse each other so that a uniform pattern is observed. If the placing of each dot is 
completely independent of another, then a random pattern can be observed as in the second 
rectangle. The third rectangle shows the dots tend to form clusters (or clumps). The circle 
show the clusters identified by simple visual inspection. In this section, we show the 
evidence from statistical data in Table 2.1 that the power system outage also tends to cluster 
and give a theoretical probability model for the distribution of number outaged lines in each 
contingency. Since we study the multiple contingencies in power systems with respect to 
time, our study is one dimensional as shown in Figure 2.3, as compared with the spatial 
distribution of dots in Figure 2.2. 
24 
3 
Figure 2.2 Comparing uniform, random (independent), and 
cluster (clumped) patterns 
—0 * $-9 S 
(«v>») (»») (*$g) Nrt)—-
Figure 2.3 Point process with/without clustering 
2.3.1 Cluster Phenomenon and Multiple Contingencies in Power Systems 
Clustering of contingencies is expected from a large power system network. We know 
that contingencies, particularly when a power system is heavily loaded, tend to breed other 
contingencies. The forced trip of one generator or line changes the flow pattern on the 
network, and some lines may become overloaded and trip either by proper or unintended 
operation of a protection relay. Faults and the ensuring relay trip of one line cause transient 
oscillation throughout the power system and may cause other components of a power system 
to be tripped also. The more severe the contingency that occurs, the more likely that an 
additional contingency follows. 
One way to study clustering is to model them as a point process [18]. A basic point 
process is Poisson process, where the time interval between two arrival times follows 
exponential distribution with parameter { A(f)}. For a homogeneous Poisson process 
Pr(#[f, ' + Af]) = (2.9) 
where #[f, f + Af ] is the number of points between time t and f + Af, and A is the arrival 
rate. If A is a constant regarding f, then the process is called a homogeneous Poisson process. 
It is recognized that homogeneous Poisson process as a probabilistic model for the generation 
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of 'points' in a cluster do not St the experimental data in some cases [18]. To find a better 
model for clustering, people have tried to modify the homogeneous Poisson process. 
A modification of the homogeneous Poisson process is to vary the arrival rate as a 
function of arrivals. When the function is ,3, (f ) = (1 + a x z)/!q (f), some regular distributions 
for the number of arrival points within time [0, f] can be obtained. The table below 
summarizes this conclusion [18]. 
Table 2.3 Facilitation-hindrance model with A, (t) = (1 + a x i)  ^ (t) 
a Effect of Past on the Future Arrivals Transitional probability Type 
= 0 Neutral Poisson 
>0 Facilitation Negative Binomial 
< 0 Hindrance Binomial 
When a >0, the distribution for the number of point arrivals follows the negative 
binomial distribution. This model fits the experiment clustering data quite well in some cases 
in [18]. 
We are not going to elaborate two much on point process and clustering, since we do not 
have the statistical data needed to test this model from a time series point of view. What we 
have in hand is the data of Table 2.1. We will use a classical um model to derive Poisson and 
negative binomial distribution in uniform way in the next section. The classical um model 
simulates the process of clustering and it follows a distribution that can be validated through 
the statistical data in Table 2.1. 
2.3.2 À Uniform Model for Poisson and Negative Binomial Distribution 
The negative binomial distribution can be derived from the case of n magnetic balls being 
placed into m urns consecutively so that the probability of transition from occupancy 
numbers (n, rj, ...,r„) with fo (n+7, rj, with r+7 ball is (a )/%axr+m). 
This means the urns that already contain more balls have higher probabilities to 'attract' an 
additional one into them. This process was illustrated in Figure 2.4, where the second um has 
a much higher probability to 'attract and capture' the next ball since it has the most magnetic 
balls in it already. When <%=0, the transition probability is just this distribution of the 
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number of balls (k) in the first cell is just like the case of binomial distribution with 
parameter p and n, that is 
\ n-k 
Pr(t|p = l/7M,n) i Y/" i \ I 
fM 
(2.10) 
As we discussed in [18], when n —> oo, m oo and n/m —> A this expression can be 
approximated by 
-, A* Pr(a=*) = Pr(a = t|A) = g-
kl 
(2.11) 
where A = «//», A = 0, 1, 2, 3,...,oo. 
However when o>0, we may see that the transition probability is a function of the 
number of balls already in the first cell; the more balls in the first cell, the more likely the 
next ball will fall into the first cell. The element events (the action of placing ball) becomes 
no longer independent, the succeeding event is heavily dependent on what previously 
occurred. Actually when o>0 with n and r sufficiently large, we get a negative binomial 
distribution with parameters a-1 and A/(A+<%-7), that is [18] 
X ^ ' +&-l^ 
a 
A + or ' 
X 
X + oc -i X + oc -i 
where A = m/mand t = 0,1, 2, 3, - , 
(2.12) 
ar, +1 i 
40 / 
Next Falling Ball f**) 
ar. +1 / 
Pr 
ar( -f I\ 
Most Likely/ 
m = 4 {number of urns) 
r-Hrt -12 
.. a = 3 
Pr = 
1 = 1  ^  = 6  
Figure 2.4 Placing magnetic balls into 4 urns 
It seems from [18] that equation (2.12) does not allow or being zero. Actually, equation 
(2.11) is the limit of equation (2.12) when <z approaches zero. 
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Lim P 
a-> 0 a 
X 
A + # -i 
= Lim 
cr-»0 
<z ' +*-1 
k 
A \
k ( (Z -i A" 
= Lim 
/?->cc 
= Lim 
/?->oo 
J3 + k — \ X 
X  +  P  J  \  x + p  
p 
v 
Y 
/ 
A + or ' 
^9+t-lV A ^ 
( / ?  +  k  — 1^ x i^p + k — 2^x • • • x ^y? + k — Xk 
= Lim 
y?-»co 
= Lim 
y?->oo 
(2+/?)* (W+l)" 
( / ?  +  k  — l) x (y? + k — 2^ x • • • x (y? + k — k^j Xk 1 
/? + &-! ^ + ^ -2 ^ + 
x— x 
X + p x + p J+/9 
- X  X 
kl 
/I* 1 
X  X — -
A:! 
W + l) 
À 1 k 
kl 
(2.13) 
The result is exactly as expected. Since only the number # of lines being tripped in each 
contingency is counted and the condition without any contingencies is not counted, # must 
be greater than 1. We reparameterize the equation (2.12) by 7 = jT+lso that the sample 
space of random variables is {1, 2, 3, - }. We also reparameterize A by // = A +1 so that 
E(F) = /y still hold as E(%) = A in equation (2.11). We will use the notation 
C7w.?fer(y = _y !//,#) to represent the newly reparameterized distribution, which is defined to 
be 
C&sTer(y = = 
a ' + y - 2  
y-1 
/U-l 
//-l + a ^ y 
j'-i / 
x 
V 
a 
„- i  \  
yU-l + (Z -1 
Î/" <z > 0,/y > 1, oMc/ y = 1, 2, 3, 
-(M) (2.14) 
(y-1)! z/" a = 0,//>l, oW y = 1, 2, 3, 
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for the rest of this dissertation. We call a the yâcfor and we will show that this a is 
actually an important index showing the tendency of power systems to have a cascading 
event. 
Unlike the Poisson and binomial distribution, this negative binomial models some 
interdependency among the element events, since #= 0 in Poisson distribution. 
Table 2.4 Parameters of different distribution models 
New format of 
NB distribution parameters 
Old format of 
NB distribution parameters 
f J  a  r  P  
2 0.01 100 0.0099 Almost Poisson (A  =  2 )  
2 1 1 0.5 Equivalent To Geometric Distribution 
2 3 0.3333 0.75 Negative Binomial 
2 7 0.1429 0.875 Negative Binomial 
From the graph above, we see that negative binomial distribution has a heavier tail than 
the Poisson distribution. For o>l, the semi-log curve of negative binomial distribution is 
convex, in contrast to the Poisson distribution, which is concave. The different shapes of 
curves show higher k are more likely to happen if k has a heavy tail distribution as the 
triangular doted curve and the square doted curve shows. 
We also draw the relationship of Pr(%=&) v.s. & in the actual statistics of Table 2.2 as in 
the right hand side of Figure 2.5-2.7 above. The shapes (concave or convex) of curves in the 
three figures match the shapes of Cluster distribution when <%>3, which suggests cluster 
model with oc>3 could be a good model. 
2.3.3 Convergence Rate Comparison of Power Law and Cluster Distribution 
Based on the discussion in Subsection 2.2.3 and 2.3.2, we form a table that summarizes 
the rate of convergence rate of the pdf of the several probability models as the random 
variable approaches infinite. 
From the above table, we see that when z —> oo, i.e. for when events became large or 
'rare', we have 
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0 < <a^- < f - X  <  1  ( 2 . 1 5 )  
ju — 1 + CKj jj. /y — 1 + c?2  
which means the convergence speed when the events becomes rare is as follows 
{Powjon) > {C7wafer(l > a > 0)} > {Geometric} > (C/iwfer(a > 1)| > {fowerLmv} 
Table 2.5 Comparing convergence rate with Cluster & Power Law pdf shapes 
PDF Family 
Poisson 
(4 
Cluster 
(//,!> a, >0) 
Geometric 
Or Cluster 
(/4 «0=1) 
Cluster 
( / / ,  a 2  >1) 
Power Law 
(c>0) 
Pr(% =% + !) 
Pr(% = x) 
A 
z + l 
oÇ1 + x -1 
X 
x , 
[i — \ + ax 
/ /-I 
n 
cc7 + x — 1 
X 
//-I 
X . 
jl — 1 + C?2 
HT 
When x —> oo 0 
u -1 
f i-\ + a~l 
ju-l 
M 
/ /-I 
ju-l + a2~l 
1 
Shape of 
% Vj. 
Pr(Z = z) 
Concave Concave Concave Concave Concave 
Shape of 
X vs. 
log{Pr(% = %)} 
Concave Concave Straight Line Convex Convex 
Shape of 
log(x) VJ. 
log{Pr(% = %)} 
Convex Convex Convex Convex Straight Line 
The rate of convergence here is actually an index representing how heavy the tail of the 
pdfs or the likelihood of rare events are. The faster the convergence speed, the less likely a 
rare event occurs. For Poisson distribution, since it assumes the independency of events, it 
converges faster than any of the five distribution families we discuss. The convergence speed 
of Cluster distribution is dependent on a , which is just a parameter showing the 
interdependency of events, or tendency of clustering to be more specific. The larger the a, 
the slower the convergence and the heaver the tail of pdf of cluster distribution. 
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Figure 2.5 Cluster distributions and actual frequency (linear scale) 
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Figure 2.7 Cluster distributions and actual 6equency (log-log scale) 
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2.4 Analysis of an IEEE Survey on High-order Initiating Contingencies 
The data we are going to analyze is the total number contingencies in each single or 
multiple contingency categories from the Table 2.2, which is a summary from the Table 2.1. 
Table 2.6 Total accumulative number of contingencies in each single or 
multiple contingency categories 
Cont. Type kai k>2 k&3 k>4 kâ5 k26 k>7 k>8 
Accumulative Count 11289 1146 195 52 16 8 6 2 
Conditional Prob (%) 
-
10% 17% 27% 31% 50% 75% 33% 
Table 2.6 is an accumulative count of the number of the contingencies Table 2.2. The 
advantage of this table is that we can calculate the conditional probability of additional line 
tripping given the number of line outaged within one minute. From the second row of Table 
2.6, we may see that this probability generally increases with the number of lines already 
been tripped. When &>7, we see a decrease, which is reasonable since the actual statistics has 
to stop somewhere. 
2.4.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
We use all the three models: the Poisson, Power Law and the Cluster distribution model 
to analyze the data in Table 2.2 and compare them. This section introduces the maximum 
likelihood method to estimate the distribution parameters). 
The maximum likelihood approach is the most popular technique nowadays [50] for point 
estimation. Suppose --, arc one independent identical sample from the 
space X with probability distribution function/(xl#,, 0%, -, the joint probability 
distribution function is 
Pr(Z, A,, -, %,)= —, %,)(% 16) 
Maximum likelihood approach defines a likelihood function 
-,%»)= fi -, %,) (2.17) 
ie{l, 2, 
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which is equal to the joint probability distribution function but switches the parameters and 
variable, i.e., takes the sample value parameters and (^,^, -,^,) as 
variables instead. If we transform (2.17). by taking the logarithm of both sides, then we get 
the following log likelihood equation 
l0gl(2,, %, 22 10g/(%,|#,, #„) (2.18) 
#e{l,2 
Define ^ = (^, - -, ^,) andz = (jc,,^, - ,Jc^).The <9(z) that maximizes Z,(^|%)is called 
a maximum likelihood estimator of the parameter 0 . #(%) must be a global maxima 
according to the maximum likelihood principle. Because it is usually easier to find the 
maxima of (2.18) than that of (2.17) by differentiating the equations, we will use the log 
likelihood function in this dissertation. 
If we assume the sample data follow a Poisson distribution, then only parameter A needs 
to be estimated. Poisson distribution is a special case of negative binomial distributions in the 
form of (2.12), where a = 0, so there is no clustering for this model. 
Suppose we observe N* samples of = & from the Poisson(A) such as in (2.3) and the 
sample space of AT is {0, 1, 2, 3, -}. The likelihood function will be 
l o g l ( A | # g , # , , l o g  
&!  
= E JV* x log (2.19) 
In order to find the candidate Â(A^, -) that maximizelogZ^ApV^A^, 
we need to solve 
91ogZ,(A|JV„A^, - _ 
9A 
= 0 
Since 
0 l o g T V , , - g  
= 1 ^^7^8 
^ „ A! a Tg"^*^ 
= 2, 
(2.20) 
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= £ N l * - ^ x { k x e l X " - e i V )  
As{0,!,-
ie{0,l 
=  I  J V . x ^ x A - ' - l )  
*e(0,L - } 
= r' % k * N k -  X  j v ,  
ie{0,!,•••} fte{0,!,•••} (2.21) 
We have 
o=A-' &x#*- ^ 
te{0,!,•••} i:e{0,l,-} 
(2.22) 
Thus we get the maximum likelihood estimation of A : 
£wt  
X = _ &=0 
IX 4=0 
(2.23) 
which is just the sample average. 
For the cluster distribution, it is a little bit complex to deduce the maximum likelihood 
estimation of A and or . We will consider the case a > 0 , since if « = 0 , the cluster 
distribution is equivalent to the Poisson distribution which we just discussed. 
f oT'+y-2l r //-I 
v — 1 j \jLl — \ + CC 
y-1 f 
X 
y v 
or 
-i \ 
//-1 + a" 
(2.24) 
_/ôry = l, 2, 3, 
Suppose we observe samples for each AT, the likelihood function will be 
l o g l ( a , / / | # , , ^  ^ 8  (Z  ^ + t -2  
k - l  
X 
r i 
<. *-1 / ^yU- l  +  a  ' ^  / / -1  +  a  % 
= Z l ^ x l o g  
MU.-) 
'  + ^ - 2 ^  
v  ^ - 1  V  
" + log M - l  ' '  
//-! + <% 
+log 
//-l + cr ^ I ». Vte{l,2,--( J 
I [(i-1)-",] 
(2.25) 
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In order to find the candidate pair (â,//) that maximize the function 
log 2(a, /j | JV,, #2, -, JVf, , we need to solve a pair of equation as follows 
61ogZ,(a,//|#„#2,-
6a 
0 log !(<%,//#2,-
= 0 
(a„u)=(â„û) (2.26) 
= 0 
The two equations are far more complex than those for Possion. However, we can still 
solve analytically. 
6 1 o g l ( a , / j | A T , ( / / - l  +  or')-(//-l) ^ 
T? =  ( ^ . ) ( ^ i + a - ' )  x X , [ ( t _ I ) ' W ' ]  
+ 
-a 
, x y ^ 
//-l + a Mu. ; 
or 'x 
a 
-i 
ke{ 1,2,—} I ke{ 1,2,-} 
(p-l)(jW-l + e~') 
- - X 
I *N, -JU Z 
_*e{ 1,2,-} _*e{l,2,-} y 
Then we got the same formula as that for Possion 
A _ *41.2, ') 
I N* 
-} 
(2.27) 
(2.28) 
Thus we get a closed form solution for //, however we have difficulty in finding a closed 
form solution for â. Although it is possible to use numerical techniques such as Newton 
method or advance statistical method such as EM method [50] to solve them or, we are not 
going to try, rather, we will search the maxima pair (#, //) for log .&(«, //1TV,, - ) 
directly using the contour graph function in Matlab. It is much easier to understand in this 
case. 
The likelihood function for Power Law distribution is 
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logl(f |AT,AT,,--)  = !  
k~] 
xlog-
'r-P 
2> 
k=l J 
= X (229) 
*=l V t=i y v t=i ) 
Like the (% in Cluster distribution, we cannot get a close form solution for p since the 
equation 
\ / 
0 = -p* Z(^*xlogt) -  log^ x (2.30) 
V*=1 ) X i=l 7 VH y 
cannot be solved analytically. We will use graphical method to find the maximum Since we 
have only one parameter to be estimated, it is easier for us to find p than the (â, f i) pair in 
(2.26). 
2.4J& Estimating the Parameters Of Poisson Distribution 
According to equation (2.23), we have a close form solution for the Â in Poisson 
distribution, i.e. 
Â = %Xt-l)Ar*/%]#*= 0.1262 (2.31) 
t=l / i=l 
The maximum likelihood estimate of Â for Poisson model is 0.12657, i.e. 
Pr(F = t) = -1) ! = 0.1262^/( A: -1) ! (2.32) 
Where t = 1, 2, 3, -
Note we changed the sample space of standard Poisson distribution to {1, 2, 3, -} 
because the sample data we have ranges {1,2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} which is void of zero element. 
2/4.3 Estimating the Parameters of Cluster Model 
Substitute the &'s and the#* 's in the likelihood function in equation (2.25), we get the 
contour and 3-D graph of the likelihood function logZ.(<z,/j A^,--) as Figure 2.8. 
In order to get a more precise numerical solution, we further narrow the range of «% and // to 
get the magnified plot in Figure 2.9 The maximum likelihood estimation of a and // is 
approximately 
36 
«s 3.08189 
1 . (2 33) 
[/y «1.12623 
According to equation (2.28), we actually don't need to read the estimate of // from 
contour graph. Using the formula for //, we have 
s y 8 
^ = 1.12623 (2.34) 
*=1 / k=1 
This is very close to our estimate of // 6om contour graph in Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9, thus 
it actually partially proved the correctness of our method. 
Likelihood 
1.135 
1.13 
1.125 3.5 
1.12 
1.115 2.5 
1.139 
1.137 
1.135 
1.133 
1.131 
1.129 
kl 1.127 
1.125 
1.123 
1.121 
1.119 
1.117 
3.2 3.4 4.2 2.4 
Figure 2.8 Contour and 3D plots of maximum likelihood for Cluster distribution (I) 
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Figure 2.9 Contour and 3D plots of maximum likelihood for Cluster distribution (H) 
2.4.4 Estimating the Parameters for Power Law Distribution 
In order to estimate the Power Law model described in Subsection 2.2.3, the least square 
curve fitting is used to estimate the approximate range of the slope . It is around 
4.0. The likelihood function (2.30) with p ranging from 3 to 6 is plotted in Figure 2.10. In 
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order to get a more precise solution, we further narrow the range ofand get Figure 2.9. By 
observation, we find c = 3.7553. Then the estimated Power Law distribution for the data in 
Table 2.2 is 
Log-Likelihood 
P(X = x\c = 3.7553) = x -3.7553 I*' 
•3.7553 
= 0.9080% -3.7553 
k=] 
Log-Likelihood 
3.754 3.756 3.758 
Power index c 
Figure 2.10 Plot of maximum likelihood function for Power Law 
(2.35) 
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C =3.7553 C=3.75 
-4449.042 
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Three different probability distributions by maximum likelihood estimation from the data 
in Table 2.2 are summarized in a group as follows 
¥ r { X  = x| a  = 3.082,/v = 1.1262) = 
1.1262-1 
1.1262-1 + 3.082 
/ 
x 
y 
3.082"'+%-2 
x - 1  
3.082"' 
y 
n. 3.115-
^1.1262-1 + 3.082 y 
for cluster model 
(2.36) 
Pr(% = =0.1262) = g^'^0.1262"'/(x-l)! for poisson model 
Pr(X = = 3.7553) = 0.9080%"^^ for power law model 
where z e {l, 2, 3, - } for all three models. 
2.4.5 Comparing Cluster Model with Poisson and Power Law Model 
Substitute k in the above formulas, we have the following Table 2.7 and Figure 2.11-2.14. 
Obviously, the Cluster model (the curve dotted with squares) is superior over the other 
two models. Except for some mismatch in the extreme events the cluster model (the curve 
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dotted with squares) fits nearly perfect with what we have observed (the curve dotted with 
diamonds). The curve generated by the Power Law model dotted with triangles locates above 
the observed curve starting from k=3, which means it overestimates the probability of large 
contingencies. The concave curve generated by Poisson model deviates from the observed 
data significantly. It underestimates the probability of large events (&>3) to the order of more 
than 10 ^ times. This result is in accordance to our qualitative analysis in Section 2.4 . The 
observed data plot on semi-log scale is concave and double log (log-to-log) scale is convex. 
Among all the three probability models we discussed, only the pdfs curve of cluster model 
(or negative binomial) has such feature. For these pdfs, the affinity factor « of the cluster 
model must be great than 1, otherwise the semi-log plot of the pdfs is still concave. The 
estimated â is equal to 3.082, which is greater than 1, just as we expected. These prove our 
judgment from the qualitative analysis in Section 2.4. 
Table 2.7 Probabilities of contingencies according to estimated pdfs 
Cont. Type #-1 N-2 #-3 N- 4 #-5 N- 6 N-7 
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 
Observed No.(Wt) 10143 951 143 36 8 2 4 2 
Observed Prob. 0.8985 0.0843 1.267E-02 3.189E-03 7.087E-04 1.772E-04 3.543E-04 1.772E-04 
Cluster (43 12.1.13) 0.8989 0.0817 1 515E-02 3.288E-03 7.657E-04 1.854E-04 4.607E-05 1.166E-05 
Poisson (A—110.1266) 0.8814 0.1113 7.022E-03 2.955E-04 9.324E-06 2.354E-07 4.952E-09 8.930E-11 
Power Law (fc|3.78) 0.9080 0.0672 1.467E-02 4.979E-03 2.154E-03 1.086E-03 6.088E-04 3.687E-04 
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Figure 2.11 Semi-log and log-log plot of pdfs for Poisson, Power Law and Cluster model 
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Although it is convenient to make the judgment that the cluster model fit best the multiple 
contingencies statistics by simply inspecting the curves and Figure 2.11-2.14, we will use a 
quantitative method to test the fitness of the fitting: -square test. 
Chi-square test is widely used in statistics to test the fitness of a probability model to 
sample data, not matter the model is continuous or discrete. Chi-square test is based on the 
Pearson theorem [52][53]. Before introducing this theorem, it is necessary to present the 
polynomial distribution [SO]. Suppose a certain random trial has & different results, the 
probability that each trial ends in the z* result is # , z = 1, 2, 3, -, t and =1. If we 
do the trial for a total of n times and we denote as the total times the z'* result show up 
among the m trails, then the multiple distribution of JV, is 
Pr |A,' ) = —r-y ; ^ (23?) 
k k 
where =/% and T]# = 1. 
i~\ i=l 
Pearson theorem: Suppose the parameters of a polynomial distribution has the pdf as in 
(2.37) and define 
y  ^ ( 2 . 3 8 )  
M M# 
then when % -» oo,j/ follows the chi-square distribution (t-l). 
In equation (2.38) the statistics is actually an index showing how the samples deviate 
from the polynomial distribution to be tested. The larger the statistics the larger the 
deviation. 
In order to apply the Pearson theorem, we need to convert the distribution we are going to 
test into polynomial distribution. Since the sample space of the three distributions we are 
going to test is {1, 2, 3, -} and it is a discrete infinite set; we need to group it into a finite 
number of exclusive subsets. We group the sample space {1, 2, 3, - } into t exclusive sets 
denoted as 5% z = l, 2, 3, - , & . Suppose % is a random variable and its pdf 
is /(%) = Pr(Z = x), xe{l, 2, 3, - } . We draw a total of n samples of % from pdf /(%) 
and count the number (denoted again as AT ) of samples that are members of the set S,. 
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Denote p, = Pr(%. Then the random variables z = l, 2, -- follows the 
polynomial distribution we just described. 
The Pearson theorem assume all the parameters for the distribution to be tested is known. 
If any parameter is unknown and 's are estimate rather than known values, we need to 
reduce the freedom number of the ^ distribution. The rule [52] is, if there a total of 
r estimated parameters, the freedom number of the is & - r -1. 
The hypothesis test is designed as follows: 
MOMpfe? come PDF /(%) 
versus 
: fAe TTze aa/Mp/a? do nof come PDF /%%) 
Prior to perform the test, setup a confidence value #, 1 > «> 0. If (^-r-l), 
then reject , else accept ^. Usually a is set to be 5%, 2.5%, or 1%. 
Table 2.9 lists the value of item # and for each of the three models. We can 
see that: 
When z > 6, j?, x JVare all less than 1 for Cluster model; 
When z>4, # x p, are all less than 5 for Poisson model. 
When z = 4, x y] n, are all less than 5 for Power Law model. 
Table 2.8 Grouping the sample space for ^-test 
/ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
n, (N = %)»,= 11290) 10143 951 143 36 8 2 4 2 
Ouster 
Pi 0.899 0.082 0.015 3.3E-03 7.7E-04 1.9E-04 4.6E-05 1.2E-05 
10147 922.14 171.03 37.12 8.639 2.093 0.5201 0.1316 
Poisson 
Pi 0.8814 0.1126 7.0E-03 3.0E-04 9.3E-06 2.4E-07 5.0E-09 8.9E-11 
9950 1256 79 3.336 0.1053 2.66E-03 5.6E-05 1.00E-06 
Power Law 
Pi 0.9080 0.0672 0,01467 4.98E-03 2.15E-03 1.09E-03 6.09E-04 3.69E-04 
p.# 10250 759,069 165.58 56.21 24 12.26 6.873 4.1626 
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In order to have a uniform test on these pdf models, we group all z's that are greater than 
4. Then we generate a new table as Table 2.9. 
The test result is summarized in Table 2.9. The last row of the table lists the freedom 
number of the -square distribution, and statistical quantities for chi-square test, the 
probability of getting a sample deviation larger than observed, assuming the sample comes 
from a certain probability model. The cluster model is far more fit than the other two. While 
both Power Law and Poisson model are not good, Power Law is the far better than Poisson 
model. 
Table 2.9 £ -test results summary 
i i 2 3 4 >=5 
Type of/' Test 
n, (#=11289) 10143 951 143 36 16 
Cl
us
te
r 
Pi 0.899 0.082 0.015 3.3E-03 1.01E-03 
=7.405 
ptn 
Prob.{/>/(3)} = 2.98% 
Cl
us
te
r 10147 922,14 171.03 37.12 11.38 
Cl
us
te
r 
18.3299 832.63 785.85 1.2435 21.309 C
lu
st
er
 
(n, -#7zy/p,M 0.0018 0.9029 4.5948 0.0335 1.8719 
Po
iss
on
 
Pi 0.8814 0.1126 7.0E-03 3.0E-04 9.56E-06 / (5-1-1) = /(3) 
y(",-;v)%2787 9 
Po
iss
on
 
A" 9950 1256 79 3.336 0.1079 
Po
iss
on
 
37144.7 93033.2 4061.17 1066.97 252.556 A" 
Prob.{^>/(3)}<10^ 
Po
iss
on
 
3.733 74.07 51.23 319.882 2339.05 
Po
we
r L
aw
 
Pi 0.9080 0.0672 0.01467 4.98E-03 4.22E-03 f (5-1-1) = /(3) 
y ( " , - W _ g 0  g g  
Po
we
r L
aw
 
10250 759.069 165.58 56.21 47.613 
Po
we
r L
aw
 
16411.21 41333.37 341.24 339.63 1466.75 
Pmb.{/>/(3)}<10^ P
ow
er
 L
aw
 
1.12448 48.52 3.079 7.267 20.99 
If we set a) to be 1%, then (2) = 9.21 and (3) = 11.345, we can see that 
(2) = 9.21 < = 7.405 for Cluster model, so accept 77, and reject 
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%^(3) = 11.345< V"——^  =  2 7 8 7 . 9  f o r  P o i s s o n  m o d e l ,  s o  r e j e c t  # @ a n d  a c c e p t  
A" 
, i.e. Poisson model is not a appropriate model for the data. 
(3) = 11 345 < V"——^  =  8 0 . 9 9  f o r  P o w e r  l a w  m o d e l ,  s o  r e j e c t  ^  a n d  a c c e p t  
A» 
, i.e. Power law model is not a appropriate model for the data. 
2.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter proposes the cluster model for computing probabilities associated with high-
order events. This model is very appealing because it provides the ability, through the affinity 
factor a, to capture the tendency of component outages in power systems to increase the 
likelihood of successive component outages, for example, cascading phenomenon, so that 
they cluster. The cluster model is actually a quite general model, with the familiar Poisson 
(complete independency between events) being a specific instance of it, where When a 
is very large, the Power Law and Cluster models both exhibit similar behavior in 
convergence rate as the event becomes very large. In our application to real data, we 
observed that Poisson underestimates rare event probabilities, Power Law overestimates 
them, and the cluster model captures them very well. This observation was confirmed using a 
statistical test of model fitness. The results of this work will help us estimate the probability 
of contingencies so that we can calculate their risk more precisely and further more, it 
also enhance decision making at both the planning and operational level. In particular, 
operational procedures for defending against large outages are of great interest to us, and the 
cluster model is a promising aid in directing computational resources as they are used on-line 
to develop defense strategies as real-time conditions change. Work to this effect will be 
presented in Chapter 5. 
The proposed model provides a basis for system operators to estimate the probability of a 
next event given the current system condition. This model is also useful to power system 
planning engineers. They can use this model to estimate the probabilities of higher-order 
contingencies in the long run. However, the proposed model is quite general and it treats a 
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power system as a whole. Thus it is not aimed to identify specific contingencies; nevertheless it 
provides a basis for the calculation of specific contingencies in power systems, which will be 
addressed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 IDENTIFYING PRIMARY HIGH-ORDER 
CONTINGENCY 
In this chapter, we will present a systematic approach to extend the traditional 
contingency list for the security analysis of power systems. The common practice to set a 
power system operational margin is the so-called JW rule, i.e., a power system should be 
operating normally after the lost of any single component. The rule has been challenged by 
the recent occurrence of big blackouts as well as operator experience. Due to the low 
probabilities of contingencies, it is very hard for system operators to do any thing opnon 
to prevent them because it is not cost effective. Yet, contingencies do happen and when 
they happen, they bring great trouble to operators. The algorithm discussed in this chapter, if 
applied to real system, continuously yields a "high-order contingency list" in addition to the 
conventional contingencies within the EMS. We will need the extended contingency list 
to generator dynamic event tree, which will be addressed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to find all higher-order contingencies. It is not even to 
identify all JV-2 contingencies; rather it aims to include more N-k contingencies with higher 
probability to occur and thus high risk. 
? 
? 
a 
Pr(N-l)*90% ? 25 
à 
« 
o 
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II IT z z^ z 
Figure 3.1 Lower order contingencies occupies the most probability space 
As suggested by the actual statistics of Table 2.1 and the cluster model, most 
occurrence (about 90%) of the initiating contingencies are 7V-7, which constitute a tiny 
amount of all possible contingencies. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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The NERC Disturbance Analysis Working Group (DAWG) provides a database on large 
disturbances that have occurred in the bulk transmission systems in North America since 
1984 [4]. Our analysis of this information resulted in a classification of three types among 
those related to protection failures: (1) inadvertent tripping, (2) protection relay fail to trip, 
and (3) breaker failure. A summary of the DAWG database in terms of this classification is 
given in Table 3.3. If we assume that Table 3.5 represents reasonably accurate statistics, then 
our approach addresses between 34% and the 45% of protection failures that are branded as 
categories 2 and 3. 
Table 3.1 Summary on disturbances caused by protection system failures 
Inadvertent Protection Breaker Total No. protection 
ear Tripping fails to trip Failure malfunction 
1984 4 0 1 5 
1985 2 0 5 7 
1986 1 1 2 4 
1987 2 0 0 2 
1988 6 0 0 6 
1989 6 0 0 6 
1990 0 2 1 3 
1991 3 1 1 5 
1992 1 1 2 4 
1993 1 0 3 4 
1994 2 0 3 5 
1995 5 1 1? 7 
1996 2 0 1 3 
1997 1 0 2 3 
1998 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 1 0 1 
Total 36 7 22 65 
Percentage 55% 11% 34% 100% 
3.1 System Topology and Primary Multiple Contingencies 
Transmission substations are normally designed to ensure that a single fault results in at 
most loss of a single circuit. However, the actual substation topology, at any given moment, 
may differ from the designed configuration, as the topological configuration of a substation, 
in terms of the connectivity of the elements through the switching devices (switches and 
breakers), may change. Variations in substation topology can occur as a result of operator 
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action for purposes of facility maintenance and for purposes of mitigating undesirable 
operating conditions such as high circuit loading or out-of-limit voltages. To a lesser extent, 
topological variation may also occur as a result of forced outages. 
Substation topological variation may, in some instances, result in situations where the 
operation of the protective systems, in response to the occurrence of a fault in the network, 
removes two or more elements when clearing the fault. Such topologies significantly increase 
the risk-level of the network, as it exposes the system to a multi-outage contingency as a 
result of a single fault, whose probability is equivalent to that of an JV-7 contingency. As 
contingencies are inherently more severe than #-7 contingencies, an 7V-& contingency having 
a probability of the same order of magnitude as an N-l contingency may cause a very high 
amount of risk, since risk associated with a specific contingency is the expected value of the 
contingency consequence [33]. 
An operator may not be aware of increased likelihood that results from switching 
actions. In this case, automated detection is critical. Even if the operator is aware of the 
increased likelihood, the question remains as to its severity and therefore its risk. 
We have developed a search algorithm and associated code to detect these situations. The 
inputs required for the algorithm include the breaker-switch status data obtained from the 
SCADA system. As this data is also used for EMS topology processing, it is available in 
most control centers. 
Another cause of events is the failure of a breaker to open under a faulted condition. 
Such an event is of lower probability than that of an JV-7 outage, as it is comprised of a fault 
and a protection system failure. Thus, it is of order-2. Yet, the severity, in terms of number of 
outaged elements, may be extreme, and therefore the risk may be non-negligible. The graph-
search algorithm we have developed also detects this situation. 
We provide three motivating examples in Figure 3.2, Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4. Figure 
3.2 shows a simplified two-bus station. The three lines are connected to backup bus 2 without 
breakers. Normally, the three lines are connected to bus-1, bypass switches 1-3 are open, and 
loss of all three lines requires occurrence of a fault together with a failure of the primary 
protection to operate, a scenario of order-2. When bus-1 needs maintenance, breakers 1-3 are 
open and switches 1-3 are closed. This situation makes the substation more vulnerable than 
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usual. Suppose line 1 has a fault. Since switches 1-3 do not have the capacity to interrupt 
current, the three lines have to be cleared together, resulting in an AW contingency caused by 
a single fault. Thus, the bus maintenance activity degrades an AW event from order-2 to 
order-1^. Even under light load conditions, this can cause a considerable change in risk. 
ii L2 13 LI 12 L3 
sj Vû [A 
3 
BUSBAR-1 
BUSBAR-2 backup 
4 i=> â 
BUSBAR-l 
BUSBAR-2 
O'o- O"o^ 
Figure 3.2 N-3 Exposure increases from probability order 2 to 1 
(when performing maintenance on a double breaker-double bus configuration) 
As a second example, a substation with double breaker and double bus (DB-DB) is 
shown in Figure 3.3. This design is advantageous relative to a single-bus-single-breaker (SB-
SB) configuration because it is convenient for bus maintenance, and it is robust to high order 
contingencies like what would occur if a line fault were followed by failure of a primary 
protection system. For example, if a fault occurs on line LI, but breaker B1 fails to open, B2, 
B3 and B4 can serve as backup to isolate the fault, limiting this order-2 scenario to an AW 
outage. However, if one of the two buses is out of service, as shown on the lower hand side 
of Figure 3.3, a fault on line 1 followed by breaker B1 failure to open requires that B2, B3, 
and B4 operate as backups. Thus, an order-2 scenario results in an N-4 event, taking the 
substation entirely out of service. Its robustness to high-order contingencies degraded to that 
of a single-bus-single-breaker configuration because of the maintenance. 
^ The "probability order" indicates the order of magnitude of the event probability. It originates &om the 
consideration of multiple independent events, with each event having occurrence probability close to P (i.e., 
between P and 10 P). Then we say that one event occurs with probability order 1 (occurrence probability P), two 
events occur simultaneously with probability order 2 (occurrence probability P^), and so on. Event probability, 
even for dependent events, may be classified in terms of probability order. In many decision problems, 
knowledge of the probability orders of the significant events is sufficient to distinguish among alternatives. 
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BUSBAR-1 BUSBAR-1 
B1 
LI 
ù 4 4 »il eib B2ù83 ù m(I 
B5 [jl  ^ B?[jl B5 B6 87 B8 
BUSBAR-2 BUSBAR-2 out for maintenariœ 
Figure 3.3 Double-breaker double-bus and single-bus-single-breaker 
The third example in Figure 3.4 shows a double-breaker double-bus substation with a bus 
tie. Normally the switch SI is open. When breakers B5, B6, and B7 are switched off for 
maintenance, SI is closed so that line L5 can be still in service. This puts the substation in 
high risk since one fault on any of the lines L4 and L5 will virtually defunct all the lines in 
service. 
BUSBAR-1 
B1 m 
Li L2 L3 
B5 (] B7[J 
BUSBAR-2 
L4 
BUSBAR-1 
B1 m 
/si 3 LI L2 L3 
B5 B6 B7 
L5 
BUSBAR-2 
»L4 
T 
'L5 
Figure 3.4 Double-breaker double-bus configuration with bus tie 
The last example in Figure 3.5 shows a ring bus substation. When B4 need maintenance 
and is removed from the station, a single tripping of line 3 will cause the ring bus to be 
sectionalized into two and load 1 to be lost. 
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B4 
Load-1 Load-1 
Figure 3.5 Ring bus more vulnerable with the outage of one breaker 
3.2 Topological Identification of Primary High-order Contingencies 
In this section, we illustrate in detail three categories of high-order contingencies caused 
by topology variation and component fault followed by one breaker failure or protection fails 
to trip, and we give a concise form to calculate the probability of these events by tracing the 
topology of system. We use an example to explain our approach. 
3.2.1 Graph Representations of Power System Topology with Substation Model 
Formally, a graph G = (F, E) is defined by an ordered pair of finite sets K and E, 
where the elements in F are called the Vertices (also called nodes or points) and the 
elements in E are called edges (also called sides or arc) [54][55][56]. Each element in E is a 
subset of F containing only two element of F. For example 
a=(r , E )=({r„ v l t  v,}, {£,=(rç,  K ) ,  e2=(f„ v,), e,=(v2, r3)}) e.n 
defines the triangle graph in Figure 3.6 with {P|, constituting its three vertices and 
=(%, E%=(^, E;=(^, F,)} constituting its three edges. 
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Ei 
Figure 3.6 A graph with three vertices and three edges 
There are a number of applications of graph theory to power systems: 
-4» The graph used in circuit theory, where a graph vertex is defined to be a voltage 
node and a graph edge is an impedance branch. 
The graph used for power flow, where a graph vertex is defined to be a voltage 
bus and a graph edge is a transmission lines or a transformer. 
The graph used for EMS to represent the connective of power system components, 
i.e. generators, lines, transformers, bus section, breakers, switches, and loads, 
where a graph is defined to be a bus section and a graph is any other component. 
The first two graphs are familiar to power system engineers. The third one used in EMS 
may not be as straightforward. We will introduce EMS graph model for power system 
topology first. Then we will use an example to derive a new form of graph modeling the 
functional groups in power systems based on EMS graph model. 
The one-line diagram in Figure 3.4 shows part of a real power system with bus bar 
segment BS-6 out for maintenance. Every component is tagged with a unique ID. Each of the 
components other than a bus section connects two different bus sections. In reality not all 
non-bus-section components are joined by two bus bars, in this case we simply insert a bus 
section between two non-bus-section components. This ensures our data format for the 
topology of the power system is the same as those in EMS. A bus section is connected by one 
or more other types of components. If we take all the breakers and open switches (which 
form a cut set) away from the diagram, the whole diagram is decomposed into seven isolated 
parts. Each of the isolated parts is contained within a dashed circle. The components 
contained in each dashed circle of Figure 3.4 form a /w/icfiona/ group which we defined 
earlier in this chapter. A functional group does not include any circuit breaker and open 
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switch, which forms the interface between two different functional groups. Generally, there is 
only one interfacing component, a breaker or a switch, connecting two functional groups. 
One convenient way to model the system is depicted in the right hand side of Figure 3.8. 
In this figure, the components are unanimously modeled as vertices. Each ellipse corresponds 
to a real power system component. The edges only show how the component are connected 
but do not correspond to any real component. The functional groups are identified with 
dashed circles as in the one-line diagram in Figure 3.7, and each one is assigned a 
label FG - i. The interfacing components between each functional group are indicated with a 
grey ellipse, i.e., components BR-1, BR-2, BR-3, SW-2, and SW-3. 
LN-2 
GROUND 
legend 
IS: Bus Section 
BR: Breaker 
G: Generator 
CAP: Capacitor 
SW: Switch 
LN: Line 
TR: Transformer 
FG: Functional Group 
Figure 3.7 One-line diagram of actual system 
illustrating functional groups 
1
—if""/-"' 
5G-7 
Legend 
BS: Bus Section 
BR: Breaker 
G: Generator 
CAP: Capacitor 
SW: Switch 
LN: Line 
TR: Transformer 
FG: Functional Group 
FG: Functional Group 
Figure 3.8 Two graph representation of Figure 3.7 
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The graph model used in some EMS is not as that in the left hand side of Figure 3.8, 
rather it models the topology as the graph shown in the right hand side of Figure 3.8. This 
model is different in that both a vertex and an edge correspond to a real component. It treats 
all bus section components as vertex and all non bus-section components as edges. Each 
vertex of the graph corresponds to a bus section component in the power system. The edges 
indicate how the bus sections are connected. Each edge corresponds to a non-bus section 
component (line, breaker, capacitor, generator, and switches). A bus section component may 
be connected by more than two edges, while each edge connects only two vertices. The 
functional groups are again identified with dashed circles, and each one is assigned a 
labelFG-f. The interfacing components between each functional group are the same as in 
Figure 3 .8, but they are modeled as edges instead of vertex. This graph is undirected which is 
different from the directed graph model in electrical circuit analysis and power flow. The 
graph for them is directed because they need a reference direction for electric current flow or 
power flow. 
In order to facilitate reference in later part of this chapter, we list all the components, 
vertices, or edges, in Table 3.3 and Table 3.2. We assign each component a number I.D. in 
addition to the name I.D. The expressions and are three different reliability 
indices defined for power system components. is the probability that component has a 
ground fault contingency and means the probability that the component fails and has to 
be forced out from operation. Since fault contingency is only one of different modes of 
failure, must be greater than or equal to is called ^er demaWJb;/ 
i.e. the conditional probability that the component fails to perform an action when the 
component is demanded to perform that action. Not all components need all the three 
reliability indices. Both ^ and are defined for non bus-section and non switching-
components because these components have many failure modes in addition to ground fault. 
Since these components are stagnant devices that do not receive any command from control 
and perform any action, they do not have an ^ index. Only is defined for bus sections 
since they are stagnant and fault is virtually the only possible failure mode for them. Only 
is defined for switching components (breakers and switches) as they receive command 
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from protection relay to connect or disconnect actions. Although it is possible for a switch 
component to have ground fault or other mode of failure, we transfer this probability to that 
of the two components the switch component connects by increasing the ^ and . The 
value of depends on the switching status of the component. If the component is already 
in OPEN (or OFF) state, then ^ is zero, otherwise, it is the conditional probability that the 
component fails to open when required. 
Since each functional group is tripped by protection relay as a whole entity, any fault or 
failure of a component within the group will cause the whole group to be tripped. The 
probability a functional group is tripped can be calculated as , where the elements of 
ieSj 
are the indices of all the components in functional group i. The probability a functional 
group is tripped due to fault can be calculated as in the same way. 
The equations for each individual group are summarized in the last two columns of Table 
3.4.We assume the availability of the connection data for each power substation and the 
components within and between them, as summarized in the 3rd and 4th columns of Table 
3.3. We perform a graph search [54], using this information to identify the functional groups. 
The results of this search for this example are provided in the first four columns of Table 3.4. 
The fifth column of Table 3.4 provides the failure probabilities of the functional groups, 
which are the summation of the failure probabilities of the non-interfacing components 
comprising the functional group. 
Table 3.2 List of vertex component of the power system diagram in Figure 3.7 
Name I.D. BS-1 83-2 BS-3 BS-4 BS-5 BS-6 BS-7 BS-8 BS-9 BS-10 
Number 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
Fault Prob. p,7 1 FT 
pi 8 
FT 
p20 
FT 
pzz 
ffT 
p24 
FT 
nZ5 
FT 
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Tab] e 3.3 List of edge components for the power system diagram in Figure 3.7 
Name I.D. No I.D. 
Connected 
Bus Sections Status 
Probability 
from To Fault Fail Per Demand 
G-l l BS-1 Ground Online PfT Pk — 
LN-1 2 BS-5 other system Online — 
LN-2 3 BS-6 other system Online p3 FT — 
LN-3 4 BS-8 other system Online — 
LN-4 5 BS-9 other system Online P5 RFT Pk — 
UN-5 6 BS-10 other system Online P5 RFT — 
TR-1 7 BS-2 BS-3 Online p6 RFT — 
CAP-1 8 BS-4 Ground Online P'rr Pk — 
BR-1 9 BS-1 BS-2 On 0 0 p9 TPD 
BR-2 10 BS-3 BS-4 On 0 0 pio PD 
BR-3 11 BS-4 BS-5 On 0 0 PN PD 
BR-4 12 BS-9 BS-10 On 0 0 pi 2 PD 
SW-1 13 BS-4 BS-6 On 0 0 pB RPD 
SW-2 14 BS-6 BS-7 Off 0 0 pM RPD 
SW-3 15 BS-7 BS-8 Off 0 0 
SW-4 16 BS-8 BS-9 On 0 0 
Table 3.4 List of functional groups and identified their failure probabilities 
Functional 
Group 
FG-i 
Interfacing 
Components 
Per Demand 
Fail Prob. Of 
Non-interfacing 
Components 
Fault/Failure Prob. of 
Functional groups 
(breaker or 
Open switch) 
Interfacing 
Components 
Fault: 
Failure: 
FG-1 BR-1 p* PD - {1,17} Z ^  
Ml,17} 
z  &  
FG-2 BR-1, BR-2 p9 pIO 1 PD * 1 PD = {7,18,19} z  ^  ie{7,18,!9> z  ^  îe{7,18,19} 
FG-3 BR-2, BR-3, 
SW-2 
p]0 pll 
rPD ' PD 
^3 = {8, 20, 
13, 22, 3} 
Z  &  
>e{8, 20,13,22,3} 
z  &  
«€{8,20,13, 22,3} 
F&4 BR-3 pu ^={2,21} Z  
'€{2,21} 
Z  ^  
fe{2,21} 
FG-5 SW-2, SW-3 pi" pis 1 PD I 1 PD S, = {23} Z ^  
'e{23) 
z &  
k(23) 
FG-6 SW-3, BR-4 pi 5 pi 2 PD ' 1 PD 
^« = {24,4, 
16, 25, 5} 
Z  
MM, 4,16,25,5} 
z  &  
/e{24, 4,16, 25,5} 
FG-7 BR-4 p!2 PD S, = {26, 6} z  &  
«*<26,6) 
Z  ^  
«€{26,6} 
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A careful observation of shows that it can be reduced to the smaller graph in Figure 3.9, if 
we take each functional group as a vertex in graph theory, and any component (a breaker or 
an open switch) between two functional groups as an edge. If we define (FG - ;, FG- y) to 
be the component j oining FG - ; and FG -y, the new graph can be express by 
G = (%, F) 
where % = {FG-1, FG-2, FG-3, FG-4, FG-5, FG-7, FG-7} 
and F = {(FG-1, FG-2), (FG-2, FG-3), (FG-3, FG-4), (FG-3, FG-5), 
(FG-5,FG-6), (FG-6, FG-7)} 
= {aa-i, aa-2, aa-3, ,w-2, ,w-3, aa-4} 
Figure 3.9 shows the graph defined by G = (%, F). 
Functional Group 
Open Svvtch 
Breaker 
Figure 3.9 Reduced functional group graph for Figure 3.8 
Since the graph is an undirected graph, we define the pairs in F as exchangeable, i.e. 
(FG - ;, FG - ;) = (FG - FG - ;). 
The results of the graph search also enable identification of the interconnections between 
functional groups, as summarized in Table 3.4. Each column in the table corresponds a 
functional group, while each row corresponds an interfacing component. There are two ones 
in each row, which indicate the interfacing component joint the two corresponding functional 
groups. The rest of the elements are all zeros. 
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Table 3.5 Connections for the interfacing components and the 
functional group 
(1- connected, 0-not connected) 
— 
FG-1 FG-2 FG-3 FG-4 FG-5 FG-6 FG-7 
BR-1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
BR-2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
BR-3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
SW-2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
SW-3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
BR-4 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
a (3.2) 
The array of elements in Table 3.5 can be represented via a matrix B in equation (3.2), 
where each row of B corresponds to an interfacing component, and each column corresponds 
to a functional group. This matrix is also called incidence matrix in graph theory [55][57]. 
^1 1 0 0 0 0 0^ 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
0 0 10 10 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
j) 0 0 0 0 1 ly 
If a component within either of the neighboring functional groups FG-z and FGy has a 
fault and the breaker connecting FG-z and FG^ fails to open, generally, all the components in 
the two neighboring functional groups will be taken out of service. The probability that the 
functional group G, and G/ both fail during the time interval At can be expressed as: 
f PD 
= ^ X 
FT 
he Sj u S i 
E fA + E fA 
ke S j 
03)  
where is the index of the interfacing component that jointing functional group ; and 
functional group y. active failure rate (failure to open as required) of the interconnecting 
components between functional groups G, and G, (given by the failure rate of the 
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interconnecting component), At is the next time interval considered, and P* is the sum of the 
failure probabilities of all components in functional groups G, and Gy. 
The last column of Table 3.3 provides the per demand failure probabilities of the 
interfacing components. We denote the vector of failure rates of interfacing component as 
D = 7%, 7%) (3.4) 
where and indicates a square matrix having diagonal elements equal to the argument of 
the function and zeros elsewhere. The index of each 7%%, is the same as the index of the 
interfacing component. 
Then all the equations in form of equation (3.3) can be summarized in matrix form as: 
or 
where 
1 PD 0 0 0 0 0 ^ 
^BQ P23 0 pio PD 0 0 0 0 
P SBC3 Pu 0 0 Pu PD 0 0 0 
^SBQ P* 0 0 0 n!4 PD 0 0 
P SBC5 
p56 0 0 0 0 pis 1 PD 0 
p 1° 0 0 0 0 p!2 PD J 
( pFT\ 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0^ DfT 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 pfT fg3 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
X pfr 
-ffG, 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 fg3 
0 0 0 0 0 1 K 
pfr 
^FG« 
pfT 
Jggg = Dx#xf% ,FT FG 
' SBC ' SBC; ' ^ .SBC, » 
— (^12: ^23» ^34' ^35' 
D is given by equation (3.4), 
^ is given by equation (3.2), 
'SBC,' 
'56' 
Ps 
r 
'SBCL 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
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FC, » 
As we mentioned previously, SW-2 and SW-3 are open, so it is not possible for the two 
switches to fail to open. We set ^ and 7^ zeroes to model this situation. 
Although equations (3.5) and (3.6) give a concise mathematical form to calculate the 
probabilities of breaker-stuck contingencies, it depends on the availability of matrix B, which 
is not easy to obtain. In addition, the size of Z? is very l&qge and sparsity technology has to be 
used to handle it efficiently. Subsection 3.2.3 will introduce a computer algorithm to search 
for functional groups and a method to get the breaker-stuck contingencies without 
formulating the 2? matrix. 
3.2.2 Some Anomalies in Functional Graph Decomposition 
We discuss two abnormal situations in the functional decomposition of power systems: 
1) There are two breakers between two functional groups; 
2) A breaker or an open switch joins one functional group instead of two. 
In some cases, in order to make sure the power supply is not interrupted by breaker 
maintenance, utilities use two breakers that operate in parallel. For example, there are a 
few cases in the single line diagram of the IEEE one-area RTS-96 substation system [50]. 
The following figure shows one of such cases 
In term of graph representation, it is easy to model this situation. It is just equivalent to 
the case where there are more than one edge between two vertices. This type of graph is 
calledp-graph, whereis the maximum number of edges between two vertices. We just need 
to add one more row in ^-matrix to indicate another breaker is also joining the two 
Brë'aker-â 
Load 
Functional Group 1 Functional Group 2 
Figure 3.10 Two breakers acting as backup of each other 
(Excerpt from IEEE RTS-96 [50]) 
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functional groups. The difficulty related to this anomaly lies in the computation of the 
probability of stuck breaker probability. One way to avoid confusion is to model the two 
breakers as one. Their aggregated per JemaWcan calculated as follows: 
P(6reo&erl afwct or 6reo&gr 2 jfwc&) = P(6rea&erl ^fwct) + f (AreoAer 2 jfwct) — 
F(6reaterl and Areoter 2 gfwcA:) 
The other way to address this difficulty is to model them separately, i.e. to treat the stuck 
breaker trips due to breaker-1 and breaker-2 as two different contingencies. In this case, the 
forms of equations (3.5) and (3 .6) is not changed. 
Another anomaly is that a breaker or an open switch joins one functional group instead of 
two. The Figure 3.11 below shows a case taken from the single line diagram of IEEE one-
area RTS-96 substation system [50], where the two functional groups joined by the breaker 
B-2 are actually the same one. We omitted the switches since they are all closed and will not 
effect on the analysis. This is equivalent to the case in graph theory where one edge starts 
from one vertex and ends in the same vertex. This edge is called a ring in graph theory [55]. 
The corresponding row in the ^-matrix defined in (3.2) has one unit element and other 
elements in the rows are all zeros. The stuck breaker contingency that corresponds to breaker 
B-2 is trivial in this case since it does not have any influence on the clearance of fault 
whether it opens or closes. 
As to the abnormality that an open switch joints one functional group instead of two, we 
have not found any in all test and real systems we know. However, we do not exclude the 
possibility that there are such cases in a real power system. If it does exist, we can use the 
same approach as we showed in the above paragraph. 
To Other Part 
ofBUS-19 
Functional Grpup 
L-37 
Load 
Figure 3.11 Breaker B-2 connects one rather than two functional groups 
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In a summary, we have discussed some anomalies when decomposing the power system 
topology into functional groups. These anomalies can be modeled as a p-graph with ring(s). 
A sample of such kind of graph is shown in Figure 3.12, where there are two edges (&/ and 
&2) between vertex PV and P2 and the ring &S starts from F2 and ends in P2 also. The 
formula (3.6) is still valid for all these anomalies, however special attention must be taken in 
computing the probabilities of stuck breaker contingencies for the breakers that cause these 
anomalies. 
El 
Figure 3.12 A p-graph with a ring 
3.2 J Algorithm to Searching fnr Topology for Contingencies 
If we have decomposed the topology of a power system into functional units, the 
identification of simultaneous #-t(k>l) primary contingencies is quite easy. As we 
indicted in Table 3.4: any single fault will result in a removal of all the components in the 
functional group, within which die fault occurs; if any component within the group fails for 
reasons other than fault and need to be removed from the system, then again, all the 
component within the group have to be removed. The reason we distinguish between the two 
situations is that we use the fault/isolate probability of a functional group to derive the 
fault/stuck breaker probability of &BC 's. 
Any single fault plus breaker failure will cause the removal of all the components in two 
neighboring functional groups within which the fault occurs such that the interface between 
the two functional groups is the failed breaker. If we assume a fault is specified by only the 
component on which it occurs (and not where on that component it concurs), then there is a 
one to one correspondence between each fault/failure initiated contingency and each closed 
breaker. 
We have not identified how to find ITC contingencies and their probabilities. To identify 
ITC contingencies from the power system topology, we need to identify the voltage bus first. 
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This will be covered in Subsection 0. The probability of an ITC contingency A that involved 
line i and line y can be calculated by 
= Pr(/me i fnpj)Pr(/mg y ; fr^) + 
Pr(/mg y fr^pa)Pr(/;»e % y frzp?) 
Data Structure to Represent System Topology 
Any EMS database stores a large amount of information for each power system 
component including how the component is connected together. We do not need all of this 
information to process power system topology. The information needed for functional group 
decomposition does not take much memory as it takes the form of data linkage rather than 
the B-matrix of (3.2). The minimal information we use to do functional group decomposition 
for each individual component is as follows. 
1) Transformer/Line components 
4- Component I.D.: the name or index of the transformer/line. 
4- Starting Bus Section I.D. : the first bus section to which the transformer/line is 
connected. 
4- Ending Bus Section ID.: the second bus section to which the transformer/line is 
connected. 
2) Generator/Load/Shunt components 
V Component I.D. : the name or index of the generator/line/shunt. 
Bus Section I.D.: the bus section to which the generator/line/shunt is connected. 
3) Breaker and switch components 
4- Component I.D. : the name or index of the breaker/switch. 
Starting Bus Section I.D.: the first bus section to which the breaker/switch is 
connected. 
Ending Bus Section I.D. : the second bus section to which the breaker/switch is 
connected. 
-4- ON/OFF status flag: the flag showing if the breaker/switch is turned on or off. 
4) Bus section components 
4- Component I.D.: the name of the bus section. 
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In order to store the search results, we also need to reserve some following fields in each 
component object in computer program: 
4- For each non-interfacing component, i.e. line, transformer, breaker, shunt, bus 
section, and load, reserve one field to store the pointer that is pointing to the 
functional group to which the component belongs. 
For each interfacing component, i.e. breaker and switch, reserve two fields to 
store the pointers to the two functional groups the component bridges. 
Each functional group object contains a W data structure that stores all the components the 
functional group contains. It also contains a list of all interfacing components it borders. 
Decompose a Power System into Functional Groups 
This is the core of the computer program to identify high-order primary contingencies. As 
a common practice, we model the one-line diagram of power systems as a graph, in which 
the vertices represent any bus section components and edges represent lines, transformers, 
generators, switches, breakers, shunts, or loads connecting two bus sections (we model 
ground as a special bus section). The algorithm we used to decompose the power system into 
functional groups is graph search. Although many textbooks provide standard method to 
search in a graph [55], the algorithm we need for decomposition is not readily available. 
Our algorithm can be summarized as follows: 
1. Begin of decomposition; 
2. virAifrari^ cAoose one wnvisifecf verfez (tws secfioy%) a* a sfarfing component 
fsfaMisA a mew e/npfyybncfiona/ group oA/ecf wi/Aowf any component in if/ 
4. fAe cAosen jecfzon fo fAe Jbncfiona/ group o6/ecf as ^zrsf component 
J. Aorfzng/rom fAk verfex, me^e fAeywncffona/group's immecAafe neigAAoring component info 
fAe group an^ ZaAe/ fAem as vûife</; 
7%e sfg? 2 continues unfi/ fAe group eapandk fo ik Aordkr, wAere fAe Zwrt/ering conyonenA are 
a// Area&ers a%/ open swifcAes; 
7. T^a// component in fAe power sysfem are visited stop searcAing ancf go fo fAe /asf sfep; e/se 
cAoose anofAer unvisifet/ Aus secfion angf refum fo sfep 2 a// over again; 
& fw/ o/^ dlecomposifion. 
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The searching algorithm from step 2 to step 4 is actually a typical (Breadth-first 
search) in graph theory. The ZfFS graph search uses a gwewe data structure to temporary store 
the indices of unvisited components. A queue is a special list data structure. Its elements are 
linked one by one linearly like that of list data structure, but it restricts the removal of old 
element to one end of the list and the addition of new elements only to the other end of the 
list. This feature is usually called Grst-in-Grst-out (fTFO). We use some special symbols to 
represent the data structures in our algorithm They are explained as follows: 
g User defined stack data structure. Its elements are power system components; 
FCL, List data structure that stores all the components within the functional group ; 
z The index of functional group 
j The index of bus sections 
w Index of components in one functional group 
w Current component for searching 
The detailed algorithm to decompose a power system into functional group is described 
as follows 
1)label all the components as 'unvisited' 
2)indexFG<- 0, indexBS <— 0: initialize indices 
3)loop~0; loop through all the unvisited bus sections 
4) FIFO <— Null: clear FIFO link list 
indexASt- ifK/g%&S+7: TVbte tAe a&zrfiMg component a/wqya &e a 6%; section component 
# iWe%fG=indgxFCr+7 
if tAe Aw: section in(&%5^ k vifite^ it » not tAe fast Awj section in tAe jwwer system consi(&re^ 
repeat step J 
en<6f 
70) iftAe Auy section indlsd)^ » viyzta/ ancf it û tAe /axt tAe Aws section in tAe/xwer Ayftem consiakre^ 
tAen en(7 
77^ en^if 
72) /ate/ Aug section ay visited 
7J^ ocW (o TWO 
14) add I$$jnclexBS F GindexFG 
15) loop-1: While FIFO!~null, 
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7(%) « pop orne e/emenf^"om fTFO 
/ /oop-2. yôr eocA w fAaf i? immaAafe nezgAAors of w 
7&) ifw û Mon-mfe^cing co/MpoweMf, f&en 
/%) w fo FG,*tiFG 
20) We/ os v»:W 
21) if w is unvisited then Add w to FIFO 
22^ eWif 
23) else if w is breaker or open switches 
24) if w's starting functional group is null then 
25) w's starting functional group <— F'Gi„Jex,-G; 
26) else ifw's ending functional group is null then 
2 w 's emAmg^mcdoma/ growp <- FGworc 
2g) 
29) endif 
30) end of I oop-2 
31) end of loop-1 
32) end ofloop-0 
33) end of FG-decomposition 
The algorithm for graph search can be found in any computer textbook on algorithm and 
data structure [54]. Our algorithm uses the basic idea described in [54]. However, our 
algorithm is very refined and tailored for actual power systems. For example, the algorithm 
does not arbitrarily choose any component to begin the search for the functional group. It 
starts the search from the bus section component only. This is because a functional group 
contains at least one bus section, so this choice will make assure that no functional group will 
be missed. During the searching process for any functional group, the algorithm assigns the 
functional group's pointer (physical memory address) to the corresponding Geld of the 
interfacing component object and stop search in that direction. In that case each interfacing 
component will be assigned two pointers pointing to the two functional groups it bridges. 
Decompose in Updating Mode 
The topology of a power system actually does not vary frequently and whenever there is 
such change, it usually happens locally and involves only a few components. We need not 
run the full search algorithm periodically as long as there is no switch operation within 
the system. Whenever there is a switch operation, we can make the corresponding changes to 
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the decomposition incrementally rather than perform a complete graph search for the entire 
system. 
The four basic switching operations that change the connectivity of a power system are: 
7^ open a 
2^ c/ayg a 
fwr» on o fwffcA 
a awifcA 
Any other topology changes are actually one or a combination of the four basic switching 
actions. For examples, a line tripping is usually the result of two or more breaker-opening 
actions and a generator tripping is the result of one or more breaker opening action. 
Turning on/off a breaker actually does not change the way a power system is 
decomposed. It only changes the probability of the stuck-breaker contingency for the 
contingency the breaker is associated with. If only one breaker is switched of% that means it 
is no longer possible to have a stuck breaker contingency that involves both functional groups 
the breaker connects, however the two functional groups are still there unchanged. The same 
rationale applies when switching on a breaker. For example, no matter the breaker BR-2 in 
Figure 3.7 is open or closed, the functional groups FG-2 and FG-3 won't have any changes. 
In contrast to the case of opening and closing of breakers, turning on/off a switch do 
change the way a power system is decomposed. Turning on a switch will merge the two 
functional groups it connects into one functional group, assuming the two neighboring 
functional group are different. This is because a switch has no current interrupt capability as 
a breaker. Whenever there is a fault event, a protection relay cannot operate a switch to isolate 
the fault. For example, if switch SW-2 in Figure 3.7 is closed, then the two functional groups 
FG-3 and FG-5 will be merged in one functional group since any fault contingencies will 
remove all the components within FG-3 and FG-5. On the other hand, turning off one switch 
may or may not make one functional group into two. 
The algorithm to decompose a power system in update mode is summarized in the 
following steps. 
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7^ SO <— Secwg one ,nwfc&zng operation ^ om 
2^ zfSO « fo A/rm q^%« 6reo&er z, /Aen 
3) update the state of breaker 
e/f e if SO M fo fwm JwzfcA z, fAen 
5) switch 1 status <— OFF 
6) rightBS <— the right bus section switch is connected with 
7) leftBS <— the left bus section switch is connected with 
8) starting from rightBS, find the functional group that contains rightBS. 
Denote it rightFG 
9) starting from leftBS, find the functional group that contains leftBS. Denote 
zf/e#FG 
10) switch i's first functional group <— rightFG 
11) switch i's second functional group <— leftFG 
12) else if SO is to turn on switch i, then 
13) switch i status <— ON 
14) newFG <— switch i's first functional group LJ switch i's secondfunctional 
groz/p 
15) switch i's first functional group <—newFG 
16) switch i's second functional group <— newFG 
7%) ew&f 
7i%) gM<7 of tpdbfeSO. 
When we decompose a power system in update mode, we update the decomposition one 
by one for each of the four operations listed at the beginning of this section. 
Grouping Bus Sections into Voltage Buses 
A voltage bus is a group of breakers, bus sections, and switches that are connected to 
each other. The electrical voltages of all the components in a voltage bus are equal to each 
other. 
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Bus sections need to be grouped into voltage buses because we need this information to 
identify inadvertent tripping contingencies. We carefully examined the NERC's disturbance 
data base and find that most of the inadvertent tripping happens to lines connected to the 
same voltage bus. We also need this information in performing dynamic simulation of the 
power system in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 later in this dissertation. The majority of 
inadvertent tripping after an initiating disturbance happens close to the location where the 
disturbance takes place. By 'close to', we mean close electrically, that is, the voltage buses 
that are directly connected to the buses having a disturbance. An identified voltage bus 
should be stored in computer memory as an object containing the following information: 
-4» All the bus sections, breakers and switches to it; 
All the lines, transformer, generation, shunt, and load that are connect to it 
We are not going describe the algorithm to group bus section into voltage bus because 
this algorithm is also used in on-line power flow and state estimation in EMS [59]. 
Contingencies List Generation 
After a system is decomposed into functional groups and all the voltage buses are 
identified, the generation of contingencies list is easy. In the language of this dissertation, a 
contingency is not only defined by the components it removes, it is also defined by its 
associate probability. In accordance with this concept, a contingency as an object in the 
computer that contains not only the components to be removed, but also other information. 
The following information (or members, if it is a C++ class) defines a contingency: 
1) Type: for this research, type can be one of {FGC, SBC, ITC} 
2) CList: list of all components to be isolated from the power system 
3) SList: list of all switching components (breakers and switches) to be open or 
already open to isolate the components in 2). 
4) Probabilities 
a. Fault Probability (FP) : defined only if the contingency is a FGC 
b. Isolation Probability (IP): the aggregate occurrence probability of the 
contingency 
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Note SList in the third bullet defines the group of switching components that are needed 
to isolate the contingency. 
> Searching for FGC 
Since we already have the list of all functional groups, we need only do some processing 
and export the list to a file or database. 
1) Define N to be the total number offunctional groups, i is the index for junctional group FG-i 
2) loop-1: For i=l to N do step 3 to step 8 
4) Add all components in FG-i to the Clist of FGCj 
5) Add all interfacing components in FG-i to the SList of FGCl 
6) FPj<— Ppg., Ppc, is defined in Table 3.4 
7) IPî 4 Ppç , Pp£ is defined in Table 3.4 
8) end of loop-1 
> Searching for SBC 
For stuck breaker contingencies, we just need to search all the close breakers (note only 
closed breaker can get 'stuck') and output the two functional groups it connects. 
1) Define N to be the total number of breakers, i is the index for breakers 
j!) De/znej fo /ôr &BC, 
;< -0  
7oop-7. For i—7 A? A^ab J fo 77 
J) if Greater-; « c/ofa7 
6rgater-r /o iSBCy 
7) Xdk/Areater-ffOiSBCy 
6^ 7P,<— is deGned in equation (3.5) 
9) M+T 
7Q) 
77) EW qf/oqp-7 
72) 7W of X/gorifW 
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> Searching for ITC 
7) A? 6g fAe (ofo/ /mmAer ofvo/kzge 6wy&;. z » fAe imtfexWfoge 
2) De^we / fo 6e fAe _/br /TC ; 
y <-1. ; 1 
4) loop-1: For / = 1 to N, do step 4) to step 16) 
5) M <— number of branches (lines or transformers) connected to voltage buses i 
6) loop-2: For j = 1 to M, do step 7 to step 14 
7) loop-3: For k — j to M, do step 8 to step 13 
8) add branch l and branch j to ITC.'s CList 
9) add the terminal breakers of branch i and branch j to lTCi 's SList 
10) lPi<— PITC , PITC can be calculated through equation (3.8) 
11) If contingency ITC j is not included in ITC list 
7(f) ew7q/Voqp-7 
17) end of Algorithm 
3.2.4 Test on a Large Utility Power System 
We coded the approach in C++ computer language. A full run of the program takes less 
than four minutes for a system topology of about 1600 buses. We believe it is possible to 
perform a continuous (or at least semi-continuous) tracking of the substation topology to 
identify these events. 
The size of the utility is described in Table 3.6. Since the system is large, we first ran the 
program on individual small substations and IEEE-RTS 96 to verify and debug the program, 
and then we ran the program on the large system. The company provided us with four 
topologies of typical substations as well as the data files that completely describe the 
topology of system to the substation level from the EMS. We checked the program with each 
72; 
13) 
74% 
15) 
endif 
end of loop-3 
end of loop-2 
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substation. As a comparison, we run the program on IEEE-RTS 96 24-bus system too. The 
functional groups identified by program are the same as those found by inspection. 
Table 3.6 Number of components in the utility system 
Type Bus Line Xfmr Gen Shunt Load Switch/Breaker 
No. 1549 1830 697 353 357 1506 10653 
One problem encountered in using the EMS data is that the switch data file does not 
distinguish between switches and breakers. After several discussions with a utility engineer, 
we decided to use a number of heuristic rules to distinguish between them. However, this 
classification is based on experience and may occasionally cause an incorrect judgment. In 
the long run, the EMS database should be modified to provide the necessary fields to enable 
identification of breakers from switches. 
Statistics of all the contingencies are shown in the following tables. Table 3.7 
shows the statistics on contingencies caused by faults (no breaker failures). The first line in 
this table shows the number of components lost in a contingency; the second line indicates 
the number of such contingencies identified. Table 3.8 shows the statistics on contingencies 
caused by fault followed by a breaker stuck. The first line in this shows the number of 
components lost in the contingency; the second line indicates the number of such 
contingencies identified. We only count lines, transformers, generators, and shunts. Loads, 
switches, breakers, and bus sections are not counted. 
We may see that a considerable number of functional group contingencies include more 
than two components. One event goes to the extreme of 11. This is most probably due to the 
fact that some breakers are mistakenly classified as closed switches, as we mentioned above. 
Many multi-section radial circuits, which are equivalent to branch, are protected only by two 
terminal breakers. The program counts them as an contingency, where & is the number of 
segments of the radial branches. We may see that even for the contingencies that involves 
stuck breaker, the majority of them trip only one component. This is partly because many 
substations use the reliable redundant configuration such as breaker and a half configuration 
and partly due to the fact that we only count components that are completely disconnected. If 
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a line is only open-ended, the program still treats it as part of the system even though it is 
functionally not operational. 
Table 3.7 Number of functional groups 
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
No. 2022 468 49 14 5 3 2 1 0 0 1 
Table 3.8 Number of fault/breaker failure contingencies 
k 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 
No. 3011 1248 356 134 63 31 23 0 1 1 7 1 0 0 1 
A full run of the program takes less than one second for a snapshot of the topology of the 
1549 bus system. The computer we use is a common Dell PC with Intel Pentium II processor 
(400MHz) and 384MB of RAM. This computation time does not include the time spent on 
reading the input data files into memory and processing the system topology into link lists, 
which typically takes a significantly longer time. Because a power system's topology 
changes are typically localized and it involves only a few components at a time, it is 
unnecessary to perform full topological evaluation continuously. That means if we use the 
updating algorithm, it would take little time. However, as we see from Table 3.9, even for 
system as large as 10,000 buses, it takes only a few seconds, so the significance of 
improvement is not that much. 
Table 3.9 Search time to identify contingencies 
System IEEE RTS 96 Southern System Projected Large-scale Systems 
No. of Buses 24 1,549 5,000 10,000 
Time/Sec. 0.01 0.63 2.08 4.17 
3.3 Conclusion 
The selection of higher-order contingency related to system topology is investigated. The 
proposed approach systematically identifies three failure modes of protection related 
contingencies and the probabilities associated with them. The selection criteria are based on 
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rare event approximation and event tree. As a result, the total number of all possible 
contingencies is limited to a number linearly proportional to the scale of the system. 
The proposed approach is clear and simple in nature; yet it provides an efficient 
contingency prescreen to capture most high-order contingencies related to protection 
malfunction. After this prescreen, other complicated techniques for screening and severity 
evaluation can be applied to these contingencies. 
The contingencies we identified are not fixed. They change with the topology of system. 
Therefore, a continuous tracing of a power system configuration is required. Generally, the 
EMS of a power system has the function of state estimation, which includes a topology 
processor. Thus, the topology information is fully accessible and our approach requires no 
additional information beyond that. We only need to do standard graph search [54] to identify 
the connection matrix B in the algorithm. 
Sometimes it is better to use order to classify events than the number of 
component lost (JV-&). The term coMfingency does not give enough information on the 
probability of the contingency. An contingency does not mean it has a lower probability 
than an JV-J contingency. While a contingency classified as probability order 2 event does not 
mean it would cause the lost of more than one components. It is those contingencies that 
occur with probability one but cause the lost of more than one component that we are 
particularly interested. System topology analysis propose in this chapter is a desirable tool for 
this purpose. 
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CHAPTER 4 RISK OF EXTENDED PRIMARY CONTINGENCIES 
4.1 Introduction to the Risk of Contingencies 
When estimating the risk of a power system, engineers tend to omit high-order 
contingencies because either these contingencies have very low probability or the number of 
contingencies is too large to analyze them comprehensively. In this section, we calculate the 
risk of high-order contingencies and compare the results with traditional jV-7 contingencies. 
The risk [23] we estimate is define as 
where 
Pr(C,) is contingency i. 
ZA, is the forced loadsheding in order to avoid branch 
overloading after contingency i. 
TV is the total number of contingencies to be studied. 
4.2 Preparing Raw Reliability Data 
The first step to estimate risk is to get the probabilities of contingencies. One difficulty of 
estimating the risk of rare events lies in that there are not so many published statistics 
regarding them. The NERC website [4] and reference [40] [49] [50] provides an excellent data 
source for our study. Most of other published reliability data is on individual power 
components. The IEEE reliability test system (1979 [49] and 1996 [50]) provides a summary 
on the reliability of each of the components for the test power system. Although the test system 
is not a real system, the reliability data for the test system is based on the statistics of real 
power systems. Since the risk we calculate is from an operational point of view, we need to 
convert the raw data that is usually provided on annual basis into hourly reliability data. 
(4.1) 
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The data for generator reliability usually are MTTF (mean time to failure) and MTTR 
(mean time to repair). If we assume the current condition of generator is normal and the unit 
for MTTF is hour, the failure probability of the generator during the next hour is 
Pr(0<T<1.0) = = 
where T is the random variable representing the time passed until the generator fails. 
4.3 Estimating the Risk of Typical Substations 
The five substation configurations discussed in this dissertation are taken from [60]. AH 
calculations assume that none of the substation components are in maintenance or out of 
service for any reason before a contingency. Furthermore, all the five configurations have 
four out-going or incoming connection points, so the apparent functions of them are the 
same: serving as a hub to join four branches. In terms of contingencies, the performances 
of all five configurations are the same. If any line has a fault and it is tripped correctly, all the 
three other lines will be still functional. 7%e d^ererzce /:es i» f&af f&e;r roAwsfMe&y fo Aig/z 
order coMfrngeMcfes. Some substations are obviously more reliable than others for high-
order contingencies, for example, the double-bus-double-breaker (DBDB) configuration is 
more reliable than the single-bus-single-breaker (SBSB) configuration in Figure 4.1. A bus 
fault outage can defunct all the four lines from/to the SB SB station while the DBDB station 
can withstand such a disturbance without interrupting the service to any of the four lines. 
Usually, power system engineers study the reliability of substation using state diagram with 
Markov model or Monte Carlo method [37][38][39]. The full state diagram is not practical 
for a substation with many components. In this case, many simplifications have to be made 
so that the approach is feasible. Our approach provides a new way to study substation 
reliability and the algorithm is not restricted by the number of components in a substation. 
We use our graphic functional group model described in the previous chapter to analyze the 
reliability of the five basic substations. 
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H Y 
Single Bus Connected 
with Bus Tie (SB-TL) 
Ring Bus 
(RB) 
H H i 
MM î V 
Double Breaker and 
Double Bus (DB-DB) 
Single Breaker-Single 
Bus (SB-SB) 
Breaker and a Half Bus 
(B-HB) 
Figure 4.1 Five typical substation configurations 
Some of the notations used in next section are defined below: 
FS#, : contingency caused by fault plus breaker ; stuck; 
: failure probability of bus section z. It is assumed to be zero for this discussion, i.e., 
^ = 0 for all z; 
: conditional stuck probability (per demand failure rate) of breaker ;. It is assumed 
to be the same (denoted as ^ ) for all breakers in the five substations; 
D : diagonal matrix whose elements are ^'s; 
pL : fault probability of line z . It is assumed to be the same (denoted as # ) for all 
transmission lines; 
Z? : connection matrix of all function groups in a substation. Its elements are defined in 
equation (3.2); 
FG - z : functional group z ; 
Ppc : fault probability of the z'* functional group; 
: column vector representing the fault probabilities of all functional groups; 
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* : the aggregate probability of a group of contingencies caused by a fault within 
any of the two neighboring functional groups of breaker z and followed by the 
stuck failure of breaker z. The fault could happen on either side of the breaker. It 
could be a single line outage as well as a multiple line outage. 
: column vector made up of , the length of the vector is the same as the 
number of breaker in the study case; 
: serve as a measurement for the consequence of contingency . We use a 
simple linear index to evaluate consequences: the consequence is equal to the 
number of lines lost in each contingency; 
C,%g : row vector representing 's; 
: risk of fault stuck-breaker contingencies. 
4.3.1 Single Breaker and Single Bus (SB-SB) 
This configuration is simple and straightforward. From Figure 4.2, there are a total of five 
functional groups and four breakers, implying four stuck breaker contingencies. The B-matrix 
representing the connectivity of the four functional groups is shown in the right side of 
Figure 4.2. Clearly, with this single-bus-single-breaker substation diagram, any stuck breaker 
failure will cause the lost of all the four lines. The functional group fault probability, which is 
the summation of the fault probability of each component in the functional group, is 
calculated from equation (4.3), assuming the failure probability of bus ^ = 0. 
Line-l Line-2 
FG-4 
Une-4 
/'—R%3 
/ Line-3 \ 
'1 1 0 0 (f 
10 10 0 
10 0 10 
,1 0 0 0 1, 
Figure 4.2 Single breaker single bus substation and its ^-matrix 
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ffŒ-4) (4 
^FG " f^FG' .PfG' f FG' PfG» ^FG ) 
/ f 
— (Py fy Py Py fyj  
D = dzog(^, p^, A&J (4-4) 
With D, ffc known, the probabilities of all the stuck breaker contingencies can be 
calculated by 
PpSB = D x B x PFG 
/ \r (4 5) 
= A+A, ft+A, P& + A) 
Since the consequence of all stuck breaker contingencies are the removal of all four lines, 
the C,%g is just a row vector consist of four 4's as in (4.6). The total probability of having a 
fault plus stuck breaker contingency in the SB-SB substation is ][PfSB_;=4 
^FSB =(CFSB~ 1 »  CFSB-2 >  CFSB-3 >  CFSB-4 )  ,, _ 
(4.6) 
= (4, 4, 4, 4) 
Then the risk of the substation is calculated as 
RISK S B_ S B  — CF S B  x PFSB — 16 x psb x py. (4.7) 
4J.2 Rinp Riis 
This configuration is simple and straightforward too. From Figure 4.3, there are a total of 
four functional groups and four breakers. The ^-matrix representing the connectivity of the 
four functional groups is shown in the right side of Figure 4.3. With this ring bus 
configuration, any stuck breaker failure will outage at most two lines. The functional group 
fault probability is calculated as from equation (4.9), assuming the failure probability of bus 
Py -0-
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Line-2 
Une<3 f 1 
0 
1 0 ol 
1 1 
0 0 1 
Figure 4.3 Ring bus substation and its 5-matrix 
1 0  0  1  
^FSB ~ ( ^ FSB-i » PfSB-2 • ^FSB-l ' F'FSB-A ) (4-8) 
PpG ~ {PpG> ^FC ' PfC ' PFG ) ^ ^ 
= (?„ f/, f/, 
D = d;og(^, f^,,) (4.10) 
With D, B, fpc known, the probabilities of all the stuck breaker contingencies can be 
calculated by 
—DxBx 
(4 11) 
(4.12) 
= 2^, 2p„ 2^) 
Since the consequence of all stuck breaker contingencies are removal of all four lines, the 
Cj%g is just a row vector consist of four 2's as in (4.12) and the probability of having a fault 
plus stuck breaker contingency for the ring bus station is 
Cf3B " (CfSB, ) CfSB, ) 
= (2, 2, 2, 2) 
Then the risk of the substation is calculated as 
x — 16 x x (413) 
4.33 SingleJBnsCqnncct^w^^ 
This configuration SB-TL in Figure 4.4 is adapted from SB-SB by splitting the bus and 
adding a tie-breaker between the two buses. When any of breakers 1-4 get stuck, only two lines 
will be lost at most. Note we assume Bus-1 and Bus-2 will never have a fault (p,&=0), so it does 
not matter whether Breaker-5 gets stuck or not. The B-matrix representing the connectivity of 
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the four functional groups is shown in the right side of Figure 4.4. The functional group fault 
probability is calculated as from (4.15), assuming the failure probability of bus = 0. 
Pf5g-2' ff33-3' f ) 
PFG ~ ( PFG •> Pre ' PFG? PFC , ' PFC •> PFG) 
-(#;  f/» f/» P;» A» f /)  
D = = (4.16) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
BR-5 / Bus-1 Bus-2 
IS IB B = 
V Line-1 
FG-1 
"""'X iW} u"6"4 
^3 FG-4 
/I 0 0 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 0 1 
0 0 10 10 
0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 V 
Figure 4.4 Single bus connected with tie breaker and its B-matrix 
With D, jB, and known, the probabilities of all the stuck breaker contingencies can be 
calculated by 
= Dx^x^=^x(^„ 0)^ (4.17) 
The consequence of all stuck breaker contingencies is removal of all four lines, the 
is a row vector consisting of four 2's as in (4.18). The probability of having a fault plus stuck 
breaker contingency for the SB-TL substation is 
= (2, 2, 2, 2, 4) 
Then the risk of the substation is calculated as 
—Cfgg x = 8 x x (4.19) 
4j.4 ppubleBrcakerandDqu^ 
From Figure 4.5, there are a total of six functional groups and eight breakers, much more 
than all other types of substations. The ^-matrix representing the connectivity of the four 
\f5B-2» ) (4.18) 
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functional groups is shown in the right side of Figure 4.5. With this DB-DB configuration, 
any stuck breaker failure outages at most one line. The functional group fault probabilities are 
calculated from (4.21), assuming the failure probability of bus f y = 0. 
-FG?-
BfN BR-7 hBR-
BR-aJBR BR-1U BR-2 
B 
P6-6-
Bus-2 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
Figure 4.5 Double breaker and double bus and its 5-matrix 
PPSB - {P FSB-V P  FSB 21 P FSB-3 ' P FSB-4' P FSB-5 ' P FSB 6 ' P FSB 7 ' P FSB-S ) 
^FG = ( PFC ' PFG > PFG > PFG ' PFG •> PFG ) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
= (#,  A, f / ,  A, 0,  0) 
#  = = At,  At,  At) (4.22) 
With D, 5, Pfc known, the probabilities of all the stuck breaker contingencies can be 
calculated by 
— Z) x B x 
(4.23) 
— ^ (fy » Py Py» fy Py Py Py fy) 
Since the consequence of all stuck breaker contingencies is the removal of a line, the 
is a row vector consisting of four I's as in (4.24). The probability of having a fault plus stuck 
breaker contingency for DB-DB substation is fgg-r# Among all fault plus stuck 
breaker contingencies, none of them involves more than one line. 
Qg; Cf3_2, Cpgg_g, 4^-7' 
=(1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 
Then the risk of the substation is calculated as 
(4.24) 
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(4.25) 
4.3.5 Breaker and a Half R" s (R-TTR1 
From Figure 4.6, there are a total of six functional groups and six breakers. The B-matrix 
representing the connectivity of the four functional groups is shown in the right side of Figure 
4.6. With this B-HB configuration, any stuck breaker failure will outage at most two lines. 
The functional group fault probabilities are calculated from equation (4.10), assuming the 
failure probability of bus = 0. 
""FG-3-
gy&l. 
tine-21 
FG-i, 
$ FG-4 
y /Lhe-3 
tine-4 $_1 FG-5 
Bus-2 
g = 
^1  0  0  0  0  1  
1 1 0 0 0 0 
0  1 1 0  0  0  
0  0  1  1 0  0  
0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
Figure 4.6 Breaker and a half bus and its 5-matrix 
! FSB P FSB-4 ' 
\T 
(4.26) "  (  P FSB- ]  ' P FSB-2 ' P FSB-3 ' P FSB-4' 
^RC ~  (  P FC ' P FG > P FG > P FG ' P FG > P FG ) 
= (f„ A, 0,  P; ,  0/  
^  -  (At,  At» At,)  —(At,  At;  At» Pj»; At;  At) 
With D, Pfc known, the probabilities of all the stuck breaker contingencies can be 
calculated by 
(4.27) 
(4.28) 
^fS6 — Z) X ^ X 
(4.29) 
= At*(At,  ^At,  At,  At,  2p;t ,  At)  
The stuck of breaker 2 and breaker 5 will cause the removal of two lines while other 
breaker stuck will cause the outage of only one line. The probability of having a fault plus 
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stuck breaker contingency is ^f3g-,=72 xp,& Among all fault plus stuck breaker 
contingencies, only the stuck of breaker 2 or breaker 5 could involve more than one line. 
^FSB ~{CFSB-1' CFSB-2' CFSB-3' CFSB-4> CFSB-5' CFSB-6 ) ,, (4.30) 
= (1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 1) 
Then the risk of the substation is calculated as 
X = 12 X ^  x ^  (4.31) 
4J.6 Summary 
Table 4.1 gives a summary of the topological analysis results for the stuck breaker 
contingencies. Because the SB-SB configuration has a smaller probability of having a stuck 
breaker contingency (compared with ring bus) and higher consequences (compared with 
ring bus), the ring bus and the single bus single breaker configuration has the same 
That does not mean ring bus have no advantage. It hedges the risk of high-order 
contingencies by containing them to involving only two without adding more breakers, which 
is very expensive, although with the cost of more complex protection scheme. The SB-TL 
and DB-DB schemes have also the same risk index, but DB-DB uses eight breakers 
while SB-TL uses only 5. The advantage of DB-DB lies in the fact it considerably reduces 
the possibility of multiple contingencies. A fault and stuck breaker failure just cannot cause a 
contingency that trips more than one line. The B-BH scheme seems to have no advantage 
compared with SB-TL. It takes more breakers while has a higher risk than SB-TL. The 
probability of having N-2 is also the same as SB-TL, so there no improvement at all. 
One conclusion from this analysis is that increasing the number of breakers also increases 
the possibility of stuck breaker failure. Increasing the number of breakers does not 
necessarily results in improveed reliability. 
The analysis of typical substation schemes in this section is just a rough estimation and 
has many assumptions. We use a linear consequence measurement here. The consequence of 
an jV-2 contingency may be more than doubled to that of an JV-7 contingency. In practice, it is 
possible that an #-2 contingency means collapse of system, while an AW means no impact at 
all to a system. In addition, maintenance related benefits are not considered in this study, which 
may play a significant role in the design of substation. For example, although the B-HB does 
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not provide advantage in defending high-order contingencies, the operator does not need to 
outage any line when breakers need maintenance. 
Table 4.1 The probability and risk of high-order contingency for different substations 
Substation 
Type Risk 
Prob. 
(Fault plus 
Stuck 
breaker) 
Prob. 
(#-*, t=22) 
number of 
breakers 
Fault plus stuck breaker 
Contingency set* 
SB-SB 
4 FG; and FGS, FG2 and FGS. FG_, 
and FG5, FG4 and FG? 
The risk of this configuration is the highest. Although the probability of having 2 or more 
circuits out is not as high as the ring bus, once the event occurs, it will take out all the four 
out-going lines. 
Ring Bus 
4 FG7 (WFG2, FG2 aWFGJ, FG3 
and FG4. FG4 and FG1 
The probability of high-order events is the highest for the ring bus station. 
SB-TL 
5 
FG7 aWFGJ, FG2 ow/FGJ, fW 
and FG6, FG3 and FG6, FG4 and 
FG6 
This configuration has the same risk index as DB-DB, but it needs only five breakers, 
while the DB-DB needs eight. 
DB-DB 
0 8 
FG7 awfFGJ, oWFGJ, FGj 
andFG5, FG4 and FG5, FG1 and 
FG6, FG2 and FG6, FG3 and FG6, 
FG4 and FG6 
No doubt DB-DB is the most reliable configuration. Outage of any two circuits needs one 
line fault and two breaker failures, which is a probability order 3 event and whose 
probability is negligible compared with probability order 2. 
B-HB 
6 and FG4, FG4 and FG5. FG5 and 
This configuration is a compromise between DB-DB and Ring Bus configuration. 
4.4 Estimating the Risk of IEEE RTS-79 
We extend the conventional contingency list to include the following list: 
4- Functional group tripping 
Stuck breaker tripping 
* Only the contingencies that will take two lines completely out due to a breaker failure are considered here. For a contingency that involves 
one line only (and plus a bus fault), its risk is minimal and do not contribute much to calculation precision. We can let the algorithm screen 
these events easily. For a contingency that includes more than two functional units, the algorithm needed to be modified to go deeper. This 
is our future work. 
84 
"0- Inadvertent tripping 
The IEEE RTS96 is used because it was small and was therefore convenient for 
debugging, and because it was the only well-known test system we have that has full 
substation topology and component reliability data. 
4.4.1 Fault and Failure Probabilities of Power System Components 
Estimating the probability of higher order contingencies is the first of two steps to find 
their risk. This section will focus on probability calculation. The next section will address the 
consequence issue. We have formula in (3.5) to calculate the probability of functional group 
stuck breaker contingencies and (2.12) to estimate the possibility of additional inadvertent 
contingencies following an primary contingency. The difficulty lies in where to find the raw 
statistical data we need and how to process them into the data for the formula. 
The IEEE RTS-79 [49] and IEEE RTS-96 [50] provide detailed reliability model for each 
of the components of the 24-bus test system. Assuming the time interval between two fault 
events follows exponential distribution and the expectation of the time interval is Tin hours, 
then the probability that a fault event occurs within the next hour can be expressed as 
Pr(fWf) = Pr(T < 1 Aowr) = Pr(T ^ 1 Aowr) = = l-e"'^ 
In this discussion, we only consider the fault probability of lines, transformers, and bus 
bars. For example, line 8 has outage rate per year 0.44 and transformer 9 has 0.02, then their 
fault probabilities are 5.0227%10"^ and 2.2831 x 10"** respectively. The fault probability of 
bus section is 10 to 20 times lower than a line. In [50], a 138kv bus section has 0.027 faults 
per year and a 230kv bus section has 0.021 faults per year. Therefore, their fault probabilities 
for a one-hour period are 3.08219x10"^ and 2.39726x10"^ respectively. We assume the fault 
probability of load, generator, and breakers are zero. Their fault probabilities can always be 
incorporated in the components they connect. 
The IEEE RTS-79 [49] and IEEE RTS-96 [50] do not give data on the probability that a 
breaker fails to open after a fault. For probability of stuck break, we based our estimation on 
the information and method in [37]. We assume stuck-breaker is the only way a breaker fails. 
We use the information in [37] to estimate the per-demand failure rate of breakers. Reference 
[37] uses a detailed event tree to estimate the per-demand failure rate of two breakers 
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considering the relay. We adapted the event tree to calculate the failure probability of one 
breaker only as in [37]. We see the estimated per-demand breaker failure is 1 - 0.97384 = 
0.02616. 
3 
Oi 
o 
LU O È ® Q of ï â  I  
11 
•75° 
o <3> 
W8 
1 II 
PM=l 
P(B^) 
=0.99 
P(E/A,B,C,D) 
=0.9709384 
P(D/A, 
=0.981347 
= 0.98876 
< 
8,C) / 
113 / 
/ ^ 
P(Ec/A,B,CP) 
=0.001963 
C)=0.0074216 
|P(B /ft)=0.01 
Ppc/A,B)=0.001238 
=0.979384 
=0.001963 
=0.0074216 
=0.01238 
=0.01 
Figure 4.7 Event tree to calculate the per-demand failure probability of a breaker 
The probability of inadvertent tripping is based on our discussion in Section 2.4. We 
assume only the lines that are connected to the same functional group will suffer inadvertent 
tripping. This assumption is valid since inadvertent tripping generally occurs in the vicinity 
of the initial fault. From Section 2.4, we observe that the number of JV-2 contingency is about 
a tenth of the number of #-7 contingencies. Based on this observation, we assume that the 
probability of an inadvertent tripping is 0.1. For in IEEE-RTS 96, the number of branches in 
each substation is about 3. Suppose the branches in a substation are L-l, L-2, and L-3, then 
when branch L-l trips first, the probability L-2 (or L-3) trips later is 0.05, which is the half of 
0.1. Since the statistics also include stuck-breaker failure which we already accounted above 
as 0.02616. Then the rest will be caculated as 0.05 — 0.02616 = 0.02384. 
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4.4.2 Initial Contingency List Generation 
We run the algorithms in the last chapter to find the contingencies and calculate their 
probabilities at the same time. The results for this analysis are summarized in Table 4.2 to 
Table 4.6. The count & includes only lines, transformers, and generators. The functional 
groups identified by our algorithms may be easily verified from inspection of the topology 
data given in [50]. We removed a few redundant breakers (see the discussion part of [50]. In 
order to present a more practical scenario, we also did a sampling for all the generators, 
which resulted in the shut-down of G21, G23, G26, and G27. 
Table 4.2 Summary of functional group contingencies for 
IEEE RTS96 
k 0 1 2 
No. 50 63 4 
Table 4.3 Summary of functional group contingency 
probabilities for IEEE RTS96 
Prob/Hour 10W0' 10M05 
No! 32 85 
Table 4.4 Summary of fault/breaker failure contingencies for 
IEEE RTS96 
k 0 1 2 3 
No. 24 90 50 4 
Table 4.5 Summary of fault/breaker failure contingency 
probabilities for IEEE RTS96 
Prob/hour 105~10'6 10-7~10"6 
No. 94 74 
Table 4.6 Summary of inadvertent tripping contingency 
probabilities for IEEE RTS96 
Prob/hour 10<~10' lO^KT* 
No. 84 4 
4.4.3 Estimating the Load to Be Shed 
Since branch loading is a slow process and each line usually has its emergency rating in 
addition to its normal rating to allow overloaded for a short time period, a system operator 
has the time needed to perform redispatch so that the power flow of related line is adjusted to 
its nominal limit. Load-shedding happens only if it is impossible to bring the power flow in 
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each line back to its long-term rating using some other means. In order to simulate the action 
of system operator, we use the follow linear program problem to model what a system 
operator will do to avoid overloading. 
06/gcfrve : 
M'.-") ' (4.32) 
CoMJfrazMf : 
ze{l, 
ze{l, ...AT}, 
ze{l, ...^}, 
5 x^ = f^ '=(^-^),  
(Dg xX) x^-J^ =0 , 
Where 
JVg is the total number of load buses; 
TVg is the total number of branches; 
jVg is the total number of generating buses; 
is the load demand at bus z; 
or, is the price factor to shed one unit MPF load at bus z; 
is the total load (MPF) served at bus z; 
is the real power generation at bus z; 
is the maximum real power generation at bus z, it is the summation of 
rating of all generators connected to bus z; 
7^ is the real power flow in branch z; 
is the short term rating (MK4) of branch z; 
The served load at bus i should be less 
than the total demand P™ at bus z; 
Each generator generates between 
OMFto^; 
The power flow in each branch (line 
or transformer) is limited by its rating 
DC power flow equations; 
Branch flow equations; 
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% is the constant factor to account for the power factor of the power flow 
in branch z and 12 % i> 0; 
B is the T/x jV B-matrix used in DC power flow and # is the number of buses; 
is the M x # adjacency (or incidence) matrix 
Z)g is the MxM diagonal matrix where the ^ diagonal element is the 
admittance of the i* branch. 
0 is the # x 1 vector representing the voltage angles in radius at each bus; 
is the ATxl vector representing the net power injection for 
each bus, and its element 7? can be calculated by ^  = P - Z,. 
Not all the buses are both generator bus and load bus. It is observed that some buses are 
load bus only, some others are generation bus only, and some others may have no load or 
generator connected to them. If bus ; has no generator connected to it, then we let to be 
zero so that inequality >7^ 2 0 will force the generation at bus / to be zero. We do the 
same thing for those buses without load connected to them. 
In order to solve the above linear programming problem [60], we need to standardize the 
above inequalities and equalities so that we can use the standard LP subroutine in Matlab. 
We are going to take some time to elaborate our approach since we will use this approach 
again for our DET generating process later in this dissertation. 
We will change the object function and the constraint to the following standard format: 
Objective: 
max x 
Constraints: 
4, * = 
< x ^ «6 
We define 
-
V "O /(jVxl) 
P,  D2 
p 
V /(AW) 
0 = 
I 
V(#xi) 
(4.33) 
(4.34) 
(4.35) 
(4.36) 
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nmax _ 
G ~ 
pm ax 
pmax 
rD -
pmax 
"^2 
pmax. 
V ^ V(#xi) 
pmax _ 
V(MxI) 
; ^ = 71 (4.37) 
V^V(ATxl) 
pm m _ 
^0^ 
0 pmm 
» rD 
0 
V^/(#xl) v°y 
. pmin _ 
(Wxl) 
B, 
max 
6»™ = -K (4.38) 
'* /(Mxl) V ^V(Afxl) 
0 
vOy (/fxl) 
a. 
(Nxl) 
^0^ 
0 
V^V(Mxl) 
ciû — 
zox  
0 
\^/(JVxl) 
(4.39) 
= K Po ff  (4.40) 
/ = ( T T T T ccG OCd ceB 0Cg (4.41) 
where ^4 = 
/ -n x W ^ 
^MxM ^MxM (4.42) '0 0 
\TwxAf ^AfxAf ^ ^JVxJV V(M+^)x(Ar+Ar+jf+JV) 
where the submatrix v4, D and ^ inside ^ are what we have deGned at ±e beginning of 
this section, and 7 is the identity matrix. v4 , «6 and /6 are deGned as follows 
-
V^/(M+Ar)xl 
«6 = 
n max 
V* y 
/6 = 
f pmin 
pmin 
pmax 
ffm'n 
(4.43) 
After solving the LP to obtain a feasible solution for x, we get a new system profile that 
has no overloading problem. The total forced load shedding can be obtained through the 
following formula: 
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i  (c--v (4.44) 
We use a simple example to show our method. The following diagram shows a 2-
generator 3-bus system taken &om of [62]. For this system, we assume each load is of the 
same importance such that the cost to shed 1.0 p.u. of load is uniformly one. The fact device 
can adjust the flow on each line so that power flow factor for each line is 0.8, i.e. % = 0.8 for 
: = 1, 2, 3 . Since we need the adjacency matrix of the graphic representation of this system, 
which model the topology of the power system as a directed graph, we label each line with an 
arrow showing the reference direction of the active power flow in the line. There is not 
generator at BUS-2 and there is no load at BUS-1 and BUS-3. The constraints in the LP 
problem formulation will force the generation at BUS-2 and the load at BUS-1 and BUS-3 to 
be zero. 
BUS-1 B2 
DMAX2: 
B7 BUf-z 
(gH=3-Bi -O Line-l: X,=0.20PU, Rate-l=0.80PU 
B3 
Pgmaxi-I'OPU 
Line-3: 
X3=0.25PU 
Rate-3=0.30PU 
line-/: X2=U.WPU, KATEV=U.JUHU „ • " 
Pgmax3=0.60PU 
Figure 4.8 Example system for linear programming illustration 
Objective: 
max -x = 
(0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)x (4.45) 
Constraints: 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5.0 -5.0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2.5 0 -2.5 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 -4.0 4.0 
1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 7.5 -5.0 -2.5 
0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -5.0 9.0 —4.0 
0 0 1 0 0 -1 0 0 0 -2.5 -4.0 6.5 
P G1 
'G2 
Pr G 3 
' £>1  
4,3 
4l 
4.2 
4.3 
4 
e2 
\ ^ y 
= 0 (4.46) 
v 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-0.8x0.80 
-0.8x0.30 
-0.8x0.30 
-7t 
-n 
—n 
< 
y 
1G1 
' G 2 
1 G 3 
1 D2 
1 D3 
1 B\ 
1 3 2 
^^3 
e2 
v ^3 y 
< 
1.0 
0 
0.6 
0 
1.0 
0 
0.8x0.80 
0.8x0.30 
0.8x0.30 
Tt 
%" 
The solution for the above linear programming problem is listed in Table 4.7. 
Table 4.7 Solution for the sample LP problem in Figure 4.8 
(4.47) 
4, 4:2 4?3 42 p *D3 4i 42 4s q % % 
0.81 0 0.07 0 0.88 0 0.64 0.17 0.24 -0.065 0.063 0.0027 
Substitute the solution of the parameters in Table 4.7, we find the max load the system 
can serve is 88 MW (0.88 p.u ). 
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4.4.4 Risk Computation and Results Analysis 
This section gives the results of risk assessment of the IEEE RTS-96 system. We define 
three indices: a, /?, and y, which are deGned as follows: 
Z[/-(c;)xPr(c;)] 
a(<8
''
)= 
' lPr(Cf) <4'48> 
i 
which is the average impact of contingency type f, 
yg((5/)=^[r(c;)xpr(c;)]  (4.49) 
which is the expected impact from all contingencies in type f, and 
I[r(c;)xp,(c;)] 
y{a, t )  =—f  y (4.50) 
E{l[r(c; ) x p r(c;)]} 
which is percentage of the expected impact from all contingencies in type f among the total 
impact from all contingencies 
The symbols used in the above three formula are explained as follows: 
m is the system load level in percentage of annual peak, 
? means any of the three types of the contingencies, 
; is the contingency index, 
is the ^ contingency of type f, 
) means the MW impact of contingency when the system load level is 
and 
Prfc,' ) means the probability of contingency C'. 
Table 4.8 lists a comparison of the average impacts (in terms of load being shed) of the 
three categories of contingencies discussed in the last chapter. From Figure 4.9 we see that in 
generally a stuck break contingency has a much more severe impact than the contingency in 
the other two categories. A functional group tripping has the least average impact. This is 
expected because functional group trippings usually remove fewer components from a power 
system. In most cases, a stuck-breaker contingency causes at least two components to be 
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removed, and they could remove more than two components. That is why the stuck-breaker 
contingencies overall have a greater impact than that of the others. 
Table 4.8 Expected MW load shedding by contingency types 
(assuming contingency has already occur) 
Precontingency. Sys. 
load level of daily peak 
Functional Group 
tripping (MW) 
Stuck breaker 
tripping(MW) 
Inadvertent double 
Tripping(MW) 
35% 1.59 13.3 6.5 
40% 1.82 15.2 7.42 
45% 2.05 17.1 8.35 
50% 2.28 19 9.28 
55% 2.5 20.9 10.2 
60% 2.73 22.8 11.1 
65% 2.96 24.7 12.1 
70% 3.19 26.6 13 
75% 3.42 28.5 15.8 
80% 3.64 30.5 20.6 
85% 4.09 33.1 25.5 
90% 4.92 38 33.1 
95% 16.1 56.2 56 
100% 34.8 56.4 66.2 
Expected Sized of Contingencies (100M)) 
0.7 : ; 
FG Contingencies 
• SB Contingencies 
• IT Contingencies 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0. 1  
0 
40 50 60 70 
System Load Level In Terms of Annual Percentage (%) 
80 90 100 30 110 
Figure 4.9 Average MW load shedding by contingency types 
Table 4.9 lists the aggregate expected impact (in terms of load being shed) from the three 
categories of contingencies discussed. From Figure 4.10 we see that functional group 
trippings have the largest contribution for every system loading level. This is because 
although stuck breaker contingencies and inadvertent trippings are usually much more severe 
than the functional group trippings, their probabilities are significantly lower. Therefore, the 
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majority of the load shedding is due to functional group contingencies. As the system load 
increases, all the contingencies are expected to cause more load shedding. 
Table 4.9 The Expected MW load shedding by contingency types 
Precontingency. Sys. 
load level of daily peak 
Expected MW load 
shedding for all 
Functional Group 
tripping (MW) 
Stuck breaker 
tripping(MW) 
Inadvertent double 
Tripping(MW) 
35 6.68E-05 3.04E-05 2.57E-05 1.07E-05 
40 7.64E-05 3.48E-05 2.94E-05 1.22E-05 
45 8.59E-05 3.91E-05 3.31E-05 1.37E-05 
50 9.54E-05 4.35E-05 3.68E-05 1.52E-05 
55 1.05E-04 4.78E-05 4.04E-05 1.67E-05 
60 1.15E-04 5.22E-05 4.41E-05 1.83E-05 
65 1.24E-04 5.65E-05 4.78E-05 1.98E-05 
70 1.34E-04 6.09E-05 5.15E-05 2.13E-05 
75 1.46E-04 6.52E-05 5.51E-05 2.58E-05 
80 1.62E-04 6.96E-05 5.89E-05 3.39E-05 
85 1.84E-04 7.80E-05 6.40E-05 4.19E-05 
90 2.22E-04 9.40E-05 7.34E-05 5.43E-05 
95 5.08E-04 3.07E-04 1.09E-04 9.19E-05 
100 8.82E-04 6.65E-04 1.09E-04 1.09E-04 
Expected LoadSheding (MW) 
0.08 
• Expected System Loadshedding 
• Expected LS Due to FG Contingencies 
• Expected LS Due to SB Contingencies 
• Expected LS Due to IT Contingencies 
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 
System Load Level In Terms of Annual Percentage(%) 
Figure 4.10 Expected MW load shedding by contingency types 
Table 4.10 lists the MW impact contribution in terms of share in percentage for each of 
the three categories of contingencies discussed. From Figure 4.9 we see that functional group 
tripping causes lion's share for all the system load levels. An interesting observation from the 
figure is that when the system is approaching peak load, the stuck breaker and inadvertent 
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tripping contingencies play much lesser roles than that of the functional group contingencies, 
even through the absolute MW impacts for all the contingencies categories are increasing. 
Table 4.10 Expected contribution in percentage of total load shedding 
Load Level 
(%) 
Functional Group Trip 
m 
Fault + Stuck Breaker Trip 
(%) 
Inadvertent T ripping 
(%) 
35 45.54% 38.51% 15.94% 
40 45.54% 38.51% 15.94% 
45 45.54% 38.51% 15.94% 
50 45.54% 38.51% 15.94% 
55 45.54% 38.51% 15.95% 
60 45.54% 38.51% 15.94% 
65 45.54% 38.51% 15.94% 
70 45.54% 38.51% 15.95% 
75 44.61% 37.72% 17.67% 
80 42.85% 36.29% 20.86% 
85 42.42% 34.80% 22.78% 
90 42.39% 33.11% 24.51% 
95 60.52% 21.38% 18.10% 
100 75.34% 12.36% 12.30% 
LoadSheding For 3 Contingency Types ( % 
80 
Contingencies 
SB Contingencies 
IT Contingencies 
100 110 
System Load Level In Terms of Annual Percentage{%) 
Figure 4.11 Percentage load shedding by contingency types 
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CHAPTER 5 OPERATIONAL DEFENSE OF CASCADING 
SEQUENCES 
Power system operators are as stressed as the systems they operate. In many parts of 
North America, control center personnel are highly aware that their systems are more 
frequently at risk to the consequences of unexpected contingencies. As a result, there is an 
increasing need to provide operators with enhanced on-line information regarding system 
security levels, what influences these levels, and what actions should be taken or not in order 
to most economically achieve a improved level. In this chapter, we aim to address one aspect 
of this issue though anticipatory and real-time computing. The focus of this chapter is to 
address cascading events from an operating perspective. Major cascading events that lead to 
widespread blackouts summarized in Table 1.1 are usually caused a variety of reasons. The 
system conditions are typically characterized by heavy load, reactive power deficit, 
weakened transmission system, or unfavorable network flow patterns, when either an or 
contingency occurs. Operators in the control center usually feel uncertain when system 
condition makes a cascading event likely. Operators are pretty clear that a system cascading 
is much more likely under the condition they face, but the state-of-art technology do not 
provide them with a readily decision support when system begins cascading. Except for 
certain important contingencies, what they have is a set of general rules rather a set of 
contingency-specific solutions. On-line contingency-specific decisions are usually the task of 
system protection scheme (SPS). Usually it is designed for a limited number of important 
cases. Since the decision stored in SPS is predetermined, it responds much faster than 
operator. Yet cascading that eventually leads to large-scale system collapse often starts from 
small minor contingencies. If these trivial events are not handled in a short time, they tend to 
spread throughout the system within a few hours. 
Analysis of the reports on the blackouts in Table 1.1 indicates that they may be roughly 
classified as either fast (less than 3 minutes) or slow, and if slow, they always involve a 
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cascading sequence. It is the slow types that we have targeted in the work reported in this 
dissertation. There are four typical stages of such cascading sequences. 
4- Initiating contingency. 
Steady-state progression (slow succession); 
- System becomes stressed with heavy loading on lines, transformers, and 
generator; 
- Successive events occur, typically the trip of other components with 
fairly large inter-event time intervals. 
4- Transient progression (fast succession); 
- System goes under-frequency and/or under-voltage; 
- Large number of components begin tripping quickly. 
Uncontrolled islanding and blackout. 
An important attribute of the events in stage 2 is that they are almost always dependent 
events in that their occurrence depends on the occurrence of one or more earlier events. It is 
recognized that the probability of occurrence of successive events increases dramatically 
following the occurrence of a contingency. The time interval between an initiating event and 
successive events varies greatly. For example, the time between a fault and an inadvertent 
relay trip can be less than a second. However, if a fault followed by line clearing causes line 
overload and/or generator over-excitation, subsequent tripping may follow minutes or even 
hours later. The time interval may be long enough for an operator to initiate actions to 
mitigate the undesirable trend. 
A primary goal of power system engineers is to reduce the frequency and mitigate the 
severity of blackouts. Accomplishing this requires innovations in planning, maintenance, and 
operations. The focus of this paper is to address cascading events from an operating 
perspective. Operating approaches include relieving the system via generation redispatch or 
load curtailment in a preventive mode, adapting the protection and control as a function of 
the operating conditions before occurrence of an event, or responding rapidly just after a 
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potential cascading begins to unfold. We find the third approach most attractive, as it requires 
no action, and therefore no cost, unless and until it is needed. In addition, it represents the last 
line of defense; if rapid response actions are not available or if they are not properly chosen 
or if they fail to occur, then the cascading and its consequences proceed without interruption 
or mitigation. We give this approach the name response fo WM/ô&Ang even# (RRUE), 
and identify it is a generalization of today's system protection scheme (SPS). The difference 
is in terms of flexibility and action initiation. SPS utilize pre-set fixed logic, responding to a 
limited set of conditions with a limited number of possible actions, while RRUE utilizes a 
high level of logic intelligence and, ideally, is capable of responding to all conditions with a 
wide range of possible actions. The action of SPS is initiated automatically by hardware, but 
the actions of RRUE may also be initiated by an operator. Yet, a major challenge for 
implementing RRUE is speed; it must recognize the possible existence of an unfolding event, 
analyze it, identify possible actions, select one, and communicate the actuation commands to 
the appropriate equipment, all within a time frame of minutes, an information-intensive 
decision problem requiring fast computation. We describe an approach to facilitate this in 
Section m. Section IV illustrates the approach, and Section V concludes. 
5.1 Dynamic Event Tree 
We desire to enable identification and implementation of actions following the initiating 
contingency. The philosophy behind our approach is to prepare and revise. This philosophy 
manifests itself in technology that we call a dynamic event tree (DET) [63], an extension of 
the more familiar "event tree" to be found in the reliability literature. Event trees are 
horizontally built treelike structures that model initiating events as the roots. Each path from 
root to end nodes of an event tree represents a sequence or scenario with associated 
consequence. With a large amount of information uncertain, it hard to precisely predict a 
cascading blackout because an occurrence of such cascading is just one path among a huge 
amount of possible paths in an event tree that start from root to the top of the tree. 
The DET idea is in part inspired from the work reported in [63] where the authors 
provide results of applying long-term simulation for verifying the effectiveness of different 
decisions under islanding conditions. It is extended from ideas [65][66] in the probabilistic 
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risk assessment (PRA) community, which largely emanates from the nuclear power industry. 
It is similar to the event tree, except for two fundamental differences. First, it includes 
decision nodes where it is effective and possible to take actions that avoid or mitigate event 
consequences. Second, it is dynamic; it grows according to a set of branching ruleg, and the 
tree structure, branch probabilities, consequence values, and decisions are updated as 
necessary to reflect changes in the physical network. This means that the growth and 
updating processes occur continuously with as much computing power as is available. In 
addition, trees can be stored. Therefore, when an JV-t contingency begins to unfold, the 
amount of available information can be large, and the speed with which the action is taken is 
limited only by the efficiency of the search necessary to find the appropriate tree and the 
location on the tree corresponding to the particular situation at hand. 
The paper [63] presents a comparison of results of applying long-term simulation 
program to verifying the effectiveness of different decision when system islanding happens. 
We find the process can be precisely represented in an event tree structure as in Figure 5.1. 
Our idea is that we could extend this process to what we called dynamic decision tree for 
operational purpose. 
Load-
Frequency 
control 
Load 
Shedding 
No Load 
Shedding 
Tie lines not 
ripped No load-
Frequency 
control 
A ten-cycle three 
phase short-circuit at 
an important plant 
Tie lines Tripped 
Because of loss-of-
synchronism relay 
One machine in Area 
A tripped because of 
overspeed 
Another one tripped 
because of 
undervoltage 
Figure 5.1 A dynamic event tree representation of SPS design 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the idea, where the system avoids a collapse after two timely actions 
are taken. The sequence of events comprising the Figure 5.3 simulation is captured using the 
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simple DET of Figure 5.3. The DET edges represent events, including initiating and 
successive events of cascading sequences, power system behaviors, and actions necessary to 
mitigate undesirable consequences and avoid blackouts. For example, the initiating event in 
Figure 5.3 is a fault with stuck breaker resulting in loss of three components. This event is 
represented in Figure 5.3 by Branch CI. Branch B2 represents a fast voltage collapse, and 
Branch B3 represents the actions of under load tap changing transformers in the network. B1 
is a null event, which means no action is taken. Branch A1 is an action taken to arrest the fast 
voltage collapse, and Branch A2 is an action taken to block the transformer tap changes and 
avoid the slow voltage collapse. 
1.0 
Bus voltage Action-l: 
insert shunt cap 
TA/WN 
Action-2: 
block LTCs 
n a n  Cjm 
10 sec 5 m in 
Conthgency-1: 
Fault +N-3 
outage from 
stuck breaker 
Behavtor-2: 
Fast voltage collapse 
due to lack of 
reactive power 
Behavtor-3: 
Slow voltage 
collapse due to 
LTC action 
Behavior-Is 
System is normal. Everything is within limit. 
Figure 5.2 Illustration of halting voltage collapse by dynamic event tree 
B1 
Figure 5.3 A dynamic event tree illustration 
These events do not necessarily happen at one time instant. Usually they are associated 
with a continuous time interval. For example, the voltage collapse event B2 in Figure 5.3 is 
actually a continuous changing process rather than an abrupt occurrence; the contingency 
event CI in Figure 5.3 is not the fault/stuck tripping only, rather, it is the tripping plus the 
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behavior of the system that defines the event CI. Thus, each branch in the DET corresponds 
to one or a sequence of events. 
The nodes in an event tree correspond to system states represented by the large black dot 
37-7 in Figure 5.3. As an event tree is a discrete structure whereas power system condition 
must be characterized by both discrete and continuous variables, we must discretize system 
states so that the number of nodes in an event tree is limited. We therefore introduce the 
concept aef q/egwfva/gMf gfofes (SES). An SES is a set of system states that respond the same 
(equivalent) way to a specified event Therefore, an SES may only be defined in relation to 
an event. So each node in DET is not a single power system state; rather it is an SES to the 
branches (events) that follow. 
5.2 Dynamic Event Tree Construction 
Generating a DET occurs via the procedure illustrated in Figure 5.4. We provide a brief 
description of each of the main elements illustrated in this figure. 
Load Forecast: 
> Near Term Day 
Ahead Load 
Forecast 
Weather Elements 
> Lightning 
> Precipitation 
> Wind 
> Temperature 
EMS Information: 
> System component 
parameters 
> System topology 
> Protection logic & settings 
Day Ahead System 
Configuration 
Schedule 
> Lines 
>• Transformers 
> Loads 
> Shunts 
> Generators 
y Breaker 
y Switches 
DET Engine Functions 
)- System state (power flow solution, breaker -
switch status data, and network topology) 
> Initiating event identifier and probability 
estimator 
> System state discretizer 
> Successive event identified 
> Action identifier 
> Simulator 
Figure 5.4 Dynamic event tree generation procedure 
Figure 5.5 illustrates an ideal dynamic event tree with each contingency event followed by a 
single action branch to correct the problem caused by the contingency. The algorithm follows 
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illustrated the procedure to produce a DET in Figure 5.5 for each discretized system states for 
a 24-hour period. Figure 5.5 for illustration is for illustration purpose only, in practice, the 
subtree starting from any primary contingency may be as irregular as the one illustrated in 
Figure 5.2, or may have no further development at all. The algorithm for irregular DETs will 
be covered in detail Subsection 5.4.2. 
C : confinggMcy even/ 
A : action event 
AM# 
Superscript : the depth index in event tree 
.Fu&ycnpf : fAe w%6A imier in gvenf free 
Figure 5.5 A simplified ideal dynamic event tree 
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6) ggngrofg confirnggncy Zwf fCl, ={C,, Q, C,j _/br 7^ Ay 
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z/zc/w^es fAg gvg/if y4, and fAg respo/zsg qf sysfg/M Agfwgg» 
aw/ S'y 
7 7) 7oqp2 gnak 
7&) savg DfTj 
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20) g«(7 qf/4 /gorzfAm 
The final DET for a 24-hour time frame from the algorithm will be like Figure 5.6. the 
{72,, Tf],--, 7(„} are discretized SES (define in Section 5.1) of system states. From each state, 
the algorithm generates a DET for that operating condition. For illustration purpose, the DET 
for each 7f, looks similar in Figure 5.6, but they are actually quite different from each other. 
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For example, the primary contingency list is based on the predicted operating condition and 
predicted topology information at that time. They change with time. From the graph in step 2) 
of the algorithm, we may see that each Tf, actually covers a time interval within the 24-hour 
period. The time intervals are not necessary equal to each other. In Subsection 5.2.3, we will 
discuss this and provide one criteria and the algorithm to divide the trajectory of system 
operating condition into discrete states. It is import for the reader to know that this does not 
mean that the maximum time each individual DET covers is constraint by this time interval. 
Each 7%, just provides a starting point for DET. How much time the DET should extend is 
solely depend on the need and computation capacity. It is quite possible that a single DET 
extends more than 2 hours. This time frame is in accordance with our observation of many 
cascading events. If we treat as nodes in an event tree and branch (transition 
path) between these nodes as null event, then the whole structure in Figure 5.6 becomes a 
grand DET that is applicable to the whole 24-hour time framework. 
84] 
[S2 
Figure 5.6 A grand DET for one day time frame 
5.2.1 Day-Ahead Forecasting System 
The day-ahead forecasting system performs two functions: a) forecast next day 
component on/off status according to generation and maintenance schedule; b) forecast next 
day load/generation profile. These forecasts are made assuming that there are no unintended 
events. The function of this element is to predict the future status and levels of key variables 
affecting the physical performance of the power system. These variables may be discrete, as 
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in the case of circuit or generator up or down status, or they may be continuous, as in the case 
of load and generation level. 
One of the inputs to this functionality includes day-ahead weather forecast. Weather 
forecast information is also used to update contingency probability within the DET engine. 
For example, the tripping probability of a line may increase due to die expected presence of 
lightning or hot weather. Reference [67] provides an interesting discussion on calculating the 
probability of transmission line sagging. 
5.2.2 Initiating Contingency Selection 
The breadth and depth of a DET is guided via intelligent initiating contingency selection 
and tree growth rules. A set of initiating contingencies is selected based on the approach 
outlined in Chapter 3 resulting in a contingency list comprised of the N-l and N-k initiating 
contingencies having probabilities greater than a user-specified threshold. It is intended that 
the probability level is chosen so that the initiating contingency list is much larger than 
contingency lists used for security assessment in most control centers today. We have 
designed an algorithm to process switch-breaker data (as used in most EMS topology 
processing functions) to identify contingencies, and their probabilities as a Amotion of 
substation topology, protection failures, and common mode events in Chapter 3. These 
contingencies constitute the first tier of branches for the DET. 
Once a set of contingencies is selected, it is necessary to arrange their processing order 
according to one of three tree-growth rules. The probability-based rule orders the 
contingencies in decreasing probability. The severity-based rule orders the contingencies in 
decreasing severity. The risk-based rule orders the contingencies in decreasing risk, where 
risk is the product of event probability and event severity, a rule that attempts to find a 
balance between the probability- and severity-based rules. The risk-based rule is most 
attractive; however, it (and the severity-based rule) suffers from the fact that severity is 
unknown until the contingency is analyzed. Thus, preliminary severity estimation is needed 
for each contingency. The number of components outaged in the initiating contingency (& in 
"M-&") is such a measure. Although it is rough, it enjoys the benefit of being available with 
no additional simulation. 
106 
Successive event modeling is challenging. At one extreme, we could implement the 
initiating contingency procedure for each node in the DET, resulting in an event list for each 
of the nodes. Such an approach would require estimation of successive event probabilities as 
the computation proceeds. We have implemented the simplest form of this approach where it 
is assumed that, following (and excluding) the initiating event, all equipment operates as 
designed with probability 1.0, and events associated with unexpected operation (e.g., breaker 
inadvertent operation) have probability 0. Although this approach eliminates modeling of 
protection failures as successive events, it does not eliminate modeling of protection failures 
since they may be included in the initiating event 
5.2.3 Discretize Continuous State 
A change in network configuration due to, for example, loss of a component, results in a 
clearly defined new state and is therefore a precisely identified event and corresponding DET 
branch. Small changes in operating conditions normally need no special treatment, yet 
accumulation of small changes can build up until it is necessary to treat the change as an 
event or a state transition. In establishing a basis for doing this, we observe that an action that 
mitigates a cascading sequence initiated from one operating condition may also mitigate that 
cascading sequence initiated from a similar operating condition. Thus, we desire to lump all 
such operating conditions into a discrete state. The easiest way to discretize operating 
condition is to divide, for example, the next 24 hour period into equal intervals and assume 
that each operating condition within each time interval is an SES. Figure 5.7 shows the 
hourly system load change in one typical winter weekday [49]. As we see from the figure, the 
load increase between 5:00am to 6:00am is almost 15 percent. Any contingency analysis 
results we obtain for the power system condition at the beginning of the hour (5:00am) would 
not be applicable at the end of that hour (6:00am). The solution to this problem is to use iso-
variance time intervals, where the system experiences the same amount of total load variance 
for each time interval. The right of Figure 5.7 illustrates the results of discretizing operating 
condition by iso-variance for a typical weekday loading cycle on the left. The right of Figure 
5.8 shows the results of discretizing operating condition by iso-variance for a typical 
weekend loading cycle on the left. 
107 
This is just an example to discretize power system operating conditions efficiently. It may 
be combined with other considerations. For example, we may need to assign more root states 
for afternoon hours to reflect the fact that a power system is at its peak load and cascading 
are more likely to happen for this time. 
System Load In Percent Of Daily Peak 
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Figure 5.7 Discretize operating condition by 24 equal time intervals and by equal load variance 
(weekday) 
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Figure 5.8 Discretize operating condition by 24 equal time intervals and by equal load variance 
(weekend day) 
5.2.4 Simulator 
A time domain simulator is the preferred analysis tool for developing DETs. However, it 
must be specialized to perform extended-term (several hours) of simulation quickly. This 
means it must model both fast and slow dynamics and be capable of lengthening time steps 
when fast dynamics are inactive. In addition, it must have the necessary intelligence to 
recognize when failure conditions are encountered, retrieve earlier conditions, and determine 
appropriate actions; it must also have modeling capability for a wide range of protection 
devices. Finally, in order to combine it with contingency identification and apply it online, it 
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should be able to integrate with system real time topology information seamlessly. A 
prototype simulator was developed for this work with these characteristics, with appropriate 
models of generator excitation systems, speed-governing systems, and automatic generation 
control. The simulator will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.2.5 Action Selector 
The decision set includes any operational procedures that are available, e.g., generator 
redispatch, load shedding, shunt capacitor insertion, generation rejection, HVDC ramping, 
etc. Of these, unit redispatch and/or load shedding are almost universally effective (although 
not always optimally so) in mitigating deteriorating conditions, and so we have elected to 
design into our simulator an algorithm for identifying these type of actions in Chapter 6; we 
have not yet designed algorithms for identifying other types of actions. We use the linear 
programming formulation in Section 4.4 to find the action necessary to back off any line 
loading exceeding a specified threshold. The objective is to maximize load with a constraint 
that prevents loading from exceeding actual demand, so that the actions identified utilize unit 
redispatch first and then load interruption to accomplish what unit redispatch cannot. 
5.3 Tree Storage and Updating 
A DET is a rich container of information about the power system when the system resides 
in a state corresponding to the DET root node. We store DETs for possible later use. The 
DET storage bin contains many trees. Each DET is indexed according to conditions that 
indicate whether the DET is applicable to a given state. These "DET indexing conditions" are 
loading trajectory, network configuration, and weather conditions and forecast. It is possible 
to find a tree having indexing conditions that are very similar to the existing power system 
conditions but not exactly the same. In this case, one may quickly update the tree using 
approximate methods rather than generate a new one. Such DET updating occurs to the 
probability values, the severities, or the selected actions. 
5.4 Algorithm and Programming for DET Engine 
The core of DET generating process is a time domain simulator. Our analysis requires it 
to be capable of doing: 
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* TfopW /ong-ferm sf7Mw/af%oM: It must be capable of performing rapid long-term time 
domain simulation; 
* Tqpo/ogy Processor 
o JExfracf Fb/foge 6ws 
o fxfrocf Fi/nef (orna/ Growp 
* SAorf ferm jfysfem CoM(/;fioM Forecosfor 
We use the term 'system condition fbrcastor'(SCF) rather than 'system load 
fbrecastor'(SLF) because we see SLF as part of SCF. In addition to load information, any 
other scheduled operation regarding a power system is also included in SCF. 
* .Dynamic fine rafmg 
* ProfecfioM mode/s: It must be capable of modeling influences that contribute to 
cascading events; minimally, this would include an extensive suite of protection 
system models. 
* Dzscfgfize Qperofmg Co/K&fzon 
We are not aware of any commercial tool today that has these capabilities, although the 
Eurostag program, developed by Electricite de France (EDF), comes closest in that it seems 
to satisfy the above with its adaptive step size and its extensive modeling ability. 
Using such a tool, one can design actions to be taken to appropriately detect, analyze, and 
identify mitigating actions for a possible cascading event in Figure 4.1. The implementation 
of DET is a matter of automating this process. 
That means we need to do more than design a simulator. Our concept of DET is not 
simply a simulator. It is a contingency generator and decision maker (in the sense that it 
automatically chooses actions and simulation its effectiveness) as well. It is apparent that, 
once constructed, the DET would then contain the intelligence to mitigate the particular 
contingency referred to in Figure 4.1 as event 1. 
We expect to have prototype of DET generation implemented on a small-scale test 
system. 
5.4.1 Dynamics Simulation 
According to [67], long-term dynamic simulation should model the following protection 
and control devices: 
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Generator and excitation system protection and controls 
4- Electrical network protection and controls 
4- Prime mover/energy supply system protection and control 
We currently are designing programs to model the first two parts. In addition, we also 
plan to model the slow dynamics of load variation. 
5.4.2 Template DET an H Àmnmhous DET 
The idea of recursive programming is that a function calls itself repeatedly until some 
condition is reached, e.g., event probability becomes small, or stack memory is used up. To 
the program, each node in DET is just a network status like other nodes (including the initial 
node), with a known past and uncertain future. If we consider DET as a directed graph, i.e., a 
node can reach another node only through a one-way path and only from left to right, then 
the known past is simply the path from root node to current node and the uncertain future is 
the subtree the current node spawns. Every node is equal in the sense that the program code 
designed to generate the next node is the same for each node. The procedure may be like this: 
ybmcfzo/z GenerafeDTiT (SfqpAfgcAarzzsTM, CwrrerzfAafe, 7%for%) 
afep 7. if AopAfec/zanzsm i? reac/ze<# refwm, 
sfgp 2. c/zec& cwrre/zf /power rysfe/M jfafe aW z6 rece/zf /zzsfo/y, f&erz generate a /«f 
of eveMfsfco/zfzMggMcy or acfzorz); 
sfep j \^r eac/z evenf zm f/ze W, rw» GefzerafeDjET. 
StopMechanism just provides a stopping mechanism for the generation process. Indices 
such as MaxDepth, MaxConsequence, or MinProbability may be used. 
Note function GenerateDET calls itself in step 3. 
5.4.3 Use of Computing Resources 
DET computing is done continuously. However, a key problem is to identify what DET 
computing to do at each moment. We desire to optimize the "readiness" for a given time 
frame. Readiness can be thought of as the ratio of two quantities that reflect: the cumulative 
probability of all situations for which we are prepared and know how to respond, and the 
cumulative probability of all possible situations that can occur, which is 1. State variables for 
this problem are existing trees and corresponding DET indexing conditions. Decision 
variables are task allocation for each CPU, where it is possible for CPUs to either contribute 
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towards growing a new tree or contribute towards updating an existing tree. Constraints on 
this problem are computing resources and available time. 
The algorithm to generate a DET for a large-scale power system is computationally 
intensive. Suppose the maximum number of nodes that result from any initiating contingency 
is bounded by m and the maximum time needed to generate the sub-tree is 7^,, which is 
reasonable given that we can control the depth and width of the sub-tree from any initiating 
contingency. If the number of initiating contingencies to be simulated is C(7V), then the total 
time spent on generating a DET is bounded by C(7V)% 7^,. Better algorithms, parallel 
processing, or faster machines and other emerging new technologies can be employed to 
minimize 7L For example, the analog simulator [78][79] provides a promising simulation 
tool reported to be 10* times faster than the conventional digital computer. 
5.5 Using a DET 
The state of readiness for existing and near future conditions is maximized by the 
availability of a DET corresponding to those conditions. Once a contingency occurs, the 
operator is immediately shown the corresponding tree of events and recommended actions, 
which includes the time intervals between different events and between events and actions, 
giving the operator the benefit of viewing the future for different alternatives that are 
available. The operator may then actuate or prepare to actuate one or more actions, 
depending on how far down the tree the decision node is from the node corresponding to the 
current conditions. 
The DET also serves as an efficient preparatory tool operators may use during their shift 
to study the variety of contingency scenarios and recommended actions for those scenarios. 
Studying the appropriate DET provides insight into how to respond to the various 
contingencies that might happen under conditions that exist or that are expected in the near 
future. It could be expected the operators who have spent a significant time studying DETs 
on their system for various conditions would develop a unique familiarity with how their 
system responds under severe contingencies and with the typical actions necessary to avoid 
or mitigate resulting consequences. 
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5.6 Discussion 
We propose a generalization of the SPS intended for providing rapid response to 
unfolding events (RRUE), especially focusing on dependent events that would otherwise 
result in severe consequences. The basic philosophy underlying the approach, to continuously 
prepare, revise, and store assessment results and decision-making, provides that response-
time following a first event is mainly limited by search-time. A key technology facilitating 
the approach is the dynamic-decision-event tree (DET), which has application in analyzing 
the reliability and risk of nuclear power plant. DET provides the ability to adapt decision 
logic to conditions as they evolve, in contrast to pre-fixed, static logic usually implemented 
in today's SPS. 
Simulation model 
complexity 
Event with probability order 1 
(e.g. Functional Group 
Tripping) 
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Events with probability order 2 
(e.g. stuck breaker, protection 
malfunction after disturbance ) 
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order higher than 2 
» Initiating event 
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Figure 5 .9 Complexity of DET in three dimensions 
(terms of Initial event set, decision set, and simulation algorithm) 
Whether the DET approach is feasible or not to real-time operational decision depends on 
the state of the art computing technology and resources, the algorithm carefully. DET is an 
open structure. All types of power system contingencies and decisions can be incorporated. 
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However the set of all contingencies and decision is either unaccountably unlimited while our 
computing and storage are always limited. The process of generating DET has three 
dimensions of choices: 
1) Dimension One: Initiating contingency set 
2) Dimension Two: Simulation algorithm 
3) Dimension Three: Decision set 
as shown in Figure 5.9. 
5.6.1 DET and SPS 
To some extend, DET may be regarded as an agent that designs system protection scheme 
(SPS) online. In idea case, the computer replaces the role of human to make SPS online. 
However, except this time frame difference, there are several other important differences 
between DET and SPS. 
The actions of SPS are predetermined once it is in operation. It cannot change the scheme 
by itself without the interference of operator. The actions DET takes are more flexible; it may 
provide different choices to the operator according to different condition. 
SPS are often designed to act after a rare contingency occurs, however DET considers a 
full list jV-7 contingencies as well as some more likely high-order contingencies. 
SPS, by definition [2], only takes corrective action, that is, SPS only takes action after a 
contingency or abnormal condition occurs. DET provides preventive action as well as 
corrective actions. 
5.6.2 DET and Contingencies List Method 
Although contingency list method seems an efficient way to use computation resources, it 
does not mean that it can effectively prevent cascading events. Many systems require that a 
single contingency should not be able to render the system in a state of stability, load 
shedding or undervoltage. To verify if this operational rule is satisfied, it is not necessary to 
do simulation for all the contingencies online. With contingency list method, operator 
can do simulation only for those contingencies that ranks high in the list. Once a violation is 
found, it is necessary to take corrective action to bring the system to a stronger state. 
A close look at the large events [4] may find that none of them is initiated by the 
contingency that rank highest and they are initiated either by multiply contingencies or by 
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fault on a line that is not most important. Many secondary contingencies are also involved. 
This observation suggests that we need to do more than only study the most important 
contingencies. Two things that essential to DET but not to contingencies list method are 
4- DET simulates all JV-7 contingencies plus a limited number of high-order 
contingencies. 
4- DET can do time domain simulation to study the trend of a power system online 
so that many possible secondary contingencies can be identified. 
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CHAPTER 6 DYNAMICS EVENT TREE ON A TEST 
SYSTEM 
In this chapter, we are going to test the DET concept with a small but complete test 
system. As we point out in the Section 5.6 of the last chapter, DET is very flexible and 
configurable in terms of computational complexity. In this chapter, we choose one of the 
most complex way to track the power system status - long-term time domain simulation. 
We use the slow dynamic simulation program we developed for this specific purpose. It 
starts from the basic topology information in EMS database and formulate the DAE 
equation automatically. The initiating contingency sets include the same three categories we 
mentioned in Section 0 of Chapter 3 and Section 5.6 of Chapter 5. The available decision set 
is all feasible combinations of feasible generation and load. The objective is to maximize the 
total amount of load being served. We use the same approach we illustrated in Section 4.4 of 
Chapter 4. 
6.1 Description of the Test System 
This test system is a small non-trivial system with 6 generators, 21 buses, 21 lines, 9 
transformers (including generator step-up transformers), and 3 tie lines. We developed this 
test system 6om the test system of [69]. We doubled the size of the system joining two 
identical copies of the test system with three tie lines (L301, L302, and L401) and three 
transformers (T301, T302, and T401). We also designed substation for each bus. For each 
generation plant, we use one and a half breaker substation configuration; for load bus, we 
use ring bus configuration. We like to point out that our simulation program does not 
include the traditional concept of "BUS" rather, it read in breaker bus-section (sometimes it 
is called bus bar) diagram of the system. The program processes the topology of system 
diagram and finds the buses via a search. In this section, we test DET on a small test system, 
since there are not many published test systems that include subsystem one-line breaker 
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diagram together with system dynamic parameters. The only test system identified is IEEE 
RTS 96 system among the published system with one line breaker diagram, but we do not 
have the detailed dynamic parameters of the generators and control device for this system. 
We use the test system in [62] as the basis for our DET test system. We designed the 
substations for this system and doubled its size by adding an identical system below the 
original system as shown in the APPENDIX B of this work. We denote the two subsystems 
as upper area and lower area. We also add four tie lines (and four transformers) to connect 
the upper and lower area. To create the tie line flow, we scale down all the loads in upper 
area by a factor of 0.8 and scale up all the loads in lower area by a factor of 1.2 so that there 
is a 20% percent of total load (630MW) flow on the tie lines. The generation configuration 
remains unchanged. In summary, there are 22 buses, 6 generators, 6 load, 40 lines (including 
4 tie lines), 6 step-up transformers, 4 tie line transformers, and 128 breakers. 
6.1.1 List of Test System Components and Parameters 
APPENDIX B gives the one-line diagram of the test system. All the bus sections and 
breakers have a unique number identification. The DET simulation engine uses this 
information to process the topology of the test system. APPENDIX C gives the parameters 
of generators, lines, breakers, transformers, and loads. 
6.1.2 Control Devices 
A. Exciter Model 
We use a simple PI controller for generator terminal-voltage control. The block diagram 
of the governor is shown below in Figure 6 .1. 
+ 
© 
E 
f 
Figure 6.1 Governor block diagram of test system 
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B. Governor Model 
The governors are all modeled as a speed integrator with droop ratio if as in Figure 6.2. 
7c* is the time constant for hydro-mechanically server, which is modeled as a inertia link. 
The output of the governor is 7, which is the mechanical power input to electric machine. 
is the output of AGC, which is illustrated in Figure 6.3. As shown in Figure 6.3, it is 
actually summation of the gate reference and the AGC adjustment signal. Note we 
assume every generator participates in the global frequency adjustment. 
®r 
Figure 6.2 Exciter block diagram of test system 
C. AGC Model 
Figure 6.3 illustrates the AGC model we are using. The aim of the AGC is to regulate 
system frequency to . Any deviation from this value will be sensed by the AGC. The 
inverse of the time constant in each of the integrators in Figure 6.3 is proportional to the size 
of the unit, for which the output signal intended. This way a larger generator contributes 
more to frequency regulating and a smaller generator less. 
7&i 
sT 
sT, 
Figure 6.3 AGC block diagram of test system 
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D. Over-excitation Limiter Model 
We use the summed-type over-excitation limiter (OEL) model [70]. The regulating part 
of the OEL is a pure integrator. It simulates the heat build-up in the exciter. A wind-up 
limiter [67] is added to the integrator to limit the output of OEL to exciter. The direct output 
of OEL is not limited because it is a reflection of winding temperature rather than a concrete 
element that has a physical limit. 
y, 
1 / ^OEL + EXCITER Ef GEN 
+ Soumit 
/ ( D ' 
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Figure 6.4 Over-exciter limiter block diagram of test sytstem 
6.2 Formulation of Dynamic Algebraic Equations 
The set of differential equations is as follows 
% 
00) 
a 
6E' 
= 0 — 1 
tj 
gf 
6AE 
= [£DF-£,+(Z,-Z;)/,]/r;0 
-[i'-i'.l/rc. 
° X x (a , r -a , )  +  R(L^-SJT, )] / :  
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(6.1) 
(6.2) 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
(6.5) 
(6.6) 
(6.7) 
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In the above equations, these equations are for all the generations including the exciter, 
governor and AGC models. The notation for exciter, governor, and AGC are the same as we 
showed in Figure 6 .1-3. For generators, the meanings of the notation are the same as what is 
in [69]. The limiter for each variable is implemented as logic in program and is not shown in 
the above equations. The program checks all the variable limits for each integration step and 
correct them if necessary. We use the two-axial model [69] for generator dynamics. 
The set of algebraic equations are as follows, where ; means the generator and y 
means the/* generator bus. 
c r' F/O 9 
— + WJ WJ = 0 (6.8) 
for each generator; 
cos#% 
sin#% 
for each generator bus; 
/yA A 
vF/y 
-sin#' 
cos#' 
v: = o (6.9) 
f l t \  cos#% -sin#' A 
sin#% cos#' 
for each generator bus; 
v^y 
= 0 (6.10) 
X 
K 4 
V; K KJ 
= 0 (6.11) 
for the whole linear impedance network with « voltage bus ( is the system admittance matrix ); 
^'1 
(c  
Uy 
= 0 (6.12) 
for each load bus with constant P and Q. The loads in our test system are modeled as constant active and 
reactive power injection. 
Equations (6.8) to (6.10) are for each individual generator. Equations (6.11) and (6.12) 
are for the whole network and each voltage bus respectively. 
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6 J Description of Integration Method Used 
The long-term dynamic simulation program has been of great interest nowadays. This is 
partly due to the increase in speed of computer, which has made the long-term simulation of 
large-scale system possible within the acceptable time scale. Another reason is that the 
response of a power system to disturbances is not only decided by fast dynamics of its 
machines, it is also decided by the action of slow processes, such as tap changers and load 
dynamics. These slow dynamics may not cause an immediate problem after a disturbance; 
rather they often cause voltage problems and/or thermal loading problems after an extended 
period. The last, but not the least reason is the availability of sophisticated integration 
algorithms which made large simulation time steps possible. Some commercial programs 
such as EURO STAG, GE Exstab, and TSAT have successfully implemented the so-call "A-
stable" implicit integration program [71]. 
There are two ways to categorize integration algorithms: single-step / multi-step and 
explicit/implicit. The single step method does not use the solution information in the 
previous steps for the solution of the next step, although it may divide the current single step 
into several small intervals to improve the solution precision, as what is done in Runge-
Kutta. Multi-step methods use the prior solution information, which includes the derivative 
of the state variables as well as the state variables themselves. The advantage of multi-step 
methods lie in the fact that they are faster compared with single step methods to get the 
same solution precision. However, some report [72] indicates that the performance of 
Runge-Kutta methods is more attractive than that of others in tough conditions like 
discontinuity. For explicit methods, the next step calculation uses only the solution 
information known; implicit methods, on the contrary, use the unknown solution 
information of next-step(s). Iterative methods, such as Newton method in power flow 
solutions is needed to solve the implicit non-linear equation for implicit method. The most 
attractive feature of implicit methods lies in the fact they allow very large time steps (as 
large as 20 seconds in EXSTAB [74] and 10 seconds in EUROSTAG [71]) without losing 
numerical stability. 
GE's EXSTAB is based on the f&efa mef&ocf, which is similar to trapezoidal rule but 
gives better performance [74]. EUROSTAG is based on mixed ADAMS-BDF method [71]. 
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Both the theta method and ADAMS-BDF method are which means that if the 
system poles (eigenvalue of the linearized dynamic system) are all located on the left half 
the complex plane, these method are always numerically stable regardless the size of time 
step. 
For the testing program, we use "Theta method" because it does not have the infamous 
AaMzfy problem [71], which means that an algorithm falsely reports stability when 
the physical system is actually unstable. A general power system dynamic algebraic 
equation (DAE) groups for equations in (6.1) through (6.12) can be summarized as 
^ = (613) 
0 = g(jc,y) (6.14) 
where 
x is a vector of state variables in (6.1)~(6.7) 
(6.13) is the group of equations in (6.1)^(6.7) 
y is a vector of the variables in (6.8)-(6.12) excluding those in x 
(6.14) is the group of equations in (6.8)^(6.12) 
The theta method for the DAE in (6.13) and (6.14) can be expressed as 
=z»+A, [(1 -  #) ]  (615) 
Discretize (6.13) and (6.14) using Theta-method, we find 
- A&c» ] - (1 - #) V ( %,+„ A+i ) = 0 (6.16) 
g(z»+i,X,+,) = 0 (6.17) 
Note in (6.16) and (6.17), only %„+/ and are unknown variables and the rest are all 
known. The DAE equations now are transformed into a set of purely algebraic equations, 
which can be approach by the established Newton-Raphson method efficiently. We choose 0 
= 4.7 for our program, as suggested in [74]. 
We are not going to discuss our simulation algorithm further. Readers interested in this 
topic may refer [71]-[75] for further information. 
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6.4 Validation of the Dynamic Simulation Tool 
We test our DET dynamic simulation engine on the Ontario Hydro 4 bus test system (see 
Appendix A for details of the system). Since our program builds network model directly 
from EMS's one-line substation in addition to an initial converged power flow case, we 
added 18 breakers to the test system so that all the lines, generators, load and shunt can be 
isolated by opening the associated breakers. Other parameters of the system stay unchanged. 
Before fault, the statuses of generators are listed in Table 6.1. Since we model all the 
loads in the system as constant impedance, these initial generator parameters are sufficient 
to decide all other variables like bus voltages and line flows. The exciter model we use is a 
standard ETMSP Type 30. The scenario we simulated is a 3-phase ground fault at bus 5. 
The fault was cleared by itself after 0.01 second without any breaker operation. We use the 
ETMSP application as a benchmark to our program. 
Table 6.1 Initial status of generator for Ontario test system 
No V-abs V-angle P Q 
1 1.03 2.928 790 77.57608 
2 1.01 -7.906 790 188.01250 
3 1.03 0,6634 690 69.85064 
4 1.01 -8.78658 740 85.26508 
ref 
'FD 
E 2 
= 200 7^ =0.01 T,=0.01 7^, =10 7^=0.1 
Figure 6.5 ETMSP type 30 exciter for Ontario hydro 4-generator system 
The simulation results from the ETMSP application and our DET dynamic simulation 
engine are presented in Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.7 respectively. The two figures are almost 
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identical. The minimal différences are probably introduced by different algorithm the two 
programs use. The ETMSP application uses fixed step Runge-Kutta algorithm [76] for 
integral while the DET engine uses step-variable implicit integration algorithm [72] [74]. 
G«mRWOu*ut ETMSPSMUL*nON RESULTS 
8.1 
7.9 
77 
7:5 
7.1 
6.9 
6.7 
65 
2 3 5 6 7 8 O 1 
Figure 6.6 Response of generator after a temporary fault at bus section 5 (ETMSP) 
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Figure 6.7 Response of generator after a temporary fault at bus section 5 (DET engine) 
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6.5 DET Generation 
The test simulation uses the current system topology to generate an extended 
contingency list as the first tier of event nodes. An iterative programming technique and an 
LP optimizer are then employed to build a DET for each contingency as illustrated in Figure 
6.8. The branches Bl, B3, and B5 represent the initial contingencies, the system 
reconfiguration, and the emergency loading respectively, The branches B2 and B4 represent 
the "do-nothing" decisions. The nodes (^,'s) in Figure 6.8 represent the status/trajectory of 
the system after/before the actions (B/s) are applied to the system. 
6.5.1 Test Scenario 
We studied the possible cascading for a one-hour time interval during which the load 
ramped 20% from 900 seconds to 2700 seconds for a scenario where the system is in a 
weakened condition due to the outage of a tie line. Line loadings are monitored, and the 
most effective redispatch & load curtailment actions are identified for overloaded lines. 
Initial contingency 
(N-l or N-k) 
First corrective action 
(Redisptach) 
Secondary corrective 
action (Load-shedding) 
N/A System status Normal/Abnormal 
Figure 6.8 Dynamic event tree template for DET test system 
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Figure 6.9 System load ramp curve of DET test scenario 
6.5.2 Contingency Event Branch 
We generated a comprehensive list of initiating contingencies for the selected scenario, 
as summarized in Table 6.2. We are not going to elaborate how and why we generated these 
contingencies since they are accounted for in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The count in "JV-
includes components that are open-ended as well as those that are completely 
disconnected from the system. There are 12 #-0 contingencies that do not result in losing 
any components; these are bus faults at substations with breaker-and-a-half protection 
design. Since we are going to do dynamic simulation (both long-term and transient in one 
application), we assume faults are cleared without any delay. These do not compromise our 
analysis since a close examination of all the NERC's record [4] of major power system 
disturbances find an initiating fault never causes the immediate collapse of a system; rather 
it is usually the slow stead state progress of system that causes serious problem. 
Table 6.2 Identified contingency summary for test system 
Contingency Category N-0 N-l N-2 N-3 N-4 N-5 N-6 total 
Functional Group Removal 
(line fault, bus fault, etc.) 12 48 6 0 0 0 0 66 
fault plus stuck breaker 0 49 63 3 1 0 0 116 
Inadvertent Tripping 
(Simultaneous loss of two branches ) 0 0 114 89 15 2 2 222 
Total 12 97 183 92 16 2 2 404 
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6.5 J Decision Event Branch Set and Decision Identification 
The decision set is the combination of all the redispatches of all the available generators 
and load curtailment, if it is necessary. We assume any of the available generators can 
generate between zero MW to its maximum output. 
We use linear programming optimization to find the primary redispatch to back off any 
line loading that exceeds a specified threshold. The linear programming problem is defined 
the same way we illustrate in Section 4.4.3 of Chapter 4. It is solved only whenever it is 
necessary, i.e., the flow on a line exceeds a defined percent its emergency loading. After we 
find the primary redispatch, we set the governor setting of each generator according to the 
redispatch and simulate the response of system to check if the redispatch is effective. Since 
the system total load increases between 900s and 2700s, decisions that are effective for now 
may fail after loading increases to certain level. In that case, we apply the secondary 
decision straightforward: direct loading shedding, i.e. shed any increased load(s) that cause 
new problem. 
6.6 Results Analysis 
The result of the DET engine computations for this scenario is a large repository of 
information that includes contingency specification, the response curves of all key variables 
for that contingency, and necessary actions. Of the 404 contingencies we analyzed, 10 
resulted in fast (within 1 minute) instability and 394 of them resulted in stable, but 
unacceptable performance. Our implementation of the DET engine does not generate a 
corrective action for cases resulting in instability within 1 minute since this is not enough 
time to implement operator-initiated actions. Of the other 394 contingencies, all of them 
resulted in overloading problems that were corrected by proper generator and load 
reconfiguration as identified by our optimization approach. 
Figure 6.10 illustrates a representative contingency via the one-hour trajectory of power 
flow on each line after the loss of the largest generator (G-101) in the upper area, which 
serves as Bl, the initial contingency in the template DET in Figure 6.8. We see that line 
L401 is the most loaded line for the entire system. Figure 6.10 shows the time domain 
simulation results of the flow on Line L401 with and without the first and second actions 
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(B3 and B5 in Figure 6.8) applied. The effectiveness of the first redispatch only holds until 
time 1100s. After that, load increase causes the flow on that line to exceed 100% again. To 
prevent further loading, an emergency load-shedding scheme is identified and executed to 
prevent circuit loadings from exceeding their ratings. The initiating contingency and system 
trajectory with and without actions, as shown in Figure 6.8, are mapped to the DET 
branches and nodes shown in Figure 6.8. 
Since the DET engine has the capability of slow dynamic simulation, we can also 
observe the voltage variation in the test system. We find that, even though the DET engine 
for the test system is designed to solve the overload problems only, the action taken by the 
DET engine solves the voltage problems as well. Of the 394 stable, but unacceptable 
contingencies, 29 exhibited low voltages in the southern part of the system that were 
corrected by either the first (redispatch) or second (load interruption) actions taken. 
Table 6.3 Voltage problem summary by identified 
contingency for test system 
Contingency Collapse No Voltage Corrected by Corrected by 
Type immediately Problem first action second action 
FG 0 65 0 1 
SB 0 114 0 2 
IT 10 186 16 10 
Figure 6.11 illustrates a representative contingency, resulting in overloading and low 
voltage, via the flow on the most severely overloaded line after loss of lines LI06 followed 
by the inadvertent tripping of LI 16. Figure 12 shows the voltage of the most severely 
depressed bus following the same contingency. The contingency, decisions, and system 
behaviors of Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.13 are mapped to the branches and nodes of the DET 
in Figure 6.8. The voltage collapses after 1800 seconds (point E in Figure 6.13) if the 
operator does not take any action. Following the system reconfiguration (a redispatch) at 1 
minute (point A in Figure 6.13), the system behaves well until point D, where a low voltage 
problem shows up. If the secondary action at point B is applied, the system will avoid both 
the overloading and the voltage problems. 
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Figure 6.10 Branch loading after lost of the largest generator 
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Figure 6.11 Line flow response after the lost of the largest generator 
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Figure 6.13 Voltage response after the lost of the largest generator 
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CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Contributions of the Dissertation 
This work is the first to propose the use of c/wsfer probability model to predict the long-
term tendency of cascading in power systems. The proposed model explains the distribution 
of existing observed statistics very well. It is also the first to propose the use of the affinity 
index to evaluate the likelihood of multiple contingencies in power systems. The model is 
compared again the frequently discussed Power Law model. We find the cluster model is 
superior to Power Law model. This model can also give the conditional probability of next 
transmission outage given the number of lines already lost. 
A systematic way is proposed to identify power system initiating contingencies (including 
higher-order) for operational use in the third and fourth chapters of this dissertation. It is the 
first to use B-matrix to represent the connective of functional groups (also call protection 
control groups). It is the first to give the formula in matrix form to evaluate the probabilities 
of fault plus stuck breaker contingencies. The work extends the conventional contingency list 
by including a subset of high-order contingencies, which is identified through topology 
processing. 
This work is the first to propose the use of dynamic event tree as an operational defense 
plan to cascading events in power systems. The DET can provide guidance for system 
operator to respond rapidly to the high-risk contingencies. The idea significantly 
improves the readiness of system operators to possible cascadings. 
We tested our DET concept on a small system, which proved the effectiveness of DET as 
a decision support tool for control room operator. The DET engine we designed is seamlessly 
integrated with system real time information such as topology and maintenance scheduling. 
Whenever the DET engine sees an overloading problem, it can suspend the on-going 
dynamic simulation process and does a static optimization (linear programming) to search for 
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the redispatch to relieve the overloading. The contribution of this work can be summarized as 
the following bullets 
4- Propose a new and more accurate probability model for higher-order 
contingencies compared with Power Law model; 
-4» Propose a systematic approach to strategically select contingencies using 
system real-time topology information; 
V The method to selection contingency provides algorithm to calculate event 
probability as well; 
Designed a long-term dynamic simulation tool that 
- Integrates with system topology data in EMS and 
- Performs static optimization in a search for operator decision; 
Proposed the use of the dynamic event tree (DET) to model and store possible 
cascading sequences; 
The DET combined with the higher-order contingency selection provides 
operators with guidance and decision support in regard to high-order 
contingencies. 
7.2 Discussion and Future Work 
This dissertation addresses the rare events of power systems comprehensively. It 
proposes new model to explain the propagation of cascading events, investigated the original 
of huge black-out, and most important proposes a possible solution to cascading events. Most 
of this work was completed well before the August 14 of 2003, when the northeastern part of 
United States was stuck by the largest blackout in history. The US blackout was followed by 
a sequence of similar events in four European countries: Sweden, Denmark, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom within a few months. These rare events remain latent as if they will never 
happen. The general public tends to be dumb when huge blackouts do not happen for a long 
time. When they happen, people feel alarmed and tend to overact. Actually, it is 
inappropriate to compare these rare events (or so-called catastrophic events) to nature 
disasters such as strong earthquakes and prehistoric biological distinctions. Unlike the natural 
systems such the earth and animal fauna, power systems are completely man-made. If 
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engineers can design power systems from scratch, they should be able to prevent those 
cascading events caused by the internal defect in power systems. 
In recent years, we see much advancement in power system analysis and other 
monitoring tools, however there has been a delay in their application in online security 
assessment and decision-making. It is possible that some of the recent events could have been 
avoided if some more advanced techniques were available [8]. 
I summarized below my past and future work in case I have a chance to extend my work 
or other peoples are interested in continuing my work. 
Task 1 : Concept of rare event system and its application in evaluating the 
probability of power system contingencies (completed) 
V Task 2: Developing a general probability model for rare events in power systems 
(completed) 
-4» Task 3: Find the possible application of our ideal probability models for rare event 
prevention (not done yet) 
Task 4: Developing the algorithm for identification of topology related 
contingencies (completed) 
Task 5: Implementing the algorithm to identify topology related contingencies 
(completed) 
Task 6: Developing the concept of dynamic event tree (completed) 
V Task 7: Developing algorithms for the generation of DET (partially completed) 
Task 8: Developing viable scheme for the application of DET in power system 
control center, (not done yet) 
APPENDIX A ONTARIO HYDRO 4-GENERATOR SYSTEM 
AREA 1 / AREA 2 
LOAD-14- ! 4 LOAD-2 
Figure A.l Ontario hydro 4-generator system with test substation added 
Table A. 1 Bus sections and breaker connection data 
BKNo. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
FR-BS 1 1 16 8 2 18 5 5 5 20 11 6 6 22 4 4 24 3 
TO-BS 7 15 2 2 17 5 9 10 19 6 6 12 21 4 13 23 3 14 
Table A.2 Load and shunt data 
No. BS No. G(p.u.) B(p.u.) 
1 9 15.5684 -1.0103 
2 12 13.9426 -0.9966 
3 10 0 2.235 
4 11 0 2.58 
Table A.3 Line data 
No r X B FR-BS TO-BS 
1 0.0025 0.025 0 15 16 
2 0.001 0.01 0 17 18 
3 0.022 0.22 0 19 20 
4 0.001 0.01 0 21 22 
5 0.0025 0.025 0 23 24 
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Table A.4 Generator data 
Name L-1 L-2 L-3 U-1 
No 1 2 3 4 
Bus Section 7 8 14 13 
D 45 45 45 45 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
X, 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 
X, N/A N/A N/A N/A 
K N/A N/A N/A N/A 
K N/A N/A N/A N/A 
K N/A N/A N/A N/A 
K N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Tdo 8 8 8 8 
Ko 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
£ 8 8 8 8 
c 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
H 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 
T, 58.5 58.5 58.5 58.5 
R 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 
mBase 100 100 100 100 
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APPENDIX B ONE-LINE DIAGRAM OF DET TEST SYSTEM 
6.302 
L103 
L1Q2 
LOADxOl 
T401 BUS-401 
LOAD1Q2 
(G10lHK©— 
L207 
L2Î1 G202 
SUS-202 
LOÂD2Q3 
BUS-201 
Figure B. 1 One line diagram of a DET test system 
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APPENDIX C DET TEST SYSTEM PARAMETERS 
Table C.l Bus section and breaker data 
No fb to name No fb to name No fb to name No fb to name 
1 2 3 BUS-7 33 46 51 BUS-5 67 18 65 BUS-8 131 127 121 BUS-9 
2 2 4 8US-7 34 51 50 BUS-5 68 66 67 BUS-8 132 122 127 BUS-9 
3 5 3 BUS-7 35 50 49 BUS-5 101 102 103 BUS-7 133 146 151 BUS-5 
4 5 6 BUS-7 36 49 48 BUS-5 102 102 104 BUS-7 134 151 150 BUS-5 
5 6 4 BUS-7 37 46 62 BUS-5 103 105 103 BUS-7 135 150 149 BUS-5 
6 7 3 BUS-7 38 53 47 BUS-5 104 105 106 BUS-7 136 149 148 BUS-5 
7 8 7 BUS-7 39 47 48 BUS-5 105 106 104 BUS-7 137 146 153 BUS-5 
8 8 4 BUS-7 40 37 35 BUS-4 106 107 103 BUS-7 138 153 147 BUS-5 
9 9 3 BUS-7 41 37 38 BUS-4 107 108 107 BUS-7 139 147 148 BUS-5 
10 9 10 BUS-7 42 38 36 BUS-4 108 108 104 BUS-7 140 137 135 BUS-4 
11 10 4 BUS-7 43 39 35 BUS-4 109 109 103 BUS-7 141 137 138 BUS-4 
12 3 11 BUS-7 44 39 40 BUS-4 110 109 110 BUS-7 142 138 136 BUS-4 
13 11 12 BUS-7 45 40 36 BUS-4 111 110 104 BUS-7 143 139 135 BUS-4 
14 12 4 BUS-7 46 41 35 BUS-4 112 103 111 BUS-7 144 139 140 BUS-4 
15 13 14 BUS-8 47 42 41 BUS-4 113 111 112 BUS-7 145 140 136 BUS-4 
16 14 15 BUS-8 48 42 36 BUS-4 114 112 104 BUS-7 146 141 135 BUS-4 
17 15 16 BUS-8 49 43 35 BUS-4 115 113 114 BUS-8 147 142 141 BUS-4 
18 16 17 BUS-8 50 43 36 BUS-4 116 114 115 BUS-8 148 142 136 BUS-4 
19 13 18 BUS-8 51 44 35 BUS-4 117 115 116 BUS-8 149 143 135 BUS-4 
20 65 54 BUS-8 52 45 44 BUS-4 118 116 117 BUS-8 150 143 136 BUS-4 
21 17 54 BUS-8 53 45 36 BUS-4 119 113 118 BUS-8 151 144 135 BUS-4 
22 20 21 BUS-9 54 34 29 BUS-6 120 118 154 BUS-8 152 145 144 BUS-4 
23 20 19 BUS-9 55 34 33 BUS-6 121 117 154 BUS-8 153 145 136 BUS-4 
24 19 22 BUS-9 56 33 55 BUS-6 122 120 121 BUS-9 154 134 129 BUS-6 
25 21 23 BUS-9 57 29 30 BUS-6 123 120 119 BUS-9 155 134 133 BUS-6 
26 23 24 BUS-9 58 55 56 BUS-6 124 119 122 BUS-9 156 133 155 BUS-6 
27 24 22 BUS-9 59 31 32 BUS-6 125 121 123 BUS-9 157 129 130 BUS-6 
28 25 21 BUS-9 60 30 31 BUS-6 126 123 124 BUS-9 158 155 132 BUS-6 
29 25 26 BUS-9 61 56 32 BUS-6 127 124 122 BUS-9 159 131 132 BUS-6 
30 26 22 BUS-9 62 57 58 BUS-6 128 125 121 BUS-9 160 130 131 BUS-6 
31 27 21 BUS-9 65 53 62 BUS-5 129 125 126 BUS-9 -
32 22 27 BUS-9 66 63 64 BUS-5 130 126 122 BUS-9 -
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Table C.2 Generator parameters 
Name L-1 L-2 L-3 U-1 U-2 U-3 
No 1 2 3 101 102 103 
Bus Section 52 1 28 152 101 128 
D 10 10 10 10 10 10 
0.14 0.89 1.31 0.14 0.89 1.31 
0.09 0.86 1.25 0.09 0.86 1.25 
x, 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.07 
K 0.06 0.11 0.18 0.06 0.11 0.18 
K 0.09 0.02 0.25 0.09 0.02 0.25 
K 0.02 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.2 
K 0.02 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.2 0.2 
Tdo 8.96 6 5.89 8.96 6 5.89 
K. 0.01 0.535 0.6 0.01 0.535 0.6 
Tl 0.01 0.535 0.6 0.01 0.535 0.6 
K, 0.01 0.535 0.6 0.01 0.535 0.6 
H 23.64 6.4 3.01 23.64 6.4 3.01 
P 0 0 0 0 0 0 
248 163 109 248 163 109 
Table C.3 Transformer parameters 
Name No FR-BS TO-BS r X ratio rating 
G001-STEPUP 1 43 52 0 0.0576 1 500 
G002-5TEPUP 2 1 2 0 0.0625 1 500 
G003-STEPUP 3 27 28 0 0.0586 1 500 
G101-STEPUP 101 143 152 0 0.0576 1 500 
G102-STEPUP 102 101 102 0 0.0625 1 500 
G103-STEPUP 103 127 128 0 0.0586 1 500 
TAP-1 4 56 57 0.001 0.04 1 500 
TAP-2 6 62 63 0.001 0.04 1 500 
TAP-3 7 65 66 0.001 0.04 1 500 
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Table C.4 Line parameters for the test system 
No NAME F-BUS T-BUS R X B RATING 
1 L1 42 33 0.051 0.276 0.052667 20.87184 
2 L2 41 34 0.051 0 276 0.052667 20.87184 
3 L3 39 29 0.051 0.276 0.052667 20.87184 
4 14 53 8 0.096 0.483 0.102 40.60418 
5 L5 47 7 0.096 0.483 0.102 40.60418 
6 L6 48 9 0.096 0.483 0.102 40.60418 
7 L7 11 14 0.0255 0.216 0.049667 45.35213 
8 L8 12 15 0.0255 0.216 0.049667 45.35213 
9 L9 10 16 0.0255 0.216 0.049667 45.35213 
10 L10 13 20 0.0357 0.3024 0.069667 13.94768 
11 L11 18 19 0.0357 0.3024 0.069667 13.94768 
12 L12 54 24 0.0357 0.3024 0.069667 13.94768 
13 L13 30 23 0.117 0.51 0.119333 30.69879 
14 L14 31 25 0.117 0.51 0.119333 30.69879 
15 L15 32 26 0.117 051 0.119333 30.69879 
16 L16 40 51 0.03 0.255 0.058667 17.41327 
17 L17 38 50 0.03 0.255 0.058667 17.41327 
18 L18 37 49 0.03 0.255 0.058667 17.41327 
101 L101 142 133 0.051 0.276 0.052667 11.33927 
102 L102 141 134 0.051 0.276 0.052667 11.33927 
103 L103 139 129 0.051 0.276 0.052667 11.33927 
104 L104 153 108 0.096 0.483 0.102 33.05252 
105 L105 147 107 0.096 0.483 0.102 33.05252 
106 L106 148 109 0.096 0.483 0.102 33.05252 
107 L107 111 114 0.0255 0.216 0.049667 25.35086 
108 L108 112 115 0.0255 0.216 0.049667 25.35086 
109 1109 110 116 0.0255 0.216 0.049667 25.35086 
110 1110 113 120 0.0357 0.3024 0.069667 17.55411 
111 L111 118 119 0.0357 0.3024 0.069667 17.55411 
112 L112 154 124 0.0357 0.3024 0.069667 17.55411 
113 L113 130 123 0.117 0.51 0.119333 27.22736 
114 L114 131 125 0.117 0.51 0.119333 27.22736 
115 L115 132 126 0.117 0.51 0.119333 27.22736 
116 L116 140 151 0.03 0.255 0.058667 20.55661 
117 L117 138 150 003 0.255 0.058667 20.55661 
118 L118 137 149 0.03 0.255 0.058667 20.55661 
301 L301 105 64 0.03 0.16 0.05 127.4453 
302 L302 106 67 0.03 0.16 0.05 29.50849 
401 L401 144 58 0.03 0.16 0.05 40.93759 
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Table C.5 Load data 
BUS NAME BS-No P(MW) P(MVAR) 
1 UPPER-1 46 125 50 
2 UPPER-2 55 90 30 
3 UPPER-3 17 100 35 
101 LOWER-1 146 125 50 
102 LOWER-2 155 90 30 
103 LOWER-3 117 100 35 
Figure D.l IEEE RTS-24 bus test system substation diagram 
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